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Violence and Crime in Nicaragua

A Country Profile

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PREFACE

The Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) conducted an evaluation of a cluster of citizen security projects. This cluster evaluation modality is a new product for the office. In this particular cluster evaluation, the focus is on the implementation effectiveness of these citizen security projects. The main objective was to identify what factors explained the implementation performance of the projects, and what lessons could be learned from these experiences. As part of this evaluation, specific inputs were prepared. One of these inputs is a series of diagnostics of the dynamics of crime and violence in the countries where the projects were implemented. This Background Paper presents the results of one of these diagnostics as well as from additional exercises, for Nicaragua.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Santiago Ramirez, Research Fellow at OVE, prepared this background paper, with guidance from Chloe Fevre and Yuri Soares, co-team leaders of the evaluation.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This background paper is part of an in depth comparative evaluation of citizen security projects financed by the IDB in four countries in Central America (Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama and Jamaica). Country profiles were elaborated for each country with the objective to better understand the specificity of the context in which citizen security projects were prepared and implemented. Violence and crime are indeed highly context-based, and so must be their solutions. Understanding the socio-economic, historical and political environment indeed allows analyzing margins and manoeuver and constraints, and in the context of this evaluation, assessing the relevance of Bank's financed interventions.

Following the introduction, the country profile begins with an overview of the Nicaraguan context in terms of geography, demographics, economy, as well as recent political history (section II). It then builds a diagnostic that covers different forms of violence and crime (section III) as well as main risk and protective factors (section IV), based on available statistics and specialized international and local literature. In section V, the paper reviews the strategy adopted by the Government throughout the last decade to respond to main forms of violence and crime, and in section V, it describes the budget allocation to citizen security over recent years. Finally, section VI presents the IDB citizen security project part of the comparative evaluation, and summarizes various exercises that OVE undertook to provide additional background information and analysis.

II. THE NICARGUAN CONTEXT

A. Geography and demographics

Nicaragua occupies 24 percent of the territory in Central America, the largest portion than any other country in the region (UNDP, 2011). It borders with Costa Rica to the South, Honduras to the North, the Caribbean Sea to the East and the Pacific Ocean to the West (INETER, 2000).[1] By 2011, Nicaragua also had the fourth largest share of the region's population, with 5,869,859 inhabitants (13.6 percent), after Guatemala (34.1 percent), Honduras (17.9 percent) and El Salvador (14.4 percent). According to the most recent population census (2005), the population of Nicaragua was made up of 49 percent men and 51 percent women, and there were 11 self-reported ethnic groups, of which the *miskito* and the *mestizo from the Caribbean* held the two

[1] The country's physical geography divides it into three major zones: the Pacific Lowlands, the Central Highlands and the Caribbean Lowlands.

largest shares (27.2 percent and 25.3 percent, respectively).[2] Most of the *mestizo* population is located in the western part of the country, while the majority of the *black* and *amerindian* populations are found in the eastern, more rural areas in the North and South Atlantic Autonomous Regions, respectively (INIDE, 2006).[3] More generally, the country's population is unevenly distributed between the east and west parts of the territory. The North and South Atlantic Autonomous Regions, which cover almost the entire eastern Caribbean coast[4], occupy around 50 percent of the land territory in the country, yet by 2005 their population density was the lowest among all departments, with 11.2 and 9.5 persons per squared kilometer, respectively.[5] By contrast, that same year only the department of Managua to the west had a population density of 364.5 persons per squared kilometer. The country's administrative division comprises 15 departments and 2 autonomous regions, all of which are divided into a total of 153 municipalities.[6]

B. Main socio-economic indicators relevant to violence and crime

In 2011, Nicaragua was the second smallest economy in the region in terms of real GDP (6.1 percent of the Central American economy) after Belize's (0.9 percent), and the poorest in terms of real GDP per capita (US $2,579- 2005 PPP-) (WDI, 2012). The country is ranked as a Lower Middle Income country by the World Bank, and although it exceeded growth expectations in 2011 (4.7 percent), IMF (2012) stated that "boosting growth to reduce widespread poverty remains Nicaragua's key challenge" (IMF, 2012, p.4).[7] Nicaragua's growth has been driven by consumption and investment on the demand side and by construction and manufacturing on the supply side (IMF, 2012). Although its current account deficit widened from 2010 to 2011 as a result of rising oil prices and increased imports, sizable FDI inflows and assistance from

[2] The other self-reported ethnic groups were Chorotega-Nahua-Mange (10.4 percent), Xiu-Sutiava (4.5 percent), Creole (Kriol) (4.5 percent), Cacaopera-Matagalpa (3.4 percent), Nahoa-Nicarao (2.5 percent), Mayangna-Sumu (2.2 percent), Rama (0.9 %), Garífuna (0.7 percent) and Ulwa (0.2 percent). Different responses included: "other" (3.1 percent) and "didn't know" (10.7 percent), while 4.4. percent of respondents ignored the question. Also, according to the CIA World Fact Book of 2007, by that year the country was made up of 69 percent *mestizo* population (mixed Amerindian and white), 17 percent *white* population, 9 percent *black* population and 5 percent *amerindian* population.

[3] Large populations of the *miskitu* ethnic groups can be found in the North East coast of the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Bourgois, 1986). According to the 2005 population Census, the self-reported *miskitu* population in the R.A.A.N. was 102,806, accounting for 57 percent of all the R.A.A.N.'s population self-identified as belonging to an ethnic group (179,376), and 33 percent of R.A.A.N's total population (314,130) (INIDE, 2006).

[4] The department of Rio San Juan occupies a small portion of the Caribbean coast, in the south eastern corner of the country's territory.

[5] Own calculations based on population census of 2005 (INIDE, 2006) and INETER (2000).

[6] The legal base for the political administrative division in Nicaragua is Law No. 59 of 1989. The Nicaraguan Institute of Territorial Studies (INETER) carried out the legalization and institutionalization of 143 municipalities between 1987 and 1995. However, only by 2005 were the current 153 municipalities officially delimited by a series of laws approved by the National Assembly (INETER, 2000).

[7] IMF's Article IV Consultation Report, 2012.

Venezuela under the *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (ALBA)* resulted in a small surplus in the balance of payments in 2011. Many export products, especially coffee and gold, have benefited from the recent rise in international commodity prices.

Specific socioeconomic indicators have improved over the past decade in Nicaragua. For instance, the share of people below the poverty line has declined in the country from 48.3 percent to 42.5 percent over the period 2005-2009 (although they still remain well above the Latin American average -27 percent-), and the income GINI coefficient has done so from 0.51 to 0.46 over the same period (IMF, 2012). Education levels among the population have increased. The net primary enrollment rate rose from 78 percent in 1999 to 92 percent in 2010, with a similar increase across gender, and the net secondary enrollment rate increased from 35 percent to 46 percent between 2000 and 2010 (UNESCO, 2012 and WDI, 2012). Similarly, youth unemployment rates remain low in Nicaragua relative to other countries in Latin America. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2011), Nicaragua's urban unemployment rate has decreased from 19.1 percent in 2001 to 13.7 percent in 2008 (for youths aged 10-24 years old). Meanwhile, the average for Latin America remained at 16.5 percent in 2008. On the contrary, with regards to health indicators, Nicaragua's situation is somewhat fragile relative to the rest of Central America. By 2010, the country was below the regional average of life expectancy at birth (74 years vis a vis 76 years), it had a high adult mortality rate (16.5 percent probability of dying for people between 15 and 60 years old, vis a vis 12.5 percent), and a high maternal mortality ratio: 95 per 100,000 live births compared to 63 (WHO, 2012). In terms of gender equality, the country only ranked 37 among 86 countries in 2012 in relation to the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), although it improved from being ranked 28th among 102 countries in 2009.[8]

C. Political history and recent major events

These characteristics of Nicaragua are embedded in a turbulent history of dictatorship, war and economic struggles, coupled with young political institutions in need of further development and a high vulnerability to natural disasters. Nicaragua endured a 43 year long hereditary dictatorship by the Somoza family between 1936 and 1979, after which it experienced a revolution that started the Sandinista National Liberation Front's decade regime (1979-1990), a time characterized by a devastating civil war and a wrecked economy. After this, the first time elected Nicaraguan government under the presidency of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (1990-1997) initiated economic stabilization and adjustment programs under the prescription of the

[8] The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) was first launched by the OECD Development Centre in 2009 as an innovative measure of the underlying drivers of gender inequality for over 100 countries. Instead of measuring gender gaps in outcomes such as employment and education, the SIGI instead captures discriminatory social institutions, such as early marriage, discriminatory inheritance practices, violence against women, son preference, restricted access to public space and restricted access to land and credit. The 2012 SIGI is made up of 14 unique variables, grouped into 5 sub-indices: Discriminatory Family Code, Restricted Physical Integrity, Son Bias, Restricted Resources and Entitlements and Restricted Civil Liberties. Source: http://genderindex.org/content/team. Accessed on 12/13/2012.

International Monetary Fund (IMF), programs that continued under the administration of Arnoldo Alemán (1997-2002). During these years of reform, however, the economic recovery of the country was challenged by external shocks that damaged its physical infrastructure and productive capacity, including droughts brought by El Niño Phenomenon in 1997 and heavy floods by hurricane Mitch in 1998, both of which reduced economic growth and put pressure on fiscal accounts. Internally, by the 1990's most of Nicaragua's institutions were still undergoing transitions from their political origins of the 1979 revolution. Currently, the institutional development in Nicaragua still shows symptoms of being incomplete. According to the 2011 World Governance Indicators, Nicaragua only ranked between the 25th and 50th percentiles in all six indicators: political stability/absence of violence, control of corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law, government effectiveness, and voice and accountability. For these last two indicators, it ranked last among Central American countries.

III. TRENDS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN NICARAGUA

A. Availability and reliability of data on crime and violence

Most of the data related to crime and violence used in this country profile comes from the Annual Statistics Books of the National Police of Nicaragua, which are currently available online to the public for every year from 1998 until 2011. This source of information is the most systematic and reliable on crime and violence in the country, yet data inconsistencies remain, especially when compared to data from other sources of the same institution. For instance, OVE obtained some detailed information on domestic and sexual violence directly from the Women and Children Precinct Division of the National Police (CMN) during its first mission to Nicaragua, but found quality problems that should warn the reader against relying fully on the reported figures from this source.[9] Recently, UNDP (2011) mentioned problems with the way information is gathered by the CMN. It stated that local CMN delegations across the country registered any type of crime which to the judgment of the police official in charge of receiving reports was related directly or indirectly to problems within the family environment. This resulted in an overestimation of domestic violence figures in 2010.

The second source of information used is the National Survey on Demography and Health (ENDESA), which implemented a module on domestic violence in its latest version, producing information on female victims of this type of violence (ENDESA 2008). Although the raw data is not available online, the National Institute on Information and Development (INIDE), which produces official statistics in the country, has a final report showing the results of the survey.

Thirdly, with regards to school violence, OVE used the results of a survey published in a study financed by the Department for International Development from the United Kingdom in 2005.[10].

Fourth, the data on perception of insecurity and trust in institutions comes from the Latinobarometer, an opinion survey held annually in 18 Latin American countries between 1995 and 2010[11] with economic support from the IDB. Raw data on the Latinobarometer was retrieved online.

Finally, all demographic information comes from the most recent population census of 2005, for which information is published by the National Institute of Development Information (INIDE).

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[9] OVE did not obtain raw data from the CMN, only short reports on the domestic and sexual violence situation in Nicaragua. Yet the information had the advantage of being already disaggregated by type of domestic violence and sexual crimes.

[10] Ortega (2005), *Violencia Escolar en Nicaragua. Un Estudio Descriptivo en Escuelas de Primaria*, Revista Mexicana de Investigación Educativa, Vol. 10, No. 026, pp. 787-804, Ciudad de Mexico.

[11] Except 1999.

In Nicaragua, there are no inter-institutional information systems producing reliable statistics related to crime and violence, although some institutional registries exist. Apart from those of the CMN, the Ministry of Health has several: An Injury Watch System in 8 hospitals, 3 Municipal Observatories for the Prevention of Violence and the Statistical Information System that registers the physical and psychological violence in health units. The Judicial Power, through the Technical Commission on Statistics, has put forward the justice sector's system of indicators as a starting point for the Observatory for the Improvement of Statistical Information in relation to domestic and sexual violence. The commission is composed of the Statistics Divisions of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Public Ministry, the National Police, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the National Penitentiary System, the Ministry of the Interior, and the General Directorate of Migration and Foreign Residents. The Medical Forensics Institute has a system of statistics since 1999 that registers expert medical examinations of men and women of all ages, with coverage of over 24 municipalities. Civil society organizations also have a couple of registry systems. In 2004, the Network of Women against Violence elaborated a Registry System at the national level within the framework of the Political Incidence Enforcement Project of the Network of Women against Violence. And the Alliance for Centers, which brings together 31 alternative centers and Non-Governmental Organizations that work in gender violence issues, has developed a registry system about the actions of community referral and counter-referral, implemented since 2009 (Bolaños, 2008). The main problem is that there is no common conceptual framework across institutions on which the variables and indicators on crime and violence are built. Furthermore, variables and indicators are constructed to serve individual institutional purposes, so there is no integral approach across institutions to the problem of crime and violence.

B. Trends of different forms of violence and crime in Nicaragua (1996-2011)

1. Crime against property and against persons

Total reports on crime in Nicaragua have risen rapidly and persistently since 1996[12], at an average annual rate of 7 percent. A higher share of these reports historically corresponds to crime against property and crime against persons. A much lower share is accounted for by crime against public health and other crime.[13] In 2010, for the first time, reported crime against persons surpassed reported crime against property, mostly as a result of a drop of the latter since 2008. This last drop also explains an apparent decreasing trend in total reported crime starting in 2009. However, by 2011 total reported crime remained high compared to 1996. In the former year there were 4,406 reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants (phti), as opposed to 1,602 in the latter, reflecting a 175.1 percent increase between both years.

[12] In fact, this is true since 1982, according to our own calculations based on data from the National Police.

[13] We show the official general classification of crime, as reported by the Annual Statistics Book of the National Police, 2011, p.13. The Law 641 of 2007 (current Criminal Code of Nicaragua) considers tampering and/or unauthorised distribution of farmaceutical products and food as crimes against public health, among others.

Figure 1. Reported crime in Nicaragua (1996-2011)



Source: Own construction based on annual statistics book of the National Police, 2011.

Throughout the same period, the increase of crime against property was largely driven by robbery and theft reports, and that of crime against persons responded mostly to injuries and other crime (figure 2).[14] Reports on homicides and rape represented the lowest share of crime against persons in Nicaragua, but rape is one of the most underreported crimes (UNDP, 2011) and it is high relative to other Central American countries (figure 3). Meanwhile, homicide rates in Nicaragua remained well below the region's average, reaching only 12.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011 (figure 4).

[14] Robbery includes robbery with force, robbery with intimidation, robbery with violence and aggravated robbery; homicide includes murder, parricide, imprudent homicide and homicide; rape includes rape to children under 14 years of age, aggravated rape and rape; and injuries include slight injury, serious injury, very serious injury and imprudent injury. These categories are specified in Law 641 of 2007.

Figure 2. Reported crime against property and against persons in Nicaragua (1996-2011)



Source: Own calculations based on the annual statistics book of the National Police, 2011

Figure 3. Average reported rape per 100,000 inhabitants in Central America (2005-2007)



Source: UN Human Development Report for Central America 2009-2010.

Figure 4. Homicide per 100,000 inhabitants in Central America



Source: Own calculations based on UNODC homicide statistics, 2012.

The incidence of some of these types of crime is highly concentrated in few departments in the country, as shown in table 1. Managua stands out as the department with the highest reported violent crime in terms of robberies, and the North and South Atlantic Autonomous Regions in the case of rapes. For the years 1998, 2005 and 2011, Managua showed an average of 758 robberies per 100,000 inhabitants (phti), compared to a country average of 286, and the North and South Autonomous Regions showed an average of 57 rapes phti and 48 rapes phti, respectively, compared to a country average of 29. Both Autonomous Regions also showed the highest growth rates of reported robberies, rapes and injuries. Between 1998 and 2011, robberies phti increased by 164 percent in the Northern Region and rapes phti by 145 percent in the Southern Region. Reported injuries phti increased by 63 percent and 53 percent, respectively.

Contrary to the case of robberies and rapes, reported injuries and homicides showed less concentration in Managua and the Autonomous Regions relative to other departments. For instance, in terms of injuries, other departments were also highly violent, like Estelí and Granada, showing figures of 405 and 396 injuries phti, compared to a country average of 299 (however, reports on injuries have also tended to decline for the whole country in general since 2005). In terms of homicide, not only the Autonomous Regions but also Chontales, Rio San Juan and Jinotega showed high figures relative to the rest of the country, showing averages of 34, 23 and 23 homicides phti, respectively. In fact, between 1998 and 2011, Chontales showed an alarming increase of 376 percent in homicides phti, climbing from 14 homicides phti to 67 homicides phti, making it the highest homicide growth rate in the whole country.

The IDB supported Citizen Security Project (CSP) was implemented from 2004 to 2010. The trends show that there is a clear difference between departments where the CSP was implemented and the other departments.[15] While reported robberies phti and injuries phti were higher on average in CSP departments compared to other departments in all three years (1998, 2005 and 2011), they were lower in the case of rapes phti and homicides phti. This remains true even after excluding Managua from the CSP departments.

[15] Although the CSP targeted municipalities and not departments, 8 of the 11 municipalities targeted were department capitals.

Table 1. Trends of crime and violence in Nicaragua by department

	Robbery			Rape			Injury			Homicide		
	1998	2005	2011	1998	2005	2011	1998	2005	2011	1998	2005	2011
Project departments												
Managua	714	703	858	25	16	27	510	617	227	11	13	14
Masaya	160	435	223	17	27	30	295	486	175	3	6	5
Granada	325	353	589	19	23	18	479	455	255	4	4	6
Carazo	431	605	611	17	16	29	342	369	166	4	6	3
Esteli	257	438	325	21	30	23	375	680	160	12	8	6
Chinandega	176	371	246	14	24	29	204	452	132	9	10	7
Matagalpa	196	330	203	31	30	37	291	479	163	27	22	14
León	266	178	194	23	17	25	227	255	131	13	3	5
Average	***316***	***427***	***406***	***21***	***23***	***27***	***340***	***474***	***176***	***10***	***9***	***7***
Other departments												
North Atlantic Autonomous Region	231	281	609	41	57	72	207	548	337	24	22	20
South Atlantic Autonomous Region	183	157	457	33	31	81	213	215	327	21	26	43
Boaco	84	141	184	36	33	22	181	401	127	16	8	9
Chontales	187	324	190	37	25	35	231	453	114	14	22	67
Rio San Juan	167	160	179	33	32	64	240	251	159	23	21	25
Jinotega	130	138	127	27	22	22	243	304	92	26	23	21
Rivas	115	296	250	17	19	31	309	525	156	7	8	6
Madriz	103	157	93	24	20	20	262	482	118	9	7	3
New Segovia	159	133	143	40	21	27	350	399	96	16	10	9
Average	***135***	***193***	***203***	***31***	***25***	***38***	***259***	***402***	***148***	***16***	***14***	***23***
Country average	***228***	***306***	***322***	***27***	***26***	***35***	***292***	***434***	***173***	***14***	***13***	***15***

Note: All figures are rates per 100,000 inhabitants. Source: Own calculations based on the Annual statistics book of the National Police, 2011, and UNDP (2011).

2. Sexual and domestic violence

Other crimes against persons in Nicaragua involve sexual and domestic violence. According to data directly obtained from the Women and Children Precinct Division of the National Police (CMN), most domestic violence against women in Nicaragua is manifested through minor injuries (see figure 5), which according to the new Penal Code (Law 641 of 2007) are those that require medical attention or surgery, but which are not long lasting injuries; they include wounds, concussions, excoriations, fractures, dislocations and skin burns.[16] UNDP (2011) reported a sharp decline of reports on domestic violence crimes from 2006 until 2009 (from 17,559 to 9,153) based on data from the National Police, but it noted that available data on domestic violence is not homogeneous within this institution.[17] Figure 6 shows reports on sexual

[16] Before 2007, The Law of Reforms and Additions to the Penal Code (Law 230 of 1996) contained similar definitions for injuries

[17] According to UNDP (2011), while the consolidated tables of the annual statistics books of the national police registered the mentioned decline in domestic violence reports between 2006 and 2009, the CMN registered figures close to 30 thousand reports within the same period (2007-2009). The reason for this was likely to be that the local CMN delegations across the country registered any type of crime which to the judgment of the police official in charge of receiving reports was related directly or indirectly to problems within the family environment, including robberies and theft.

crimes. For 2010 and 2011, the most prevalent sexual crime was rape, followed by sexual abuse and statutory rape of 15 year old minors (Law 641 of 2007).

Figure 5. Reports on crimes of domestic violence against women in Nicaragua (2010-2011)[18]



Source: Women and Children Precinct Division of the National Police (CMN)

Figure 6. Reports on sexual violence in Nicaragua (2010-2011)



Source: Women and Children Precinct Division of the National Police (CMN)

The CMN produced a diagnostic on domestic and sexual violence in Nicaragua in 2008 (Bolaños, 2008). It showed the distribution of domestic violence and sexual crimes across departments from 2004 until 2007, using data from the CMN. Excluding the outlier case of Managua, CSP departments showed a higher number of reports every year from 2004 until 2007 relative to other departments. Although the figures are not deflated by population, it is worth noting that by 2005 the CSP departments held less than half of it in Nicaragua (37 percent), and still showed a higher average of domestic violence and sexual crimes. In general, however, the

[18] The CMN only delivered information for 2010 and 2011.

available information shows that between 2004 and 2007 reported crimes on domestic violence fell in Nicaragua, while sexual crimes increased moderately.

Table 2. Reported crimes of domestic and sexual violence across Nicaraguan departments in 2004-2007

	Domestic violence				Sexual crimes			
	2004	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**
Project departments								
Managua	3,935	2,995	3,730	5,098	655	421	827	940
Masaya	826	485	153	379	231	204	210	214
Granada	804	395	429	490	113	84	136	183
Carazo	662	859	510	710	136	155	175	222
Estelí	728	806	360	222	87	160	142	126
Chinandega	543	380	98	92	127	57	104	151
Matagalpa	702	558	462	196	95	90	112	104
Average (excluding Managua)	***711***	***581***	***335***	***348***	***132***	***125***	***147***	***167***
Other departments								
León	736	789	127	288	196	140	158	217
Rivas	252	277	196	137	129	102	106	97
Boaco	471	212	131	151	137	137	143	139
Chontales	663	381	147	198	209	121	148	194
Madriz	354	256	327	171	147	118	203	175
Nueva Segovia	498	140	223	214	98	57	149	145
Jinotega	314	160	152	200	221	130	195	329
Average	***470***	***316***	***186***	***194***	***162***	***115***	***157***	***185***
Total	**11,488**	**8,693**	**7,045**	**8,546**	**2,581**	**1,976**	**2,808**	**3,236**

Source: Domestic and sexual violence diagnostic of Nicaragua (Bolaños, 2008).

3. School violence

The Department for International Development from the United Kingdom published a study in 2005 on the specific case of school violence in Nicaragua. [19] Survey data from this study drew results from 3,042 students randomly selected from 46 publicly, privately and mixed financed schools found in the Managua metropolitan area.[20] Students were between 8 and 22 years old. According to this study, in 2005 the most reported types of violence *between students themselves* were associated with robberies (48.3 percent), verbal assaults (45.3 percent), physical beatings (37.5 percent), exclusion and isolation (37.2 percent), physical aggression from siblings

[19] Ortega (2005), *Violencia Escolar en Nicaragua. Un Estudio Descriptivo en Escuelas de Primaria*, Revista Mexicana de Investigación Educativa, Vol. 10, No. 026, pp. 787-804, Ciudad de Mexico.

[20] Specifically, six districts of Managua and five municipalities that together constitute the Managua metropolitan area.

(approximately 32 percent), threats (25.5 percent), and sexual violence (4.0 percent). This apparently low incidence of sexual violence from adults towards students, however, is very high compared to international figures. According to the study, the corresponding figure exceeded by 3 percentage points those found in school violence studies in Europe, in particular in Spain. With regards to violence exercised by *adults towards students*, violence exercised by parents showed the highest incidence, with 21.1 percent of students reporting that they were insulted, beaten, threatened or scorned by their parents. Verbal assaults from teachers towards their students had a lower incidence, with 11.3 percent. Physical and sexual violence exercised by teachers had the least incidence, with 7.5 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively. Finally, in relation to *aggressive behavior* by students, the types of violent behavior mostly self-reported were verbal violence (52 percent), physical violence (32 percent), relational violence (isolation, rejection and indifference) (23 percent), psychological violence (16 percent)[21], physical violence with weapons (4.6 percent), and sexual violence (4.3 percent). The frequency of violence exercised between students, by adults towards students and through self-reported aggressive behavior by students, closely follows the order of incidence described.

One major finding of Ortega (2005) has to do with gender. The study found statistically significant evidence of male students being the most involved in school violence, both as victims and victimizers, including the case of sexual violence between students. Although the first part of this finding is consistent with findings in other countries (Smith et al. 1999; Smith, 2003), this is not the case for the second one, given the fact that the international evidence points towards victims of sexual violence between students being mostly women.

In general, contrasting with evidence found in Europe, in Nicaragua male students seem to be more exposed to higher risk types of violence (robberies, physical and sexual violence). This is also true for verbal violence (Smith et al., 1999).

C. Victimization and trust in public institutions in Nicaragua

In terms of victimization, Latinobarometro provides surveys for Nicaragua for the period 1996-2010 (figure 7). During this period, Nicaraguan rates were close to the Central American average. Although there were evident increases throughout the end of the 1990s, the 2000s appear to show a declining trend in these rates.[22] And since 2006 they have been under the regional average, mainly because of sharp increases in the rates of El Salvador and Honduras. On

[21] These last figures in parentheses are approximations.

[22] Data comes from Latinobarometro, an annual and nationally representative public opinion survey carried out in 18 Latin American countries since 1995. The victimization question common to all surveys between 1996 and 2010 is: *Have you or someone in your family, been assaulted, attacked, or been the victim of a crime in the last 12 months?* With possible answers being "yes", "no", "don't know" and "no answer". We calculate the victimization rate as the percentage of respondents who answered "yes", after eliminating the "don't know" and "no answer" responses. The way the question is written can lead to underestimation of the real victimization rate, as multiple individual victims in the family/household could be included in a single "yes" answer.

another front, confidence in government institutions like the police and the judicial power has remained on a negative note since the end of the 1990's in Nicaragua, with the percentage of survey answers of "little confidence" and "no confidence" always being below those of "a lot of confidence" and "some confidence". Between 1996 and 2010, only an average of 12.8 percent answered that they had "a lot of confidence" in the police, while 31.6 percent answered they had "no confidence". The situation of the police improved between 2005 and 2007, with a sharp drop in the "no confidence" answers, but they spiked again after this year. The corresponding figures for the judicial system were 7.6 percent and 39.5 percent, but its image has not improved in the eyes of the public according to this data. The situation of local governments is mostly the same as that of the police and the judicial system. On the contrary, an important institution for Nicaraguans seems to be the church, showing an average of 53.7 percent of respondents who answered having "a lot of confidence" in the institution, relative to 12.8 percent who answered "no confidence" throughout the mentioned period. This favorable perception of the church has been very stable.

Figure 7. Victimization rates in Central America, according to Latinobarometro surveys



Source: Own calculations based on Latinobarometro annual opinion surveys 1996-2010.

Figure 8. Citizens trust in selected Institutions in Nicaragua



Source: Latinobarometro annual opinion surveys 1996-2010. Y-axes show the percentage of respondents who selected each of the confidence categories

D. Victims, perpetrators and use of weapons in Nicaragua

1. Characteristics of victims and perpetrators of common crime and violence in Nicaragua

Characteristics of victims are available by type of crime for the year 2011 (National Police data). Victims of robbery, injury and homicide were mostly males between the ages of 15 and 45 (with a ratio of about 3 to 5 between the 15-25 and 26-45 age groups) who had completed only primary or secondary education and were currently employed in administrative, services, industrial or agricultural occupations. By contrast, rape victims were virtually all females, mostly students below the age of 26 (33 percent below the age of 13 and 57 percent between the ages of 13 and 25), and having completed only primary or secondary education.

Contrary to the victims, detained persons showed a homogeneous profile across all types of crime.[23] For robberies, rape, injuries and homicide almost all detained persons were males between the ages of 15 and 45. Most of them had completed only primary or secondary education and on average 40 percent were unemployed. Only in the case of robberies were victimizers younger relative to the other types of crime (with 60.4 percent between the ages of 15 and 25) and showed a higher unemployment rate (57.1 percent).

Table 3. Distribution of victims and detained persons by type of crime and demographic characteristics in Nicaragua (2011)

[23] The penal code of 2007 refers to detainees as those detained by the police with a previous judicial order.

VICTIMS											
Gender			Age			Education			Occupation		
ROBBERY											
Male	15125	63.9%	Under 13	115	0.5%	Iliterate	913	3.9%	Student	2435	10.3%
Female	8562	36.1%	13-25	7988	33.7%	Primary	6255	26.4%	Unemployed	1475	6.2%
			26-45	10643	44.9%	Secondary	10278	43.4%	Administrative and service	5084	21.5%
			Over 45	4941	20.9%	Technical	3015	12.7%	Industrial and/or agricultural	2949	12.4%
						University	3226	13.6%	Domestic	591	2.5%
									Housewife	2591	10.9%
									Other	8562	36.1%
Total	23687	100%		23687	100%		23687	100%		23687	100%
RAPE											
Male	102	5.3%	Under 13	642	33.4%	Iliterate	247	12.8%	Student	1100	57.2%
Female	1821	94.7%	13-25	1104	57.4%	Primary	1052	54.7%	Unemployed	149	7.7%
			26-45	149	7.7%	Secondary	586	30.5%	Administrative and service	40	2.1%
			Over 45	28	1.5%	Technical	6	0.3%	Industrial and/or agricultural	13	0.7%
						University	32	1.7%	Domestic	47	2.4%
									Housewife	226	11.8%
									Other	348	18.1%
Total	1923	100%		1923	100%		1923	100%		1923	100%
INJURY											
Male	6211	60.3%	Under 13	151	1.5%	Iliterate	799	7.8%	Student	937	9.1%
Female	4083	39.7%	13-25	4248	41.3%	Primary	4305	41.8%	Unemployed	673	6.5%
			26-45	4485	43.6%	Secondary	4300	41.8%	Administrative and service	1111	10.8%
			Over 45	1410	13.7%	Technical	327	3.2%	Industrial and/or agricultural	1942	18.9%
						University	563	5.5%	Domestic	327	3.2%
									Housewife	1990	19.3%
									Other	3314	32.2%
Total	10294	100%		10294	100%		10294	100%		10294	100%
HOMICIDE											
Male	725	91.0%	Under 13	17	2.1%	Iliterate	108	14%	Student	38	4.8%
Female	72	9.0%	13-25	259	32.5%	Primary	389	49%	Unemployed	73	9.2%
			26-45	388	48.7%	Secondary	262	33%	Administrative and service	45	5.6%
			Over 45	133	16.7%	Technical	16	2%	Industrial and/or agricultural	307	38.5%
						University	22	3%	Domestic	2	0.3%
									Housewife	34	4.3%
									Other	298	37.4%
Total	797	100%		797	100%		797	86%		797	100%
DETAINED PERSONS											
Gender			Age			Education			Occupation		
ROBBERY											
Male	8168	98.4%	Under 13	0	0.0%	Iliterate	810	9.8%	Student	276	3.3%
Female	135	1.6%	15-25	5016	60.4%	Primary	4079	49.1%	Unemployed	4737	57.1%
			26-45	2968	35.7%	Secondary	3219	38.8%	Administrative and service	189	2.3%
			Over 45	319	3.8%	Technical	63	0.8%	Industrial and/or agricultural	566	6.8%
						University	132	1.6%	Domestic	7	0.1%
									Housewife	38	0.5%
									Other	2490	30.0%
Total	8303	100%		8303	100%		8303	100%		8303	100%
RAPE											
Male	907	99.1%	Under 13	0	0.0%	Iliterate	71	7.8%	Student	25	2.7%
Female	8	0.9%	15-25	434	47.4%	Primary	482	52.7%	Unemployed	285	31.1%
			26-45	397	43.4%	Secondary	339	37.0%	Administrative and service	23	2.5%
			Over 45	84	9.2%	Technical	9	1.0%	Industrial and/or agricultural	186	20.3%
						University	14	1.5%	Domestic	0	0.0%
									Housewife	3	0.3%
									Other	393	43.0%
Total	915	100%		915	100%		915	100%		915	100%
INJURY											
Male	2591	94.7%	Under 13	0	0.0%	Iliterate	167	6.1%	Student	124	4.5%
Female	146	5.3%	15-25	1230	44.9%	Primary	1254	45.8%	Unemployed	944	34.5%
			26-45	1250	45.7%	Secondary	1206	44.1%	Administrative and service	87	3.2%
			Over 45	257	9.4%	Technical	52	1.9%	Industrial and/or agricultural	475	17.4%
						University	58	2.1%	Domestic	13	0.5%
									Housewife	66	2.4%
									Other	1028	37.6%
Total	2737	100%		2737	100%		2737	100%		2737	100%
HOMICIDE											
Male	753	95.8%	Under 13	0	0.0%	Iliterate	47	6.0%	Student	24	3.1%
Female	33	4.2%	15-25	346	44.0%	Primary	384	48.9%	Unemployed	303	38.5%
			26-45	396	50.4%	Secondary	334	42.5%	Administrative and service	26	3.3%
			Over 45	44	5.6%	Technical	10	1.3%	Industrial and/or agricultural	154	19.6%
						University	11	1.4%	Domestic	1	0.1%
									Housewife	16	2.0%
									Other	262	33.3%
Total	786	100%		786	100%		786	100%		786	100%

Source: Own calculations based on the annual statistics book of the National Police, 2011.

In addition to the National Police data, the National Survey on Demography and Health (ENDESA) provides information on female victims of domestic violence in 2008.[24] According to the survey, at the national level, 19 percent of women 15-49 years old reported having been victims of physical violence at some point in their lives (since they were 15 years old). Most of these abused women had a maximum attained educational level of primary, and in general physical abuse of women decreased with their level of education and increased with age. Most female victims of physical abuse were currently separated, divorced or widows (33 percent). Of the 19 percent abused women, 80 percent were physically abused by their husband or ex-husband. For CSP departments, however, this last figure was a bit lower, at about 75 percent, while shares of all other perpetrators rose above those of other departments.

Table 4. Characteristics of female victims of physical violence

Characteristics of women 15-49 years old physically ill treated/abused at some point since they were 15 years old. Nicaragua 2006/07*	Physical violence
Total	**19.2**
Area of residency	
Urban	20.5
Rural	17.2
Education level	
No education	26.2
Primary 1-3	24.6
Primary 4-6	20.1
Secondary	16.1
Tertiary	14.8
Age	
15-19	7.6
20-24	15.2
25-29	20.6
30-34	25.1
35-39	25.6
40-44	30.5
45-49	29.1
Civil status	
Married/union	21.7
Separated/divorced/widow	33.3
Never married/union	5.7
Figures are percentages of women 15-49 years old	

[24] ENDESA (2008) is based on a stratified probabilistic sample at the national level. The sample framework is based on the latest 2005 census. Two types of questionnaires were used to collect information: one for the household applied in 17,209 households containing administrative information, household characteristics and household member characteristics, and a second one applied to 14,221 women between the ages 15 and 49 giving information about sexual and reproductive behavior.

Note: ENDESA (2008) uses the definition of physical violence contained in *The National Plan for the Prevention of Domestic and Sexual Violence*. According to this plan, physical violence occurs when a person who is in a relationship of power with another inflicts non-accidental damage through the use of physical force or through the use of some type of weapon which can provoke external or internal injuries, or not, or injuries to self-esteem. Repeated non-severe punishment is also considered physical violence. Source: ENDESA (2008).

Table 5.

Percentage of women between 15 and 49 years old who were physically attacked since they were 15 years old, by person who exercised physical violence and by department, Nicaragua 2006/2007

	Husband or ex-husband	Father	Mother	Brother	Sister	Stepfather/stepm other	Another family member	Boyfriend	Unknown
Project departments									
Managua	64	16	13.3	6.4	0.7	4	6.1	3.2	1.9
Masaya	79	10.4	7.2	0.7	1.5	0.7	4.7	2.2	1.5
Granada	72.5	22.7	15.3	5.1	0.5	2.9	0.9	1.4	0.5
Carazo	79.3	4.8	7.9	3	0	0	1.8	6.7	3.7
Estelí	72.2	7.9	7.4	9.1	0.6	2.8	5.1	0	0.6
Chinandega	80.3	7.1	5.6	6	0.4	2	1.6	2	0.8
Matagalpa	82.7	12	6.9	1.5	3.1	2.6	5	0.8	2.3
León	76.1	9.3	11.1	5	1.9	2.5	7.6	2.7	2.7
Average	***75.8***	***11.3***	***9.3***	***4.6***	***1.1***	***2.2***	***4.1***	***2.4***	***1.8***
Other departments									
RAAN	81.7	17.6	10.3	0	1	0.6	2.4	1.4	0.7
RAAS	92	3.1	4.2	0	1	3.1	1.4	0	0
Boaco	63.3	19.8	11.4	8.4	1.5	0.8	5.4	0.8	0.8
Chontales	89.8	3	6.1	0	0.6	1.8	5.3	0	3
Río San Juan	87.2	2.4	6.1	2.8	2.8	0	3.3	1.4	1.9
Jinotega	82.7	8.9	10	1.5	1.1	1.6	0.5	1	1
Rivas	85.9	12.3	16.5	1.3	0	2.3	3.7	1.8	1.8
Madriz	83.2	0.8	2.5	4	0	0	5.3	4.1	2.9
Nueva Segovia	76.2	9.9	6.9	1.7	0.6	1.7	3.5	0	3.5
Average	***82.4***	***8.6***	***8.2***	***2.2***	***1.0***	***1.3***	***3.4***	***1.2***	***1.7***
Country average	**79.3**	**9.9**	**8.7**	**3.3**	**1.0**	**1.7**	**3.7**	**1.7**	**1.7**

Source: ENDESA (2008).

2. Use of weapons

The use of weapons is documented in the Annual Books of the National Police for some of the reports of robbery, rape, injury and homicide. [25] When the use of a weapon was registered, fire weapons were mostly used in homicides (24 percent in 2010 and 2011) and robberies (52 and 49 percent in 2010 and 2011). According to UNDP (2011, also using data from the National Police), the share of firearms used in homicides has substantially decreased since 2009, when it was 56 percent. The use of bladed weapons is more evenly distributed across types of crime. About a third of reports that registered the use of a weapon documented bladed weapons. However, their use in the case of rapes spiked in 2011, with an incidence of 80 percent. The use of blunt weapons is mostly reported for injuries compared to any other crime, with about 20 percent of weapon-use reported crimes.

Table 6. Use of weapons by type of crime (2010-2011)

[25] This information is clearer in the Annual Books of 2010 and 2011.

	2010								2011							
	Robberies		Rape		Injuries		Homicide		Robberies		Rape		Injuries		Homicide	
	Reports	Share	Reports	Share	Reports	Share	Reports	Share	Reports	Share	Reports	Share	Reports	Share	Reports	Share
Fire weapons	4118	24%	10	6%	574	6%	422	52%	3248	24%	4	12%	461	7%	363	49%
Bladed weapons	5530	32%	45	28%	2732	30%	295	36%	4669	34%	27	79%	2309	37%	282	38%
Blunt weapons	666	4%	7	4%	1852	21%	43	5%	305	2%	1	3%	1160	18%	34	5%
Other weapons	7191	41%	98	61%	3823	43%	54	7%	5426	40%	2	6%	2371	38%	68	9%
Total	**17505**	**100%**	**160**	**100%**	**8981**	**100%**	**814**	**100%**	**13648**	**100%**	**34**	**100%**	**6301**	**100%**	**747**	**100%**

Note: Source- Own calculations based on the annual statistics books of the National Police, 2010 and 2011. In the data recorded in the Annual Statistics Books of the National Police, the total reported crimes with the use of a weapon are less than the number of total reported crimes.

According to data from the CMN, 58 percent of cases of domestic and sexual violence involved the use of bladed weapons in 2011. In 28 percent of the cases, blunt weapons were used, and in 14 percent, firearms. The CMN reports that the incidence for all three types of weapons decreased in comparison to 2010.

IV. DISCUSSION ON RISK FACTORS BEHIND CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN NICARAGUA

Once the main forms of crime of violence and their evolution have been identified, it is important to understand the risk that influence their development in order to be able to select interventions to prevent them. Risk factors are commonly defined as those characteristics "that increase the likelihood of someone becoming a victim and/or perpetrator of violence" (WHO, 2010:18). To organize risk factors at different levels of influence, the ecological model is often used. It comes from public health and has been diffused by the World Health Organization through its World report on violence and health (Dahlberg and Krug, 2002). It allows organizing risk factors at the individual, relationship, community and societal level. However, risk factors are often difficult to identify. Surveys most often than not are unavailable, or present only very partial information. So to supply this lack of primary information, secondary data can be used. For this country profile on Nicaragua, OVE focused a specific form of violence and crime, domestic and sexual violence, researched the local literature available in Nicaragua, and rebuilt the risk factors based on those secondary sources. OVE also compared the findings with the international literature, in particular using Bielh's 2005 review of evidence. The discussion below is based on this combined literature review, and aims to identify what specific risk factors were present in Nicaragua so as to inform the selection of interventions to prevent domestic and sexual violence in the country. The risk factors identified are presented following the individual, relationship and societal levels of the ecological model. At the individual level, risk factors include gender (Heise et al., 1994; Americas Watch, 1991), age (Larrain, 1997), pregnancy (Bohn, 1990; Gielén, 1994; Valdez-Santiago and Sanin, 1996), a history of family violence (Jaffe, et al. 1990; Klevens, 1998; Ellsberg et al., 1996; Larrain and Rodríguez, 1993; Traverso, 1998) and the consumption of alcohol (Kantor and Strauss, 1989; Leonard, 1992; Frieze and Brown, 1989; Traverso, 1998). To begin with the latter, data from the CMN shows that although the consumption of alcohol and drugs is present in some cases of domestic and sexual violence, it is not a dominating risk factor for this type of violent behavior. By 2011, 56 percent of domestic and sexual violence perpetrators were sober at the time of committing the crime, while 42 percent were under the influence of alcohol and only 3 percent had consumed some kind of narcotic. However, a somewhat different finding was made previously in Nicaragua (Bolaños, 2008). Bolaños' diagnostic showed that for 2008, 45.3 percent of male victimizers of domestic violence were drinking alcohol before assaulting their partners, while 48 percent of sexual violence perpetrators were sober at the time of the act. Older females were shown to be more exposed as victims of domestic violence when their partner/victimizer was under the influence of alcohol. According to ENDESA (2008), out of 56 percent of female victims of domestic violence between the ages of 45 and 49, 30 percent reported the consumption of alcohol and jealousy as the reasons for being assaulted; and only 21 percent said there was no apparent reason for being victimized. At best, although the consumption of alcohol seems to be present in at least half of

the events related to domestic and sexual violence in Nicaragua, its validity as an important risk factor also seems to depend on other individual risk factors, such as the age and gender of the victim, and on the type of crime committed.

Other risk factors commonly found in the literature such as low levels of education, unemployment and young age are also relevant in Nicaragua. For instance, in the case of rape, poorly educated, unemployed, young women (aged 13 to 25) are the most vulnerable to being victimized in Nicaragua (Table 1). Olson et al. (2000) found that literate women in the department of Leon who had been victims of attempted or completed rape were victimized twice as often as men (15 percent vis-à-vis 7 percent) and that those same women were more likely to be later involved with a higher number of sexual partners compared to non-abused or moderately abused women.[26] Also, there is evidence that violence against pregnant women is common and often repeated in Nicaragua, as other studies made in the department of Leon show (Ellsberg, et al., 2000; Valladares, et al., 2005). Ellsberg et al. (2000) also found that there was a considerable overlap between physical, emotional and sexual violence, with 21% of ever-married women between the ages of 15 and 49 reporting all three kinds of abuse. [27]

At the relationship level, male domination in the household (Gwartney-Gibbs et al., 1983; Fagot et al., 1988; Malamuth et al., 1991-1995), women isolation from friends and family (Nielsen et al., 1993; Traverso, 1998) and family income (Strauss et al. 1980; Ellsberg, 1996; Traverso, 2000; Morrison and Orlando, 1991) are the most commonly found risk factors for domestic and sexual violence, as documented in the literature. In Nicaragua, male domination in the household seems a plausible risk factor behind domestic violence. For instance, according to ENDESA (2008), of all surveyed women between the ages of 15 and 49, 26 percent reported having observed their father physically ill-treating their mother. The same survey showed that 80 percent of physically abused women were victimized by their husband or ex-husband. Bolaños (2008) says that this is evidence of patterns of behavior being transferred from generation to generation in the country. According to a diagnostic on the situation of relapsing men with a history of violence in Districts I and V of Managua and Ciudad Sandino, prepared by Pineda (2006) for UNFPA, there is a consensus among specialists who work with violent men that violent behavior is the result of gender differences, manifested through masculine violence aimed to exercise control over women or other men. This in turn, reflects that the exercise of

[26] Olson et al (2000) used a sub-sample of literate urban men and women 15-44 years of age in the department of Leon to describe the experiences of sexual abuse occurring before 19 years of age, and to explore the possible association to later sexual risk behavior.

[27] Regarding other forms of violence, the literature review suggest that being a poorly educated and unemployed male between the ages of 26 and 45 seems to imply a higher risk of being a victim of homicide. The gender contrast is not present in the cases of robberies and injuries, however. Both males and females are at similar risk of becoming victims of these crimes. In general, the risk of becoming a victim of crime seems to increase with age up to the 26-45 age range, after which it starts to decrease.

violence responds to cultural traits, whereby the value of power and control over their partners is given to men. Bolaños (2008), Rocha (2005), and Maclure and Sotelo (2003, 2004) have emphasized the existence of patriarchal relationships in Nicaragua. Finally, in a recent study in urban areas in Colombia, Peru and Nicaragua, Bard (2012) found that risk factors associated with intimate partner violence (IPV) included low level of education, socio-economic class (middle class), employment, the number of children (three or more), and the lack of joint-decision making between partners.

At the societal level, risk factors include social norms (Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Schechter, 1982; Sanday, 1981; Counts et al., 1992; Sanday, 1981; and Leviston, 1989) and history of conflict, which leaves large numbers of weapons spread throughout a country as well as a culture of violence to solve problems. In Nicaragua, Rani et al. (2003) showed evidence of what they call gender-based double standards through a representative cross-sectional survey done in six departments of the Pacific region in 1998. According to the study, most young men (83%) reported that they had received direct encouragement from at least one person in the last year to engage in premarital sex, and at least half perceived that their father, siblings, other relatives and friends approved of premarital intercourse. In contrast, women held more negative attitudes toward pre-marital sex and were more often discouraged by parents or siblings from engaging in sex. In terms of history of conflict in Nicaragua, it is estimated that as much as 250 thousand firearms circulate in Nicaragua, according to IDHCA (2009-2010), which represent 8 percent of firearms in circulation in Central America. The same source reports that only 36 percent of these weapons was registered by 2009. The Sandinista revolution in 1979 and the civil war that lasted until 1990 (of which some armed groups remained active until 2001) also suggest a culture of violence to solve problems in Nicaragua. For instance, Rocha (2012) mentions that one of the motives behind early gang formation in the urban scenery of Managua was the urge to revive war time camaraderie sentiments between former combatants. Rodgers (2009) mentions the long regional history of war and its aftermath as a structural factor behind violence.

Table 7. Summary of risk factors in Nicaragua.

Level	Risk factor	Description	Source
Individual	**Gender**	Descriptive evidence suggests that important individual risk factors behind crime in Nicaragua are age, gender, education, unemployment, pregnancy and having a history of family violence. Specifically, in the case of sexual violence manifested through rape, poorly educated, unemployed women between the ages of 13 and 25 are the most vulnerable to being victimized. On the other hand, being a poorly educated and unemployed male between the ages of 26 and 45 seems to imply a higher risk of being a victim of homicide. The gender contrast is not present in the cases of robberies and injuries, however. Both males and females are at similar risk of becoming victims of these crimes. Pregnancy is shown by the literature to be a major individual risk factor for domestic violence in Nicaragua, and that there appears to be a considerable overlap between	***General literature***: Biehl (2005); Heise et al., 1994; Americas Watch, 1991. ***Specific studies for Nicaragua****: Ellsberg (1997); Morrison and Orlando (1999); Olson et al. (2000) and ENDESA (2008).* ***Own calculations of descriptive statistics***: *Annual Statistics Book of the National Police (2011).*
	Age		***General literature***: Larrain, 1997; ***specific studies for Nicaragua****: Ellsberg (1997) and Morrison and Orlando (1999). ENDESA (2008).* ***Own calculations of descriptive statistics***: *Annual Statistics Book of the National Police (2011).* ***Own***

		physical, emotional and sexual violence. Last, although the consumption of alcohol seems to be present in at least half of the events related to domestic and sexual violence in Nicaragua, its validity as an important risk factor also seems to depend on other individual risk factors, such as the age and gender of the victim, and on the type of crime committed.	***calculations of descriptive statistics***: *Annual Statistics Book of the National Police (2011).*
	Education		***Specific studies for Nicaragua:*** ENDESA (2008); Bard (2012). ***Own calculations of descriptive statistics***: *Annual Statistics Book of the National Police (2011).*
	Pregnancy		***General literature***: Bohn, 1990; Gielén, 1994; Valdez-Santiago and Sanin, 1996; ***Specific studies for Nicaragua:*** *Ellsberg, et al., 2000* and *Valladares, et al., 2005.*
	History of family violence		***General literature***: Jaffe, et al. 1986; Klevens, 1998; Ellsberg et al., 1996; Larrain and Rodríguez, 1993; Traverso, 1998; s***pecific studies for Nicaragua:*** *ENDESA (2008).*
	Unemployment		***Own calculations of descriptive statistics***: *Annual Statistics Book of the National Police (2011).*
	Alcohol and drug abuse		***General literature:*** Kantor and Strauss, 1989; Leonard, 1992; Frieze and Brown, 1989; Traverso, 1998; ***Specific studies for Nicaragua:*** ENDESA (2008), (Bolaños, 2008).
Relationship	**Male domination**	According to data from ENDESA (2008), of all surveyed women between the ages of 15 and 49, 26 percent reported having observed their father physically ill-treating their mother. The same survey showed that 80 percent of physically abused women were victimized by their husband or ex-husband. Bolaños (2008) says that this is evidence of patterns of behavior being transferred from generation to generation in the country. According to a diagnostic on the situation of relapsing men with a history of violence in Districts I and V of Managua and Ciudad Sandino, prepared by Pineda (2006) for UNFPA, there is a consensus among specialists who work with violent men that violent behavior is the result of gender differences, manifested through masculine violence aimed to exercise control over women or other men. This in turn, reflects that the exercise of violence responds to cultural traits, whereby the value of power and control over their partners is given to men. These sort of patriarchal relationships are recognized as risk factors by the ecological model (Bolaños, 2008), and Rocha (2005) and Maclure and Sotelo (2003, 2004) have emphasized the existence of these types of relationships in Nicaragua.	***General literature:*** Gwartney-Gibbs et al., 1983; Fagot et al., 1988; Malamuth et al., 1991-1995
	Women isolation from friends and family		***General literature:*** Nielsen et al., 1993; Traverso, 1998.
	Family income		***General literature:*** Strauss et al. 1980; Ellsberg, 1996; Traverso, 2000; Morrison and Orlando, 1991. ***Specific studies for Nicaragua:*** Pineda (2006); (Bolaños, 2008), Rocha (2005) and Maclure and Sotelo (2003, 2004).
Societal	**Social norms**	Rani et al. (2003) showed evidence of what they call ***gender-based double standards*** through a representative cross-sectional survey done in six departments of the Pacific region of Nicaragua in 1998. According to the study, most young men (83%) reported that they had received direct	***General literature:*** Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Schechter, 1982; Sanday, 1981; Counts et al., 1992; Sanday, 1981; and Leviston, 1989; ***Specific studies for Nicaragua:*** Rani et al. (2003); Rodgers et al.

		encouragement from at least one person in the last year to engage in premarital sex, and at least half perceived that their father, siblings, other relatives and friends approved of premarital intercourse. In contrast, women held more negative attitudes toward pre-marital sex and were more often discouraged by parents or siblings from engaging in sex.	(2009); Rocha (2012).

V. NICARAGUAN INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION AND GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY

Nicaragua endured a 43 year long hereditary dictatorship by the Somoza family (1936-1979), after which it experienced a revolution that started the Sandinista National Liberation Front's decade regime (1979-1990), a time characterized by a devastating civil war and a wrecked economy. After this, the first time elected Nicaraguan government under the presidency of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (1990-1997) initiated economic stabilization and adjustment programs under the prescription of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), programs that continued under the administration of Arnoldo Alemán (1997-2002). During these years of reform, the economic recovery of the country was challenged by external shocks. Droughts brought by El Niño Phenomenon in 1997 and heavy floods by hurricane Mitch in 1998 reduced economic growth and put pressure on fiscal accounts. Internally, most of Nicaragua's institutions were still undergoing transitions from their political origins. This was especially important for those which went back to the 1979 revolution and were in charge of security or public order issues. The Ministry of the Interior (MIGOB) and its current dependencies are important examples.[28] Since 1979, the MIGOB had been responsible for the organization and direction of the country's security bodies, when its primary objectives were to guarantee internal order and defend the Sandinista Revolution. It was only until the end of the 1990's that its functions were institutionalized in the *Organization, Competency and Proceedings Law of the Executive Power* (Law 290 of 1998). The National Police presented a similar case. Its origins went back to 1979 and it experienced substantial institutional transformations since then. In 1979 it was instituted as the Sandinista Police through the *Fundamental Statute of the Republic (La Gaceta No. 1, August 22, 1979)*, becoming the first independent institution from the army in the country, in replacement of the National Guard. It reached formal independence from its political origins through the 1995 Constitutional Reform (Law 192 of 1995), resulting in the enactment of its first Organic Law (Law 228 of 1996). The police continued to experience reform throughout the 2000's, after performing an organizational diagnostic of the institution in 1999 which resulted in the *National Police's Modernization and Development Plan for the Strengthening of Citizen Security 2001-2005*. Finally, in the case of the National Penitentiary System, while its origins also went back to 1979, it was only until 2003 that a law was enacted establishing its organization and functions.[29] Table 8 below shows the basic layout of the institutional framework for citizen security in Nicaragua. It reflects that the institutional development for this purpose is very recent in the country.

Table 8. Basic institutional framework for citizen security in Nicaragua

[28] The MIGOB's dependencies are the National Police, the division of Firemen, the Division of Migration, the National Penitentiary System and Departmental Delegations.

[29] Law of the Penitentiary Regimen and the Execution of Sentences (Law 473 of 2003).

Institution	Function	Legal base
Ministry of Governance	Coordinating with the national police to guarantee public order, citizen security, the persecution of crime and the enforcement of humanitarian laws in the National Penitentiary System; and to contribute to the formulation of crime prevention programs alongside private and social institutions.	*Organization, Competency and Proceedings Law of the Executive Power* (Law 290 of 1998) and on the reform to this law in 2007 (Law 612), which among other changes, granted civil authority to the president over the National Police, exercised through the MIGOB.[30]
National Police	Vigilance and prevention, intelligence, administrative tasks and judicial assistance (receive crime reports, investigate crimes and felonies, detain alleged perpetrators, help the victims, and recover and analyze evidence).	*Fundamental Statute of the Republic* (La Gaceta No. 1, August 22, 1979), in replacement of the National Guard, but it only reached a formal independence from its political origins through the *1995 Constitutional Reform (Law 192 of 1995).* The first organic law of the National Police came in 1996 *(Law 228).*
National Penitentiary System	Executing sentences and preventive measures dictated by the judicial courts, reeducating prisoners for their reintegration into society, and promoting family unity, health and productive occupation of prisoners.	*Law of the Penitentiary Regimen and the Execution of Sentences (Law 473 of 2003).* The origins of the National Penitentiary System, however, also go back to 1979 (UNDP, 2011).
Public Ministry	prosecuting role and representation of the interests of society and the victims of crime during criminal procedure, through the Attorney General.	*Organic law of the Public Ministry (Law 346 of 2000)*
Judicial Power	Dictate and execute sentences. Its supreme body is the Supreme Court of Justice. There are Appeal Courts, District Courts (one in each department) and Local Courts (one in each municipality). Courts can be of a criminal, family, civil, labor or unique nature.	*Organic Law of the Judicial Power of Nicaragua (Law 260, 1998). Ruling of the Law 260, (Decree 63 of 1999)*
Public Defenders Office	It depends on the Supreme Court of Justice but has autonomy in its functions. It assigns public defenders to those without economic means to finance them.	*Organic Law of the Judicial Power of Nicaragua (Law 260, 1998, articles 211-217)*
Medical Forensics Institute	Aid the courts, the National Police, the Attorney General's Office and the Office of the Procurator of Human Rights in elaborating legal medical diagnostics that allow the typification of crime based on evidence; and perform prisoner and victim evaluations according to the law, among others.	*Organic Law of the Judicial Power of Nicaragua (Law 260, 1998, articles 183-186). Ruling of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power of Nicaragua (Decree 63 of 1999,Chapter XII, section I, artícles 87 – 92)*
National Commission/Council of Coexistence and Citizen Security	Coordinating and consultative body for the design, evaluation and execution of programs, strategies and government policies that support the promotion of coexistence and citizen security. It	*Creation of the National Commission of Coexistence and Citizen Security (Presidential Decree No. 83 of 2004) Creation of the Councils and Cabinets of Citizen Power (Decree No. 110 of*

[30] The MIGOB has formal authority over the National Police, the Migration, Fire Fighters and National Penitentiary System divisions, as well as Departmental Delegations.

	responds to the Presidency of the Republic, which, since 2007, exercises power in the Council through the Director of the National Police. The Council's participants became more numerous after Decree 110 of 2007: 15 government, 2 religious and 3 civil society representatives, alongside the Councils and Cabinets of Citizen Power.	*2007)*
National Multidisciplinary Commission for the Control of Light and Small Arms	Technical instance for the formulation and proposition of public policies in relation to the control and regulation of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related material. The Commission can also formulate policies on arms trafficking and present them to the Ministry of Governance.	*Special Law for the Control and Regulation of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Material (Law 510 of 2005)*
National Council for the Fight against Drugs/Organized Crime	Formulate national policies and programs for the prevention and fight against narcotrafficking, goods, money or asset laundering and organized crime that endanger public health and national security and defense.	*Law for the Prevention, Investigation and Persecution of Organized Crime and for the Administration of Seized, Confiscated or Abandoned Goods (Law 735 of 2010)*

Since the end of the civil war, Nicaragua has undertaken reforms towards improving citizen security, including the modernization and professionalization of the police that started in the mid-1990s (Cuadra, 2005). After the end of the war, the Police faced intense political pressure from within the country and from the United States to eliminate its historic links to the FSLN and define its institutional purpose. The first step it took towards this goal was to acquire a new legal framework that guaranteed a non-partisan nature. This was accomplished with the mentioned Organic Law of 1996 (Law 228). The second step was producing the 1999 diagnostic of the institution, which identified that the police had an obsolete legal framework for the fulfillment of its duties; offered low salaries that affected the quality of work and the motivation behind it; there were judicial and functional inconsistencies between the justice administrative system, the police and the penitentiary system; the absence of a national policy and/or strategy for citizen security; weaknesses in the institutional system for strategic planning; limited capacity for regulation and control over private security services; a non-consolidated gender focus; weaknesses in the administrative system of human resources, and restrictions in the installed capacity (Cuadra, 2005). The diagnostic gave way to the quinquennial program named *National Police's Modernization and Development Plan for the Strengthening of Citizen Security*, for which the first period of operation was 2001-2005. The primary objective of the plan was to strengthen the governance of the police, consolidate its institutional base and increase its service capacity. According to Cuadra (2005), the budget of the plan was US $49.3 million. The actions towards the fulfillment of this plan included increasing rural and municipal coverage, strengthening the fight against narcotrafficking and drug consumption, and implementing policies for the prevention and integral attention of youth violence.

Since then, other projects to aid the police have also started with the aid of international donors, some of which are specified in table 9, below.

Table 9. International cooperation for the modernization of the police: situation of programs reported by June 30, 2010.

Source	Period	Program	Amount (2012 current USD)*
ASDI-Sweden/Norway	2006-2010	Strengthening and restructuring of the Nicaraguan National Police, improvement of its relationship with the community and modernization of its training system.	1,601,786.75
AECID	2008-2011	Strengthening and modernization of the Central Criminalistic Laboratory	2,467,085.16
DANIDA	2009-2010	Strengthening of the operative capacity of the Women and Children Precinct Division of the National Police (CMN). Phases I and II.	1,162,921.89
UNFPA	2010	Sexual and reproductive health projects for the Police Academy (ACAPOL) and the CMN.	259,825.26
GTZ	2009-2010	Strengthening of the CMN and gender role in the National Police	229,319.25
Common Fund/AECID	2009-2010	Contribution to the financing of the Strategic Plan 2008-2012 of the National Police	595,996.21
Netherlands	2009-2012	Support for the execution of the Strategic plan 2008-2012 of the National police	1,353,001.46
International plan	2010	Prevention and attention for girls, boys, adolescents and youth in the community. Social Community Model	2,818.04
Taiwan	2007-2011	Project uniforms for the National police	254,990.06
FAC (Norway, Switzerland, UNDP)	2010-2012	Strengthening of the preventive and investigative capacities of the Police institution in the fight against public corruption.	264,025.49
AECID/UNDP	2010-2011	Strengthening of the police institution and consolidation of its Community proactive Model through the improvement of the capacities of ACAPOL.	471,411.34
OEI/AECID	2010-2011	Project for the integrated model of attention to victims of intra-family violence and sexual violence in the District II of Managua and the Delegation of Puerto Cabeza.	229,606.71
Leon-Saragoza	2010-2011	Construction of a Women's Precinct (CMN) in the Police Delegation of Leon.	201,166.49
BCIE-UNDP	2010	Increase Coverage of the Nicaraguan National Police for the strengthening of citizen security. Phase II	53,673.32
IDB	2005-2010	Citizen Security Project/Strengthening and Increase Coverage of Community Policing by the National Police	1,511,054.60
Source: Data obtained by OVE from the IDB Nicaragua Office and the National Police. * USD 1= NIO 23.9225			

Nicaragua also developed a National Policy on Citizen Security, although it has not been approved yet. The first diagnostic on citizen security at the national level was released in 2002. [31] It included seven strategic lines to address the problems identified. Among these problems there was drug consumption, youth gangs, intra-family violence, robberies and theft, traffic accidents and cattle rustling. The diagnostic also mentioned risk factors such as unemployment,

[31] Valle, Marcos and Arguello, Ana Isabel (2002). "National Diagnostic of Citizen Security", Ministry of the Interior (MIGOB). Managua. This document is could not be found for consultation.

exclusion, migration, the traditional family model, adolescent pregnancies, child and adolescent labor, influence of the media, among others. In 2004, the Division for Coexistence and Citizen Security (DCSC) was created through presidential decree 83 of 2004 under the direction of the MIGOB. The DCSC adopted the seven strategic lines identified in the diagnostic, as described in table 10 below.

Table 10. The seven strategic lines to address citizen security

Strategic lines	Approaches and Objectives
1. Drugs	***Approach:*** Education, integral prevention of drug consumption (primary, secondary and tertiary), violence prevention, participation. ***Objective:*** Contribute to lessen the vulnerability of the youth, adolescent and child population regarding the adoption of addictive habits that facilitate violence, with special attention to risk groups in departments with major incidence of drug sales and delinquency violence, centered in education, adoption of healthy habits, treatment, rehabilitation and reinsertion in society.
2. Youth violence	***Approach:*** Gangs, violence prevention, community prevention, integral reinsertion, participation. ***Objective:*** Strengthen the existing organizations in the community, oriented towards the prevention and rehabilitation of adolescents and youths immersed in youth violence-be it at the individual level, the gang level, and its link to drug dependency, drug selling and intra-family violence- and articulate efforts between the community, institutions and civil society organizations.
3. Intra-family/domestic and sexual violence	***Approach:*** Community prevention, sensibilization and training; and detection and integral attention. ***Objective:*** promote a multidimensional and inter-sectorial approach through the development and strengthening of formal and community networks in the detection and attention of intra-family and sexual violence from a community and family perspective. Articulated effort with specific government entities.
4. Robberies	***Approach:*** Community prevention, sensibilization, training, victimization. ***Objective:*** Train inhabitants with respect to conceptual and practical tools that influence feelings of security and the chance of becoming a victim of robbery.
5. Transit security	***Approach:*** Sensibilization, training, education, law abiding, prevention of accidents at the community level, formal rehabilitation. ***Objective:*** Attend transit security, contributing to accident prevention through education and training, and develop and strengthen the institutional bodies and the appliance norms of its principles and practices.
6. Local community prevention	***Approach:*** Territoriality, principal problems, insecurity feelings, participation. ***Objective:*** Help stop the deterioration of citizen security in the territories and elevate feelings of security by the inhabitants, universalizing community prevention at the local level and deepening the relationship community-police.
7. Social communication	***Approach:*** Sensibilization, education, law abiding, principal problems, participation, community prevention. ***Objective:*** Develop actions directed towards public opinion and the media that tend to influence the assessment of insecurity, crime, delinquency and violence problems by citizens, and encourage community prevention and participation, and inform the public on the interventions related to the strategic lines.

Source: Cuadra (2005).

In 2007, the new government put forward the National Human Development Plan (NHDP). The NHDP was the culmination of various strategic collaborative processes initiated from the time the Government of Reconciliation and National Unity (GRUN- for its acronym in Spanish) took office in 2007. It is based on the *Citizen Power Model* that places humans at the center of the model, and its discourse calls for the restoration to the people of the role of the State in leading social progress. The NHDP defines citizen security as “the right of every person, be he/she national or foreigner, residing in the national territory, to develop their daily lives with a low risk

of threat to their physical integrity, property and civil rights" (NHDP, 2009: p.60). It refers to the problem of citizen insecurity as being multi-causal and gives emphasis to strengthening and deepening the relationships between state institutions and local communities through citizen power, as well as improving inter-institutional coordination in the road to achieving short and mid-term goals that lead to a State Policy on Citizen Security (NHDP, 2009: p.61).

On its part, the IDB supported Citizen Security Project (CSP) included a proposal for a National Plan and a Public Policy on Citizen Security in Nicaragua, which were never approved by the Parliament. The Plan was designed as an instrument with purposes, goals, environments for action, relevant actors and sectors, modes of intervention for State management, and the establishment of guidelines for civil society. The general objectives of the Plan were, first, to promote citizen security and co-existence as key factors behind the quality of life and the development of the Nicaraguan society, and second, to implement a set of actions in diverse contexts to stop and reduce crime, violence and the sensation of insecurity that damages citizen coexistence. There were seven specific objectives, which were:

(i) The social prevention of risk factors, including exclusion and poverty, and the promotion of socio-preventive measures through the participation of social organizations with the municipality and in association with the National Police;
(ii) The prevention of real and potential victimization through the reduction of vulnerabilities of being a victim of common crime and domestic violence, through the strategic prevention in groups at risk, through increased assistance to victims and access to justice, and through the reduction of fear and sensation of insecurity in vulnerable groups.
(iii) Crime prevention through the optimal use of space and specific situations. This would be done through increased police vigilance for situational crime prevention, through the reduction of opportunities for crime and violence in public spaces, and through the improvement of criminal justice;
(iv) Prevention of risk factors associated with the risk of becoming a delinquent, such as school drop-out, family disintegration, social exclusion and opportunities for youths.
(v) Prevention for the interruption of criminal activity through improvements to the penal justice system, increased security in prisons, improvement of alternative measures of imprisonment and the practice of a treatment model to enhance possibilities of prisoner conduct rehabilitation.
(vi) The promotion of values, rules of conduct and information for social coexistence, through social values, social participation, communication campaigns for the active involvement of citizens in social prevention actions, for the increasing of crime reporting and teach guidelines for community vigilance; and
(vii) Prevention, based on efficient and effective technical administration of institutions for better citizen security, through the creation of a National System of Citizen Security

that integrates and links all public services and the National Police; the strengthening of management capacity of private and public institutions; the purchase of better equipment for the National Police; among others.

On its part, the National Public Policy on Citizen Security has two general objectives. First, to put in practice the above mentioned National Plan for Citizen Security and Coexistence. Second, to promote measures and actions that make the perpetration of crime and violence more difficult, that give an incentive for a more active and responsible role on the part of local governments, and that materialize the participation of the citizenry and civil society organizations as a complement of the improvement of the performance of state organisms in charge of security and protection of people and their rights. The Policy is based on nine baseline principles: integrity, efficient and effective management, coproduction, double focalization, social participation and local coalition, socio preventive emphasis, situational emphasis, administrative decentralization and inter-institutional coordination and work.

Over the past decade there has also been a new body of legislation approved that relates to citizen security, of which is worth highlighting the Code of Childhood and Adolescence of 1998, which endorsed the ideal of children's rights as being a central concern of public policy (as stated by the UN Convention on The Rights of the Child in 1989, which Nicaragua signed and ratified); a new Code of Criminal Procedure (2002), which replaced the inquisitor model of criminal procedure with an accusatory model; a new Criminal Code (2008), which modified some categories of crime, making them less numerous and possibly explaining a drop in reported crime related to domestic and sexual violence (UNDP, 2010). The active implementation of these laws has not always been a reality due to budgetary constraints and a lack of political and ideological will, according to Maclure and Sotelo (2003) and toRocha (2005). More generally, according to a diagnostic by UNDP in 2010, the institutions in charge of providing security and justice in Nicaragua do not have enough territorial coverage and reflect an unequal development, although having certain strengths for the coordination of their actions. Their capacity to promote inter-institutional plans is limited in fact due to the absence of a National Policy on Citizen Security. Such a plan indeed allows for an optimal allocation of roles and responsibilities to the different institutions involved. There are no official inter-institutional indicators on the incidence of crime or on the social perception of insecurity, victimization and underreporting figures at the national, departmental or municipal levels. These indicators are necessary to design and implement well documented citizen security policies locally. Nevertheless, according to the same report, Nicaragua has made an effort since the end of the civil war to enhance state legitimacy in various fronts, mainly through the enactment of new laws.

VI. BUDGET ANALYSIS: EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL BUDGET DEDICATED TO CITIZEN SECURITY AND DONOR PARTICIPATION

A. Evolution of national budget dedicated to citizen security (2006-2012)

OVE undertook a novel exercise of estimating the evolution of the national budget allocated to citizen security in Nicaragua. The rationale for this exercise was to have a clearer assessment of the governmental priority given to the issue, and within it, the favored approach.[32] OVE did the exercise by institution and program with the information available on the Budget Books of the Ministry of Finance. These books contain disaggregated information of the approved budget by Congress between 2006 and 2012. OVE went through this disaggregated information and selected individual programs by institution whose mission was directly or indirectly relevant to violence and crime prevention. These institutions include criminal justice system institutions (including ministry of justice, national police, and penitentiary system among others) and social ministries (such as the ministry of youth (INJUVE), of family affairs (MIFAMILIA), of women affairs (INIM)). Annexes 1 and 2 show the estimated budget and the available description of each selected program.[33]

The exercise shows that during the period 2006-2012, social ministries, such as INJUVE, MIFAMILIA, INIM (among others) that focus on social prevention activities, received decreasing amounts from the central government to finance violence prevention-related activities. On the other hand, the National Penitentiary System received less than 5 percent of the annual estimated citizen security budget (figure 9). Within the police, one Program, called *Strategic Prevention of Crime* and *Police Administrative Services,* received the largest share of the total budget allocated to the police, with on average 61.4 percent of this budget during the period 2008-2012. This program's purpose is to comply with the objectives of the *Proactive Community Police Model*, which include: prevention of crime at the community level; the establishment of good relationships with the different social groups in the community; a preventive approach to juvenile violence; preventive focus against domestic and sexual violence; and specialized training (National Police, 2011). This model is executed through four specialized divisions: the Police Academy, the Public Security Division, the Women and Children Precinct Division; and the Juvenile Issues Division, as summarized by Table 11. Finally, the lowest share of the National Police's budget between 2008 and 2012 was assigned to the DCSC, in charge of the CSP and inter-institutional coordination (table 12).

[32] By favored approach, we mean criminal justice approach, social prevention approach, and situational prevention approach among others.

[33] This exercise involves a subjective selection, and therefore only suggests estimations. However, OVE reviewed very carefully all programs and included all those whose description could directly or indirectly contribute to violence and crime prevention. As such, the estimates are to be interpreted on the high side.

Table 11. Systematizing axes of the community policing model

Specialty	Model	Axes				
Police Academy	**Total School**	Curriculum development of the Police Education System	Training of teachers, monitoring staff and instructors of the Police Education System	Organization and management of the Police Education System	Gender focus	Human rights
Public Security Division	**Police-Community Relationship**	Community social organization	Chief of Sector work and the integration of the Voluntary Police within the population	Police-community relationship in crime prevention		
Women and Children Precinct Division	**Specialized Attention to Domestic and Sexual Violence**	Specialized Integral Attention	Team work	Training		
Juvenile Issues Division	**Integral Attention to Juvenile Violence**	Superior interest in youth, adolescence and childhood	Shared and coordinated responsibility with the different actors	Community participation in general and of children and adolescents in particular.		

Source: National Police (2011)

Figure 9. Participation of institutions in the citizen security budget (2006-2012)



Notes: *MIFAM, MINED, MIPRES, INIM, INJUVE, IND, ICAD, PDDH, CNC y CNDERF.
Source: Own calculations based on the *Budget Books* from the Ministry of Finance.

Table 12. Distribution of the citizen security budget within the national police (current million cordobas)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
A. Division of Police Administrative Services	254.4	325.0	262.7	234.6	458.3
B. Strategic Prevention of Crime	683.6	636.8	676.3	762.6	832.1
C. Investigation and Persecution of Crime	60.3	94.1	130.1	184.5	161.1
D. Citizen Security and Coexistence Division (DCSC)	27.959	51.334	35.304	1.971	1.943
A/(A+B+C+D)	24.8%	29.4%	23.8%	19.8%	31.5%
B/(A+B+C+D)	66.6%	57.5%	61.2%	64.4%	57.3%
C/(A+B+C+D)	5.9%	8.5%	11.8%	15.6%	11.1%
D/(A+B+C+D)	2.7%	4.6%	3.2%	0.2%	0.1%

Notes*:* **Source**- Budget Books of the Ministry of Finance 2008-2012. **Definitions**- *Division of Police Administrative Services:* Its fundamental objectives are to reach the citizenry through the simplification and speeding up of administrative processes and requirements. This is oriented towards the decentralization of the most sensitive and in demand services such as the provision of driver licenses, permits for carrying weapons and for public and private security agencies to operate (Orozco et al., 2008; Budget Books of the Ministry of Finance, 2008). *Strategic Prevention of Crime*: This program's purpose is to comply with the objectives of the Proactive Community Police Model, which concentrate on the following tasks: prevention of crime at the community level; the establishment of good relationships with the different social groups in the community; a preventive approach to juvenile violence; preventive focus against domestic and sexual violence; and specialized training (National Police, 2011). *Investigation and Persecution of Crime:* This program investigates felonies, public prosecution offenses and privately actionable crimes. *Coexistence and Citizen Security*: This program is managed by the DCSC. It receives and analyzes data relevant to order and citizen security; it studies, plans and executes methods and techniques of crime prevention, and it is in charge of inter-institutional coordination for these tasks (Budget Books of the Ministry of Finance, 2008).

B. International donors' support to citizen security in Nicaragua (2006-2012)

Regarding international funding, the period 2006-2012 is characterized by the withdrawal of traditional donors and the World Bank following reports of irregularities in the 2008 municipal elections (IMF, 2012). With this in mind, OVE analysis, based on data from the Nicaraguan Ministry of Finance, finds that donor participation for citizen security fell throughout the period. Table 13 below shows the reported amounts and shares of both government and donor participation in the OVE estimation of the citizen security budget in Nicaragua.[34] Donor support (measured in current NIO) halved during the period, from NIO 627 million in 2007 to NIO 317 million in 2012. Between 2006 and 2012, government funds and IDB loans were the most important sources of finance for this estimated budget.

Table 13. Distribution of government and donor participation in the estimated citizen security approved budget. Nicaragua (2006-2012)

	2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
Source of Income	**Amount**	**Share**	**Amount**	**Share**	**Amount**	**Share**	**Amount**	**Share**	**Amount**	**Share**	**Amount**	**Share**	**Amount**	**Share**
Treasury rents and/or earmarked rents	97.6	18.9%	94.8	15.1%	125.7	21.6%	78.5	21.7%	55.9	27.7%	150.5	37.4%	228.4	71.9%
Save the Children	7.4	1.4%	1.0	0.2%										
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	6.0	1.2%	9.6	1.5%					0.8	0.4%				
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	1.2	0.2%							0.5	0.2%				
Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI)	4.5	0.9%	6.8	1.1%	3.6	0.6%	17.8	4.9%	29.9	14.8%	38.3	9.5%		
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)	0.5	0.1%	25.4	4.0%	21.9	3.8%	26.6	7.3%	17.8	8.8%				
Norway/Supplementary Social Fund (FSS)*	0.4	0.1%												
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	3.2	0.6%	2.1	0.3%	1.1	0.2%	1.1	0.3%						
Canadian International Development Agency (ACDI)	5.5	1.1%	22.4	3.6%										
Government of Denmark	7.9	1.5%	46.4	7.4%	44.1	7.6%	132.3	36.5%	1.5	0.8%	3.0	0.7%		
Governmenth of the Netherlands			12.7	2.0%	19.7	3.4%					0.5	0.1%	0.4	0.1%
Government of Canada			1.0	0.2%	55.3	9.5%								
Government of Spain			7.6	1.2%										
Government of Taiwan			2.2	0.4%			8.6	2.4%	9.1	4.5%	48.3	12.0%		
Government of Norway					2.2	0.4%			1.5	0.7%	2.5	0.6%	0.5	0.2%
Government of The United States			5.7	0.9%										
World Bank	23.4	4.5%	31.3	5.0%									10.7	3.4%
Central American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE)	110.0	21.3%	86.8	13.8%	47.2	8.1%	16.4	4.5%						
Interamercan Development Bank (IDB)	249.5	48.2%	265.9	42.4%	261.4	44.9%	77.1	21.3%	81.7	40.5%	150.0	37.3%	68.3	21.5%
International Plan USA			0.9	0.1%										
World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF)			4.5	0.7%										
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)			0.1	0.0%										
European Union							3.6	1.0%					3.1	1.0%
Bilateral Governments- Common Fund of the National Police									3.0	1.5%	8.9	2.2%	6.2	1.9%
Other donors	0.6	0.1%												
TOTAL	517.6	**100.0%**	627.1	**100.0%**	582.1	**100.0%**	362.0	**100.0%**	201.7	**100.0%**	402.0	**100.0%**	317.5	**100.0%**
*The FSS was created through Decre 46 of 1998 as a Government fund to finance social programs.														

Notes: Amount figures are in current Nicaraguan Million Córdobas (NIO). Source- Own calculations based on the *Budget Books* of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Finance. IDB programs include Citizen Security Project NI0168, Judiciary Branch Modernization Project NI0081, Social Safety Net Stage II Project NI0161, Comprehensive Child Care Program (PAININ phase III) Project NI-L1009, Social Safety Net Program NI0161, and Program for the Institutional Strengthening for the Protection of Vulnerable Groups Phase II.

C. Disbursement of the Citizen Security Project

Based on data directly provided by the Finance Division of the Nicaraguan National Police, in the estimated budget, OVE also found that the level of budget execution of the CSP was low in 2007 and 2008, especially for the *Prevention and Attention on Domestic Violence against*

[34] These amounts reported by the Nicaraguan Ministry of Finance can be traced to specific programs. The information is available upon request. Also, the program descriptions can be found in Annex 2.

Women subcomponent, showing an execution level of 20 percent and 46 percent in those two years, respectively. At the end of the project, in 2010, however, the level of disbursement was virtually 100 percent for all project components.

Table 14. Budget execution of CSP NI0168 by sub component (2007-2010)

	2007		2008		2009		2010	
	Executed budget	Degree of Execution	Executed budget	Degree of Execution	Executed budget	Degree of Execution	Executed budget	Degree of Execution
INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING DGCSC (NATIONAL COUNTERPART)	3.9	91.9%	5.4	65.4%	5.8	84.7%	5.9	100.0%
REDUCTION OF VIOLENCE (NATIONAL POLICE)	1.8	61.9%	4.9	89.4%	7.2	83.8%	2.6	99.3%
SOCIAL PREVENTION OF JUVENILE VIOLENCE COMPONENT	0.5	77.7%	0.6	98.9%	1.8	96.6%	1.5	96.2%
SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF YOUTH GANG MEMBERS	0.4	97.5%	0.4	62.8%	2.0	97.4%	8.6	99.8%
SOCIAL COMMUNICATION COMPONENT	1.1	32.5%	3.1	90.4%	4.1	80.1%	3.5	99.9%
PROJECT FOR THE ATTENTION AND PRVENTION OF JUVENILE VIOLENCE	3.8	99.2%	2.8	78.4%	2.7	96.1%	3.4	97.8%
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE IN SCHOOL COMMUNITIES	1.8	62.5%	6.1	90.0%	6.8	99.9%	6.9	99.8%
PROGRAM FOR THE INTEGRAL ATTENTION TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS AT HIGH RISK (PAINAR)	1.1	97.1%	1.6	85.5%	2.2	90.9%	2.7	97.7%
PREVENTION AND ATTENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN - INIM	0.4	19.9%	0.7	45.8%	0.6	86.4%	0.7	100.0%
CITIZEN SECURITY PROJECT- INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE DGCSC (1590-SF-NI)	-	-	5.3	100.0%	-	-	-	-
CONSTRUCTION OF ROOS AND LIBRARY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF TIPITAPA	-	-	1.9	98.7%	0.5	97.0%	-	-
CONSTRUCTION OF ROOMS AND LIBRARY FOR THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM OF GRANADA	-	-	1.1	53.9%	2.9	98.7%	-	-
REHABILITATION OF THE NATIONAL SCHOOL OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND SPORTS OF THE IND	-	-	-	-	2.1	99.5%	-	-
CONSTRUCTION OF MULTIUSE COURTS AND VISITING ROOM FOR THE ADOLESCENTS' SPECIAL AREA IN TIPITAPA	-	-	-	-	1.84	100.0%		-
ACQUISITION OF BUNKS	-	-	0.1	90.6%	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	**14.8**	**71.1%**	**34.0**	**80.7%**	**40.6**	**93.2%**	**35.9**	**98.9%**

Notes: The executed budget is reported in million current córdobas. Source: Own calculations based on information provided by the Finance Division of the Nicaragua National Police.

VII. IDB SUPPORTED CITIZEN SECURITY PROJECT

This section presents a summary of the Citizen security project supported by the IDB, findings on the CSP implementation from OVE missions, and a summary of exercises undertaken or commissioned by OVE to better understand the local context and needs of youth-at-risk in Nicaragua as well to attempt assessing results of some of the interventions financed by the project.

A. Citizen Security Project summary

According to the project document, the Citizen Security Project's main objective was to contribute to improve the level of citizen security supporting the reduction of juvenile violence and delinquency in selected municipalities. IT specific objectives were threefold: (i) To increase the effectiveness of institutions in charge of citizen security; (ii) to increase the level of social integration of youth; and (iii) to strengthen the municipal and community responsibility.

To achieve these objectives, the project financed the following four components:

(i) Institutional strengthening;
(ii) Youth violence prevention in 11 municipalities ;
(iii) Community policing; and
(iv) Communication strategy.

The table below summarizes the sub-components, activities and costs for each component.

Component	Sub-component	Activities	Cost
1: Institutional strengthening	1.1Strengthening of DGCSC	Consultancy, consultants, equipment	US$0.539
	1.2Preparation of public policy and inclusion within the national plan of coexistence and citizen security	Validation and adjustment of the national plan elaborated through the Japanese TC + process of validation of the policy and plan through consensus building among institutions: national forums, publication of key doc, one international forum and specific technical assistance	US$0.075 and TC: Japanese Special Fund: ATN/JF-7727-NI
	1.3Training	Consultant for elaboration of a training plan for DGCSC staff and co-executing agencies + consultants for the implementation of training plan including study tour	US$0.162
	1.4Support to inter-institutional coordination	Consultancy to support the design of coordination mechanisms (including processes and conduct codes) at national level, between national and local levels and at local level within municipalities. Field visits between municipalities to exchange experiences. Support to DGCSC as superior coordinator and of Comité Tecnico de Coordinacion interinstitucional (CTCI) as coordinating agency between MIGOB and other institutions part to the program	US$0.06

	1.5Integrated information system for citizen security (SIISC)	Observatory of information on citizen security + reliable and integrated management tools on crime and violence to improve efficiency + data collection tools to assess the effectiveness of interventions financed by the program and mechanisms to improve management+ dissemination through online publications → support (?) to design and develop the SIISC, to develop management models and to train staff , analysts and users.	US$2.2; co-financed with Korean Government (US$2M)
	1.6M&E system	Measures, technical capacities and implementation of M&E system at 24 months and at the end of the execution of the program	US$0.2 + Swedish TC: ATN/FW-8805-NI
2: Social prevention of youth violence	2.1Interventions through education system	Development of "Programa Educación para la Vida" in 11 municipalities part of the program, including selection and training of teachers counselors and the preparation and implementation of violence prevention plans in schools as well as the monitoring of activities by counselors.	US$1.1
	2.2Vocational training and promotion of youth employment	Support to SEJUVE through increasing coverage of youth employment information centers and plans of transition to work (microenterprises and vocational training)	US$0.443
	2.3Promotion of positive use of free time	IND and its national academy for sports through training of sports teachers + support to Programa Educación para la Vida of the MECD through sports tournaments in primary and secondary schools	US$0.497
	2.4Prevention and attention to intra-family violence against women	Promote the National plan of prevention of intra-family and sexual violence of the INIM, with a focus on the 11 participating municipalities+ capacity building of different actors at local level in 11 municipalities including women's groups and monitoring of activities.	US$0.323
	2.5Prevention and attention to children and youth at risk	Development of community-based prevention model of PAINAR from MIFAMILIA (schools of fathers and mothers + training of family advisers) + reference and counter-reference system (to ensure better monitoring and avoid duplication)	US$0.733
	2.6Social reintegration of pandillas members	(a) Preparation and dissemination of manuals on successful practices on youth violence, in particular pandillas with SEJUVE and MIGOB. This should help develop a methodology for interventions. (b) Mapping of pandillas in 11 municipalities (and characteristics): support to SEJUVE (how many, where, dynamics, homicides). (c) Reintegration of pandilleros in 11 municipalities: interventions will be defined based on a and b.	US$0.825
	2.7Prevention to reincidence of youth delinquents	Pilot program: psychological help, coordination with police and other agencies (?) to monitor the reinsertion of youth.	US$0.376
3: Community policing (11 municipalities + 25	3.1Modernization of police communication and information system	Complement the SIISC of MIGOB strengthening component through modernization de information and communication systems for national police.	US$0.767 with Banco Centroamericano de

others)			Integración Económica (BCIE) total support of community policing: US$2.86M
	3.2Improvement and development of attention to youth and intrafamily violence	Improvement and development of youth violence and family violence attention: one study, participatory diagnostics for municipal plans of action + training of police (inc.l materials production)+ support to Comisaria de la Mujer y la Niñez program (training, equipment of comisarias in some districts)	US$0.605
	3.3Development of territorial coverage of national police and equipment	Increase rural and municipal coverage of PN (furniture and office equipment, basic technical equipment – non lethal and technical means for road safety)	US$1.8
	3.4Strengthening of police staff training	Support to police academy: evaluation of entry selection to police, training for heads of sector; evaluation of classes to police officers at all levels; and new program of technical exchange with academics, and foreign criminologists.	US$0.118
	3.5Training of non police officers involved in community policing	Training for civil servants of DGCSC, mayors, staff from local executing agencies and other actors on community policing (with local universities and /or foreign universities).	US$0.047
	3.6Support to preventive and investigative task of general inspector	Internal audit strengthening including and internal communication campaign with NP to inform on the role of audits	US$0.053
4: Social communication		Multi-media social communication campaigns (TV, radio, newspapers, etc) change stereotypes associated with youth, crime and violence, and educate people on the importance of reporting abuse and crime.	US$0.667

The project had a total cost of USD12.8 million, of which the IDB financed USD 7.2 million. The IDB project was approved in 2004 and closed in 2010. The detail of the IDB support by component is presented in table 15. It shows that the IDB financing focused on the youth violence prevention component.

Table 15. IDB support by component

Item	**Amount US$M**	**%**	**IDB**	**%**
Total	12.8	100%	7.2	56.25%
Component 1: MIGOB strengthening	3.8	30%	1.2	10%
Component 2: youth violence prevention	4.333	34%	4.333	**34%**

Component 3: community policing	3.355	26%	0.5	3.16%
Component 4: Social communication	0.667	5%	0.667	5%
External audit	0.3	3%	0.3	2.5%
Financing costs		2%		

The original executing agency of the project was the General Direction of Coexistence and Citizen Security (DGCSC), created through Executive Decree No. 25 of 2006 as a dependency of the Ministry of the Interior (MIGOB). The DGCSC's mandate was to contribute to the reduction of social violence and crime rates through the strengthening of State institutions and civil society working on citizen security issues, and towards a stronger inter-institutional coordination. The DGCSC was modified in 2007. It was made a dependency of the National Police through Executive Decree No. 15 of that year.

B. Project implementation: findings from OVE missions

OVE carried out two missions to Nicaragua during 2012 for the comparative evaluation, one in April and another one in July. The team interviewed different actors involved in the project and retrieved information to incorporate in the analysis. The interviews allowed the team to gain insight on the project's implementation. The comparative evaluation presents the findings in comparison with the four other projects under review. Below we summarize some of the findings from the missions that fed the analysis present in the comparative evaluation.

1. *Informality of implementation processes*

Throughout the interviews we were able to obtain little precise information regarding the interventions of the project and there was limited attention to OVE's requests for additional information on statistics and figures, revealing a general opacity and concern from the project actors. This is why we complemented the interviews with observation and additional exercises (see section C) to better understand the implementation processes of the project. We observed that implementation processes were very informal at the municipal and even departmental levels in Nicaragua. Local work and training of personnel seemed rather improvised for many of the interventions. For instance, in the case of the INIM, training of personnel on the theme of gender was carried out through the "training of trainers", an informal process applied locally by female leaders or promotoras who were previously identified by the INIM in the different municipalities. The criteria for identification were not clear, nor whether their work was monitored in some way or if any supervision or feedback mechanisms existed on these practices. Similarly, the INJUVE used promotores to find and organize mothers and youths at risk in the municipalities by knocking on doors and

approaching them on the street, and the IND organized sports tournaments for youths on the basis of voluntary work in the communities. There seems to be a high degree of informality and lack of clarity for the implementation of local interventions in Nicaragua that lacks the rigor for serious monitoring of activities and results.

2. The lack of a clearly defined and permanent logical framework

Interviews with personnel from the DCSC showed that the absence of a clearly defined and permanent logical framework in the project became a major problem with its design, creating obstacles for the monitoring and evaluation of outcome indicators. The project was initiated without baseline indicators and the logical framework was modified three times, in 2005, 2008 and again in 2009 (PCR, 2011). Also, according to current DCSC director, the monitoring and evaluation system should have incorporated specialized institutions that could aid in the follow-up process, such as the National Institute of Development Information (INIDE- in charge of statistical information and census), the National Police, the Health Ministry (with hospital statistics), and the Supreme Court of Justice (with the death registry of the Medical Forensics Institute). There was also a strong concern from the start about the high complexity of the project vis-à-vis the little experience of personnel in administering them.

3. *The choice of the executing agency*

Debates between the Government and the IDB regarding whether the executing agency should be the MIGOB or the National police took place during the preparation phase of the project. It was finally decided to give the leadership to the MIGOB (option favored by the Bank) because it was a civilian entity that had a broader mission than the national police. However, this institution proved to be extremely vulnerable to the political context and eventually could not solve internal political rivalries that immobilized the project during the first three years of its implementation. In 2007, the National Police became the main executing agency. Its proactive community approach and its independent structure gained through a series of reforms made it more resilient to political influence. The National Police was also the main executing agency of other donors' projects. Once the project was handed over to it, the implementation effectively started.

4. Inter-institutional coordination

According to the interviews, the Technical Committees of Inter-Institutional Coordination (CTCIT) were important for the implementation of program activities. However, the decisions made within the CTCIT were controlled by the Police Chief of Sector (*jefe de sector*), which suggests that the police was exercising more influence over the project than it was initially supposed to through the DCSC. On the other hand, government autonomous institutions like the INJUVE, INIM and IND argued that the will of line ministries to work with them in the CTCIT

was not homogeneous and depended on the type of interventions. For instance, regarding the support of the program "Educación para la Vida" through sports tournaments that the IND delivered to the MECD, interviewees of the IND reported that the delegates of the MECD did not participate in the organization of the activities and only played a figurative role in public events. On the contrary, the Division of Juvenile Issues (DAJ) of the National Police worked closely with the IND to organize youths for the sports tournaments, thanks to the effective coordination among delegates of both instances.

Throughout the interviews with the executing and co-executing agencies, it was clear that the current government's discourse about strengthening community participation and influence was well established and accepted across line ministries and institutions. Paradoxically, however, the same interviews pointed towards a centralized and vertical coordination from the police towards the rest of the institutions involved in the CTCIT and a consultative rather than participative role of the communities in the interventions. The purpose of community inclusion by the proactive community policing model was challenged by these testimonies.

5. *High politicization at the local level*

The missions also revealed significant political pressure at the local level in Nicaragua. The Citizen Power Councils (*Consejos del Poder Ciudadano*) are local activist partisan bodies. They became increasingly influential throughout the duration of the project and undermined the relevance of the Committees for the Social Prevention of Crime that were created by the project. The citizen power councils became omnipresent and according to a number of interviewees politicized the interventions of the project. Illustrative of this politicization is an incident that happened during OVE's second mission. In the process of interviewing beneficiaries to evaluate the effectiveness of job training interventions for youth at risk, OVE team encountered obstacles to the implementation of fieldwork by some young political activists supporting the government. These youths thoroughly questioned the local INJUVE delegate who was assisting OVE team, about the nature of our presence. This generated delays in our work, but more importantly, suggested the presence of political scouts at the local level that intended controlling activities and interventions implemented in the neighborhoods.

6. *The role of other actors*

Finally, the different interviews revealed that the role of the Church was very important for the local implementation of project interventions. The church was respected and recognized as an important body behind social work, and it facilitated reaching out safely to the youths in high risk neighborhoods. In addition, the interviews revealed that while civil society organizations were formally included in the design, they were not effectively incorporated in the execution of the project. According to the NGO's interviewed, the National Police had no real will to work with them. In the best of cases, they were invited to meetings, but were not allowed to intervene in the design or execution of project interventions. Many interviewees suggested NGOs were

altogether ignored. A general perception of these organizations is that there has been a growing communication gap between them and the government since 2007.

C. Exercises summary

This section presents the main findings from two exercises commissioned or undertaken by OVE: (i) an ethnographic study of ex-pandilleros in the Reparto Shick in Managua; and (ii) a tracer study of beneficiaries of a vocational training program and psycho-emotional workshops in a locality part of the CSP, Diriamba. The first exercise aimed to better understand the phenomenon of pandillas in Nicaragua, and the situation and needs of youth-at-risk in one of the most violent neighborhood in Managua. It also aimed to collect their perception on the key institutions part of the project, namely the national police and other line ministries, and to assess the extent to which the services and activities supposedly targeted at them were in fact reaching them. The second exercise attempted to estimate the impact of an intervention that aimed to build the resilience of youths and equip them with skills so that they could find a job more easily.

1. Ethnographic study of juvenile gangs and (former) gang members[35] in Managua

The CSP's diagnostic emphasized the importance of youth gangs in Nicaragua. Those young people were in turn among the main target beneficiaries of the project. As such, OVE decided to finance a study that would characterize the situation of pandillas and their evolution over time; the access to services pandilleros had, the relevance of those services to youth gang members, and the perception of pandilleros on the main actors involved in the project, in particular the National Police. This exercise was important to better understand the needs of the main beneficiaries as well as to assess the relevance and identify potential implementation issues of the project. For this purpose, in-depth interviews were conducted with 17 gang members, 4 parents and 1 local leader in the neighborhoods "Elias Blanco" and "Macaraly"[36], located in the "Reparto Schick" conglomerate of marginalized neighborhoods found in the District V of Managua. Nicaraguan gang expert Jose Luis Rocha, who has been studying gangs in the *Reparto Schick* during the past 13 years, conducted the interviews in July 2012. Below we summarize the study's principal findings. More details are available in the corresponding background paper (Rocha, 2012), on OVE's website.

a. Characteristics of pandillas in the Reparto Schick

1. *Rocha (2012) divides the recent history of pandillas of the Reparto Schick into five periods: 1. the pre-institutional phase (1988-1992), 2. the golden phase (1993-1999), 3. the atomization phase (2000-2004), 4. the pacification phase (2005-2009) and 5. the reigniting*

[35] Gang members and *pandilleros* are used interchangeably.

[36] These neighborhood names are pseudonyms to help protect the identity of the interviewees.

phase (2010-2012). Broadly, in phase 1 youth gangs had no organic independence and were unable to self-perpetuate due to unclearly bounded territorial limits. In phase 2 the institutionalization of rules and the creation of foundation myths took place, and there was also an escalation in violence manifested in the use of weapons. This was the pinnacle phase of gang activity. In phase 3 the consumption of drugs started eroding the social structure and purpose of the *pandillas*. In phase 4 a flood of interventions by civil society temporarily pacified *pandillas*. In phase 5 *pandillas* similar to those of phase 2 started to emerge, this time with more weapons.

2. *The functioning of pandillas in the Reparto Schick during the Golden Phase (1993-1999) was based on an initial bond of friendship, a set of strict rules that allowed for strong social cohesion, and on foundational myths that give meaning to their activity.* The *pandilla's* raison d'être has always been to create a space in which youths that share difficult backgrounds (including family tragedies and school dropout), can come together to forge an identity of their own which provides them with the close bonds and self-esteem that they lost or never found within their families. The bond of friendship was thus an important initial building block of these groups. Yet once the *pandillas* were formed, they were held together by strict rules: (i) bravery in battle, (ii) loyalty to one another and to the *pandilla* as a shield against authorities, and (iii) respect for the neighborhood and the protection of its people. Living up to these rules made the *pandillero* feel good about himself, gain prestige among his fellow *pandilleros* and be attractive to the opposite sex. It created a sense of identity and belonging and justified the use of violence in his activities. Similarly, foundational myths were the legacy of the first *pandillas* that formed during the Pre-Institutional Phase (1988-1992). These *pandillas* were considered legendary ancestors of current *pandillas*, serving as an appealing cultural background for *pandilleros* to identify with.

3. *The appearance of drug markets at the neighborhood level was a catalyzer of both gang activity and dissolution during the Atomization Phase (2000-2004) of pandillas in the Reparto Schick.* In particular, since the consumption of crack cocaine began amongst *pandilla* members, they began to get involved in unprecedented criminal activity against the people of their own neighborhood. The result was the erosion of the *pandillas´* social structure and strength, and the loss of its prestige among the local population.

4. *The use of weapons escalated throughout the Pre-Institutional and Golden Phases of pandilla activity and is currently in its most sophisticated stage.* During the first of these phases there were mostly fistfights between *pandillas*. Later, the use of bladed weapons was the most common. By the Reigniting Phase (2010-2012), the industry of handcrafted weapons has been fully developed.

5. *Although parents, mostly mothers, state that their efforts to correct their young sons/daughters involvement in pandillas is futile, they approve of violence because it is related to defensive actions to protect the neighborhood.* Moreover, parents are sometimes *ex-pandilleros* themselves and thus feel this behavior is legitimate.

b. Access to services and interventions to prevent youth gang activities and violence

6. *The access to services for youths at risk is limited by a lack of opportunities and by the diminishing expectations of these youths over time.* In terms of employment, it is very hard for *pandilleros* to find a full time job. Although their social record could improve in the eyes of the population through their religious activity in church, their police record is an insurmountable obstacle for this purpose. Moreover, there are informal jobs from which youths can derive a higher daily income relative to working in a fixed occupation like welding or carpentry, including washing cars in parking lots, car windows in traffic lights or selling illegal drugs on the street. Thus, there is a high opportunity cost of dedicating time to a fixed occupation. Also, demand of fixed occupations is limited within the neighborhoods and these youths have very few social ties to find work elsewhere. In terms of education, most of the interviewed youths dropped out of school before or just after they completed primary to get involved in pandillas, and *ex-pandilleros* who tried to enroll in secondary education are easily discouraged by their need to work. As a consequence, the socioeconomic situation of *pandilleros* generally does not change and so their expectations of improving their lives diminish as times goes by.

7. *Although displaying intermittent activity over time, pandillas in the Reparto Schick remain a very resilient phenomenon, in part because the belief systems deeply engrained in pandilla culture are not incorporated in the design of interventions.* For instance, while the *Integrated Development Plan for the Prevention of Juvenile Violence* in Managua pushed forward by the police in 1999 vowed for education and rehabilitation of young delinquents, it made no reference to the socio-economic antecedents of youth violence, nor did it outline a cohesive program of social assistance for marginalized youths, making its guiding principle still that of unilateral crime control (Maclure and Sotelo, 2003). More recently, *Plan Coraza* in 2012, also implemented by the police, consisted in getting youths to denounce places where illegal drug sales were taking place in their neighborhoods, by writing this on their walls. This practice, however, ran clearly against one of the *pandillas'* core values: loyalty.

8. *In addition, the youths in the Elias Blanco neighborhood of the Reparto Schick manifested they have mixed feelings towards the police.* Testimonies by pandilleros suggest that they are exposed to violence not only within the gang but also sometimes when captured by the police and interrogated for information -*pandilleros* don't give away information in accordance with gang rules and to avoid reprisal from fellow gang members, but by doing this they are

exposed to more violence-. On another front, according to an interviewed *pandillero*, the source of weapons and ammunition are local parents who are or were involved in the police or army and have them available for sale, and so good relationships are developed between them and the *pandilleros*.

9. *The lack of continuity of interventions in the neighborhoods of Reparto Schick may also limit their success.* For instance, the testimonies of *pandilleros* show that they have virtually no knowledge of many state institutions, including the Ministry of Family, Adolescence and Childhood and the Nicaraguan Sports Institution, among others. State actors are unable to reach *pandilleros* in *Reparto Schick* because few personnel limits their coverage (Rocha, 2012), and interventions by NGO´s come and go.

10. *According to the testimonies, there are few reasons why a pandillero would decide to withdraw from a pandilla:* witnessing a very cruel death of one of their peers, religious conversion, fear of threats to their family, and living with a girlfriend/wife and/or children.

11. *Nevertheless, incorporating the raison d'être of pandillas in the design of interventions that target youths at risk can be effective.* Apparently successful interventions to pacify *pandillas* during the Pacification Phase (2005-2009), kept the *pandillas'* structure but changed their objective into a beneficial one. Also, horizontal relationships were built with the youths, instead of replicating the authoritarian and patriarchal approach frequently found within the family. These two strategies allowed the protagonism and leadership of *pandilla* members previously used for violent activity to be implemented in peace associations.

2. Tracer study of technical training beneficiaries in Diriamba

OVE realized a tracer study of a sample of beneficiaries of the Nicaragua project. The objective was to assess if young men and women who participated in the personal development and technical training financed by the project showed differences in terms of employment and satisfaction in life in comparison with those who only participated in the personal development workshops. A full description of the exercise and the results are available in a background paper on the OVE website.

The youth violence prevention component of the Nicaragua project included personal development workshops as well as technical training programs in the 11 municipalities it targeted. The beneficiaries were young males and females aged 15 to 29 years old. We selected Diriamba for the willingness of the mayor to participate in the study and the access to the data on workshops and vocational training. Diriamba is a small town of 57,542 inhabitants (INIDE, 2008; based on 2005 National Census) near Managua with high rates of violence and crime.

The objectives of the personal development workshops were to contribute to the integral development of youth-at-risk (both males and females) through processes of sensibilization,

recognition and learning about their own reality, focusing on the construction and strengthening of values and social conscience, as well as the practice of positive attitudes in their daily lives. About 400 youth participated in these workshops from 2007 to 2010. The technical training aimed to contribute to the integral development of young males and females at risk through facilitating their social integration and incorporation to the labor market. The fields offered included plumbing, computer operation, basic auto mechanics, motorcycle repair, paint and body work, residential electricity, cash management skills, welding, woodwork/carpentry, and a basic beauty course. Not every field was offered every year of the program. Courses were given five times a week for three months, with each session lasting 4 to 5 hours. About 310 youth participated between 2007 and 2010. Table 15 shows the distribution of participants across treatments and controls used in the estimations. There were a total of 56 youths who only participated in personal development programs (our control group) and 189 participants who participated in both interventions (our benchmark treatment group), resulting in a total of 245 effective interviews. Surprisingly, there were 90 participants who only participated in technical trainings. This last result is inconsistent with the sequential nature of the interventions, so we built a second treatment group in which we add the participants who reported only participating in the trainings to the initial treatment group, and use it for robustness checks. For this second case, effective interviews add up to 335.

Table 16. Distribution of participants

Panel 1. Participation in individual interventions					
		Control Youths who only participated in personal development programs			
		Yes	**No**	**No data**	**Total**
Youths who participated only in technical trainings	**Yes**	189	90	4	**283**
		55%	26%	1%	**83%**
	No	56	0	2	**58**
		16%	0%	1%	**17%**
	No data	0	0	0	**0**
		0%	0%	0%	**0%**
	Total	**245**	**90**	**6**	**341**
		72%	26%	2%	**100%**
Panel 2. Treatment groups					
		Treatment 1. Youths who participated in both the personal development workshops and the technical trainings			
		Yes	**No**	**No data**	**Total**
Treatment 2. Youths who participated in both the personal	**Yes**	189	0	90	**279**
		52%	0%	25%	**77%**
	No	0	56	0	**56**

development workshops and the technical trainings, plus those who only participated in the technical trainings		0%	15%	0%	**15%**
	No data	0	0	29	**29**
		0%	0%	8%	**8%**
	Total	**189**	**56**	**119**	**364**
		52%	15%	33%	**100%**

To address the issue of effectiveness of the interventions in employment and risk behavior outcomes, we first employed simple mean differences in outcome variables without any restrictions to the sample of beneficiaries, then attempted to compare similar treatments and controls through propensity score matching (PSM), and finally applied simple OLS regressions restricted to the common support. Our choice of variables for the propensity score model included age, gender, marital status, the share of participants head of household, the number of spaces used for sleeping in a participant's household, and education levels of both participants and heads of household.

The results of the tracer study show very small differences in employment outcomes in favor of the youth who participated in the technical training. The only difference is that the latter were more occupied (i.e. they employed their time in informal occupations) than those who only participated in the personal development workshops (20 percentage point differential). Differences in risk behavior outcomes are negligible. This suggests that employment outcomes for youths at risk may not have been greatly affected by the citizen security project's interventions.

3. Survey of services available in low-income neighborhoods in Managua

One of the main challenges that Nicaragua faced in reaching youth was the capillarity and extension of the network available in the public bureaucracy. The evaluation found that many of the activities undertaken relied on networks of volunteers or networks of political and community leaders who would in turn also assist in the management and provision of prevention services. The reliance on these ad hoc networks has the advantage of being a low cost solution in a context in which fiscal pressures and capabilities in the national government are already strained. However, in order to be able to assess the implementation effectiveness of this strategy, questions related to the actual degree to which youth can be reached, and the ability of these networks to actually provide high-quality services would have to be answered.

In order to shed some light on this issue of supply of services, in 2012 OVE conducted a survey of youth, parents and community leaders in poor and violent neighborhoods in Managua. These were among the same neighborhoods targeted by the previous IDB citizen security loan in Nicaragua. One of the purposes of the survey was to identify which institutions were present in

the neighborhoods, and what resources were available to youth-at-risk. In total, 800 youth were surveyed as part of the study, along with a comparable number of parents and community leaders. The questionnaire identified the presence or absence of recreational and preventive services provided by institutions in the neighborhood, such as schools, health centers, churches, etc. The questionnaire also recorded the degree to which beneficiaries report using these services. Tables 1 and 2 below provide a summary statistics on the presence of the different institutions in the neighborhood, and the degree to which they are reportedly used by the youth.

Table 1 shows that the presence of institutions in neighborhoods. The Church has a clear presence, as does, as expected, primary schools. Technical training center, libraries, and daycare centers are less common. Youth also report using recreational and prevention services provided by institutions. The table shows that the service which is most often utilized is the church, followed by sports facilities, and libraries (when they are available—the utilization metrics are calculated over the proportion who report knowing of the institution in the neighborhood). Table 2 presents the findings for specific agencies of the state, such as the Police, INJUVE, etc. Except for the absence of private-sector driven activities (they may provide them through other organizations, NGOs, etc. and may not be recognized by the youth as such), we see that youth generally are aware of services provided, such as those provided by the police, INJUVE, and the Consejos del Poder Ciudadano, but they generally do not use them. The highest incidence of participation is actually in the case of activities sponsored by political parties.

	Exists in neighborhood	**Is used by youth weekly or daily**
Sports facilities (including soccer fields)	43	35
Non-technical training	19	18
Community centers	34	15
The church / religious centers	98	50
Library or center for the arts	18	29
Technical training centers	11	11
Daycare centers	19	…
Health clinics	58	23
Primary school	89	20
Secondary school	57	37

	Aware of services	Uses regularly
Police	62	4.9
INJUVE	66	5.5
NGO	38	1.1
Political Party	88	9
Consejos Poder Ciudadano	89	7.1
Social Crime prevention committees	43	2.3
Private sector	22	0.9

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