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The Brazilian Electoral Panel Studies (BEPS):

Brazilian Public Opinion in the 2010 Presidential Elections

Barry Ames
Fabiana Machado
Lucio Rennó
David Samuels
Amy Erica Smith
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Abstract

This report presents sample characteristics and summary statistics from the Brazilian Electoral Panel Study (BEPS) project. The survey, composed of three waves, was conducted in Brazil in 2010, a presidential election year, and is composed of 4,611 interviews with 2,669 voting-age Brazilians.

JEL classifications: D72

Keywords: Vote, Partisanship, Policy preferences, Political participation

1 Introduction

The Brazilian Electoral Panel Study (BEPS) was designed primarily to capture campaign dynamics at the national level during the 2010 Brazilian presidential election. The study mirrors prior projects conducted at the subnational level in Brazil, such as the Two-City Panel Study of 2002-2006, as well as national-level projects such as the Mexican Election Panel Studies of 2000 and 2006. All these projects share the common goal of generating data that make it possible to i) measure electoral volatility at the individual level during political campaigns, and ii) explore the ways in which both short and long-term factors affect this process and the ultimate vote decision. These are innovative projects in the study of the micro-level dynamics of vote choice in new democracies, and they offer the necessary input to investigate important facets of electoral politics in comparative perspective.

The Brazilian Electoral Panel Study is composed of three waves conducted in March and April, August, and November of 2010. The first wave was implemented about six months prior to the first round of the election and before the official launch of the political campaign that began in July with the nomination of candidates. The panel sought to establish baseline measures of vote intention, policy preferences, and several related factors, following longstanding debates on electoral behavior in Latin America and the United States. Wave Two of the survey predated the beginning of the Free Electoral Airtime (Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral or HGPE), in which candidates for all offices have 45 minutes of daily access to television broadcasting during prime-time hours. The HGPE is decisive in the electoral campaign, especially for executive-level elections, because it gives candidates the opportunity to reach broad audiences across the country. HGPE time is so important that television minutes, allocated to parties according to the number of seats they hold in the Chamber of Deputies, have become currency for negotiation in the formation of electoral coalitions. Finally, Wave Three was carried out immediately after the second round of the election, which occurred on October 31.

The set-up of the three waves facilitates analysis of the full campaign process leading up to the final result of the election. In order to capture change in perceptions, our questionnaires retained a number of items over all three waves. To our knowledge this is the first national-level panel study conducted in Brazil.

The BEPS also offers an additional and unique advantage. Wave One of the study was conducted as part of the 2010 AmericasBarometer of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). Since the LAPOP uses standardized survey instruments and sample designs across the 26 countries of the Americas, data from the first wave of the BEPS are directly comparable to data from these countries. as a result, we can examine not only how Brazilian voters changed over the course of the campaign, but also how they compare at the baseline to voters across the Americas.

This document has two goals. First, we provide technical background on the data by identifying both their limitations and their strengths. This information is particularly useful for those interested in using the data for their own analyses. (This document should be cited whenever the dataset is used.) Second, the document disseminates the basic results we have obtained.

Following these aims, the next section presents descriptive evidence focusing on the geographical distribution of respondents, their demographic characteristics and income. We contrast data from the survey with data from the Brazilian Census of 2010, an independent and reliable estimate of the population, in order to check for measurement validity in factual items and address the possibility of post-collection corrections (Fowler, 1995). These steps are useful to assess the representativeness of the sample in each of the three waves and to consider how representativeness might change due to attrition (loss of participants from one wave to the next). In cases where respondent attrition leads to biases in the distribution of the sample from one wave to the next, more elaborate forms of observation weighting need to be devised. We then turn to a summary of the main results. This section takes up most of the document and is organized thematically around the topics covered in the questionnaire. It is based primarily on descriptive statistics.

2 The Dataset

The Brazilian Electoral Panel Study conducted 4,611 interviews in 2010 across the country, including all five regions, 16 of its 27 states and 60 municipalities. Wave One, totaling 2,482 interviews, constituted the Brazilian component of the 2010 AmericasBarometer, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). Waves Two and Three were collected exclusively as part of the BEPS. In Waves Two and Three, we collected 908 and 1,221 interviews, respectively. Overall, 751 respondents participated in all three waves, generating a total of 2,253 interviews for a complete, balanced sample of participants in all three waves.

Funding restrictions imposed a limit of 1,100 interviews in Wave Two. An initial set of 1,100 respondents was thus randomly selected from the pool of respondents from Wave One, clustering by census tract (*setor censitário*). An additional set of potential substitutes was also selected from Wave One, again clustering within the same census tracts and matched one-to-one with members of the primary sample. Thus, in any given census tract a matching substitute was also selected for each person chosen to be reinterviewed. Interviewers were instructed to contact the substitute only if the primary sample member could not be contacted or refused to participate. This strategy maximized the number of respondents in the second wave and reduced biases related to attrition.

Of the 1,100 members of the primary sample selected for Wave Two, we succeeded in interviewing 598, a response rate of 54 percent. In addition, we attempted to reinterview 500 members of the substitute sample and were successful in 310 cases. The reinterview rate of the secondary sample was thus 62 percent. Overall, of a combined sample of 1,600 respondents from Wave One, we interviewed 908, or 57 percent.

Given our budgetary restrictions, the overall retention rate (the number of interviews replicated from one wave to the next) was relatively small. With an initial sample of 2,482 in the first wave, we interviewed 908 in the second wave, that is, 37 percent of respondents in Wave One. This number is low by international standards and warrants further examination for potential biases in the distribution of responses in the second wave.

In Wave Three, we sought to reinterview all Wave Two respondents. We were successful in 751 cases, yielding a Wave Two to Wave Three retention rate of 83 percent (751/908). In addition to these cases, we attempted to reinterview 519 randomly selected respondents who had been interviewed in Wave One but not in Wave Two. We succeeded in contacting 283 of them, yielding a response rate of 55 percent. Finally, we also sought to interview a fresh batch of 288 totally new respondents within the same census tracts, succeeding in 187 of the cases (65 percent). Thus, overall in Wave Three we attempted to interview 1,715 people and succeeded in completing 1,221 interviews, for an overall response rate of 71 percent. According to international standards, these indicators are above average, especially the Wave Two to Wave Three retention rate (Bartels, 1999).

Table 1. Number of Interviews, Response Rates and Retention Rates: Brazilian Electoral Panel Study

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Interviews	2,482	908	1,221
Response Rate	-	57%	71%
Retention Rate	-	37%	83%

Source: BEPS.

Table 2. Interviews by Wave and Region, Brazil 2010

Region	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Brazil
North	15% 373	14% 131	15% 181	8%
Northeast	24% 593	24% 223	24% 291	28%
Center-West	16% 407	14% 124	15% 179	7%
Southeast	28% 705	27% 245	27% 326	42%
South	16% 404	20% 185	20% 244	14%
Total	100% 2,482	100% 908	100% 1,221	

Source: BEPS and IPEADATA.GOV.BR.

Given budgetary restrictions and the fact that this was the first national panel study undertaken in Brazil, the results were quite satisfactory.

Do the samples in Wave Two and Three show distortions relative to Wave One and external data? Given that the retention rate for Wave Two is particularly low, we must check data quality by verifying whether certain geographic locations or social groups were inadvertently more likely than others to remain in the sample.

2.1 The Geographical Distribution of the Sample

Table 2 presents the distribution of interviews by region in all three waves and in comparison to estimates based on the 2010 Census. The oversampling of the North and Center-West regions and the under-sampling of the Southeast were deliberate. The goal was to have a representative sample of every region in Wave One. This was part of the AmericasBarometer design on which the first wave was based. In order to make national-level inferences when using the BEPS data, observations need to be weighted accordingly.

More importantly, however, the percentage of interviews by region in the different waves varies little. The only potential bias is an increase in interviews in the Southern Region in Wave Two, an increase that is maintained in Wave Three. This increase amounts to 4 percent, and there is no attrition bias.

Table 3. Interviews by Wave and Rural/Urban Areas, Brazil 2010

Area	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Brazil
Urban	86% 2135	88% 797	88% 1079	84%
Rural	14% 347	12% 111	12% 142	16%
Total	100% 2,482	100% 908	100% 1,221	

Source: BEPS and IPEADATA.GOV.BR.

Table 4. Interviews by Wave and Gender, Brazil 2010

Area	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Brazil
Male	48% 1,195	45% 409	46% 560	49%
Female	52% 1,287	55% 499	54% 661	51%
Total	100% 2,482	100% 908	100% 1,221	

Source: BEPS and IPEADATA.GOV.BR.

In Table 3 we investigate the distribution of the sample in rural and urban areas. The percentage of interviews in urban areas rises slightly in Wave Two, but the proportion of such interviews is kept quite constant throughout the study. It also replicates the general pattern found in aggregate data from the 2010 Census.

Overall, there seem to be no significant distortions in the allocation of interviews, whether by region or by urban/rural location. In the next section we explore possible deviations in relation to respondents' demographic characteristics and income.

2.2 The Sample by Demographic and Income Characteristics

Table 4 presents the distribution of interviews by gender. In Wave One the sample was selected based on a quota system at the household level, stratified by gender and age. This is reflected in the almost equivalent proportions of male to female in the sample and the Brazilian population according to the 2010 Census. However, as research proceeded in Waves Two and Three, there was a slight decrease in the proportion of male participants. These proportions differ more clearly in Wave Two, and they are somewhat more similar in Wave Three. Overall, however, the distribution of interviews very closely resembles that of the Brazilian population.

Table 5 shows the proportion of respondents in each age group along with the estimates for the Brazilian population, once again based on the Census data. Looking at the numbers across waves we notice little variation. This suggests that problems of attrition did not bias Waves Two and Three in comparison to Wave One. There are, however, differences between the BEPS sample and the estimates for the Brazilian population. The first cohort is naturally underestimated because the percentage indicated for Brazil cannot be disaggregated exclusively for 17 years old to 19

Table 5. Interviews by Wave and Age, Brazil 2010

Age Cohorts	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Brazil
17-19 years	7% 180	4% 36	4% 49	9%
20-29 years	28% 691	25% 228	25% 301	18%
30-39 years	24% 591	22% 196	22% 267	15%
40-49 years	16% 389	17% 155	16% 196	13%
50-59 years	13% 327	17% 155	16% 196	10%
60-69 years	8% 190	9% 79	9% 108	6%
70-79 years	3% 86	5% 41	5% 58	3%
80-89 years	1% 23	1% 11	1% 18	1%

Source: BEPS and `http://www.censo2010.ibge.gov.br/sinopse/index.php?dados=12&uf=00` consulted on May 13, 2011.

years old, as it includes all residents ages 15 years to 19 years old. Hence, there is a natural underestimation due to the calculation of the Brazilian indicator. More worrisome, however, are the distortions in the 20 to 29 years and 30 to 39 years age cohorts. Our sample grossly overestimates the share of these two groups in the Brazilian population. In the first of these cohorts the differences approximate 10 percent in Wave One and are kept at 7 percent in the next two waves. For the second problematic cohort, the differences are 9 percent in the first wave and 7 percent in the last two. Hence it is clear that weighting the data to correct for these biases may be necessary, especially for descriptive inferences. Weighting may also be necessary if these groups present specific attitudinal and behavioral traits that differentiate them from the rest of the population. If that assumption holds, then weighting may also be necessary to evaluate the relationship between variables. It is very difficult to anticipate such distortions, so this issue must be kept in mind when analyzing the data for other questions.

The last demographic variable we evaluate is race. The item used in the BEPS is identical to the Census item, based on self-placement in one of five alternatives. Race in Brazil is defined by skin color, so the alternatives below, all officially used in the Census, reflect this form of categorization. The table below presents results for the 2000 and 2010 Censuses. The distribution of self-identified racial groups again does not vary much between waves, indicating no bias caused by attrition. If anything, there was an overestimation of self-identified white Brazilians in Waves Two and Three and an underestimation of "*pardos*," a middle category between blacks and whites.

However, there are significant differences between the sample and the Brazilian population according to the 2000 results and the preliminary 2010 Census results. First, it is impressive how the configuration of identification with racial categories changed in Brazil from 2000 to 2010 based on the Census data. The percentage of residents identifying as *pardos* increased by 5 percent of the

Table 6. Interviews by Wave and Race, Brazil 2010

Race	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Brazil - 2000	Brazil - 2010
Branco	34% 847	39% 354	39% 476	54%	48%
Pardo	49% 1,217	45% 406	44% 544	38%	43%
Preta	9% 231	11% 97	10% 127	6%	8%
Amarelo	3% 67	2% 16	2% 27	0.4%	1%
Indígena	2% 45	1% 11	1% 11	0.4%	0.4%

Source: BEPS and `http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2010/preliminar_tab_zip.shtm` consulted on May 13, 2011.

population, while whites declined 6 percent. The remaining categories remained relatively stable. It is hard to explain this change, which poses a very interesting question for future research. A possible hypothesis is that the increase in affirmative action programs in the Brazilian government may have led Brazilians to value self-identification as *pardo*. Hence, such programs may have reduced the stigma and the losses associated with identification as non-white. It is important to note, however, that this did not increase identification as "black" (*preta*).

Regarding our immediate goals, there are no extreme differences between the waves, except for an increase in the proportion of white respondents in Waves Two and Three and a slight decrease in pardos. Still, the distribution by race of the research sample is quite distinct from the aggregate Brazilian data. This is especially so for those who declare themselves as "brancos" (whites). There is a 15 percent difference between Wave One and the Brazilian population. This difference falls to 11 percent in Wave Three. In Wave Three, the percentage of self-identified *pardos* declines, reaching 44 percent of the sample and becoming practically identical to the 2010 Brazilian Census report. Hence, Wave Three more closely approximates the actual distribution of racial data in Brazil than Wave One.

Finally, Table 7 presents results for income by wave. The data presents a serious underestimation of poor citizens, especially in the "up to minimum wage" bracket. In the 2010 Census, 56 percent of the Brazilian population falls into this category. This could be due to the fact that the Brazilian Census includes several other categories between no income and one minimum wage, indicating ratios of salaries below that threshold. In addition, the Brazilian Census is based on an open-ended question; individuals simply give their incomes. Wave One of our study is based on a close-ended item, with pre-defined income categories. Our first wave, limited by the comparative purpose of the AmericasBarometer, accepted as its first response alternative values up to one minimum wage. Hence, citizens may have felt inclined either not to respond or to choose some other category. Still, the differences are relevant. In addition, because the BEPS survey data

Table 7. Interviews by Wave and Income Brackets, Brazil 2010

Income	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Brazil - 2010
No Income	1% 35	2% 17	2% 21	4%
Up to Minimum Wage – R 510	22% 548	20% 181	22% 263	56%
From 1 to 2 Wages	31% 758	30% 273	29% 349	22%
From 2 to 3 Wages	17% 431	19% 174	19% 229	7%
From 3 to 5 Wages	13% 328	15% 137	15% 184	5%
Above 5 Wages	12% 301	13% 114	13% 156	5%
Non-response	3% 81	1% 12	2% 19	
Total	2,482	908	1,221	

Source: BEPS and `http://sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/tabela/listabl.asp?z=cd&o=4&i=P&c=3261` consulted on May 13, 2011.

overestimated the wealthier portions of the population, some weighting of this factor may also be necessary.

On the positive side, again, our results do not indicate any severe change in the distribution of respondents by income in the distinct waves, thus minimizing the potential for attrition bias.

In sum, the external validation of the survey results indicate that some weighting is necessary to correct for apparent distortions in the Wave One sample, especially for income and race. The BEPS contains fewer self-identifying white people than the overall population, and it oversamples richer individuals.

Still, as we observe the distribution of the distinct variables across waves there does not seem to be significant evidence of distortions generated by attrition. Hence, the structure of the panel design was apparently not biased by the relatively low retention rate in Wave Two.

2.3 General Overview of Respondents' Characteristics

In addition to the variables discussed above, the questionnaires also measured several other socio-economic indicators that can serve as important controls. Since some of these measures are not readily available from external sources, we will focus on their distribution over time in our panel study.

First, we look at variation in educational levels. This measure is available from outside sources, but not using the same metric we employ here. Hence, we focus on variation across waves. The largest group in our sample is of respondents with 11 years of schooling (completed high school), totaling about a third of the sample. Another 10 percent have eight years of schooling (completed elementary school) and about 10 percent completed only the first four years of schooling (which was an important stage in Brazil's former educational system). More importantly, the

Table 8. Interviews by Wave and Years of Education, Brazil 2010

Years of Education	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
0	4% 104	5% 47	5% 58
1	4% 88	3% 25	3% 34
2	2% 46	2% 22	3% 32
3	3% 82	3% 30	3% 33
4	9% 229	11% 98	10% 128
5	7% 181	8% 75	9% 105
6	4% 99	4% 37	4% 48
7	4% 91	3% 25	3% 42
8	11% 271	11% 101	10% 128
9	5% 132	4% 40	3% 40
10	9% 219	4% 43	7% 85
11	27% 664	30% 269	30% 362
12	1% 26	1% 12	1% 14
13	2% 45	1% 12	2% 22
14	2% 44	2% 15	1% 18
15	3% 81	4% 40	4% 48
16	1% 27	1% 9	1% 15
17	1% 20	1% 8	1% 8
Non-response	1% 33	0	0
Total	2,482	908	1,221

Source: BEPS.

educational levels of the population remain stable from one wave to the next, indicating that there was no significant bias due to attrition.

In Table 9 we present data on employment status. Again, the sample remains relatively constant from Wave One to Wave Two. Wave Two contains more respondents who are unemployed and retired than the Wave One. This suggests that attrition led to a decrease in the percentage of respondents who are economically active.

Finally, we also measure Internet use, which may be an important variable indicating how often and in which ways respondents obtain information and news. Again, there is considerable stability over the two waves in which this variable was measured. About half of our respondents never use the Internet.

3 Results

The first wave of the BEPS used the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer in Brazil. The questionnaire included a wide range of items measuring attitudes, values and opinions on various topics. Questions covered evaluations of the economy and government, political preferences, vote choice,

Table 9. Interviews by Wave and Employment Status, Brazil 2010

Status	Wave 1	Wave 2
Employed	39% 965	34% 311
Unemployed, but working informally	15% 360	20% 182
Unemployed, searching for work	11% 274	8% 69
Student	5% 134	3% 27
Housewife (works at home)	14% 352	16% 145
Retired	11% 285	15% 136
Unemployed, Not searching for work	4% 106	4% 32
Non-response	0% 6	0% 6
Total	2,482	908

Source: BEPS.

Table 10. Interviews by Wave and Internet Use, Brazil 2010

Frequency	Wave 1	Wave 2
Daily	19% 473	20% 186
Weekly	12% 302	11% 96
Monthly	5% 123	5% 45
Rarely	15% 370	15% 133
Never	48% 1,192	49% 445
Non-response	0% 22	0% 3
Total	2,482	908

Source: BEPS.

partisanship and opinions about specific policy issues, and views on discrimination and the rule of law in Latin America, in addition to the traditional indicators of socio-economic status and demographic information. This broad range of topics provided a wide variety of baseline measures to be followed up in subsequent waves of the panel study.

In addition to regular items, four experiments were embedded in Wave Three of the study. In order to simplify survey administration in the context of face-to-face interviews using paper questionnaires, we limited all experiments to two cells (i.e., treatment and control). Type A questionnaires included all "control group" questions, and Type B questionnairs included "treatment group" questions. Respondents within each census tract were randomly assigned to one of the two versions. The total number of respondents in the control group is 596 and in the treatment group 625.

The first experiment was a "list experiment" intended to capture levels of clientelism. The second was developed to measure the strength of party labels. This was done by asking respondents in the two groups to report their level of agreement with the same policy statement, but letting the party claimed to support the statement vary from the control group version of the question to the treatment group version. The third experiment focused on attitudes towards Conditional Cash Transfer programs, comparing respondents who were reminded of the conditionalities attached to the program versus those who were not. Finally, the fourth experiment focused on the effects of corruption on politicians' and parties' ratings. Before asking respondents to report these ratings, the treatment questionnaire reminded them of recent corruption scandals, while the control questionaire did not. Because corruption scandals were not evenly distributed across parties, instead primarily involving the government party (PT), this experiment was placed at the end of the questionnaire so as not to contaminate other responses. Although treatment and control groups were selected at random, it was advisable to include a control for questionnaire type when analyzing the data.

3.1 The Stability of Vote Intention and Partisanship Over Time

One overarching concern of the BEPS was to maximize the number of items from Wave One that were repeated in Waves Two and Three. This enabled us to measure correctly the evolution of individual-level choices during the campaign process.

We begin by showing the evolution of vote intentions across waves. We then compare these intentions with estimates for the same periods from other polling firms. Given that the last wave was conducted just after the end of the elections, we also compare our estimates to the final election result. This exercise provides an indicator of the external validity of the data, in particular of Wave Three results. Notice that the election was conducted in two rounds. Respondents in Wave Three were asked to report their choices in both rounds. Given the proximity of the second round to the

Table 11. Vote Intention by Wave and Data from Polls for April and August and Election Results for the First Round of the Election, Brazil 2010 (%)

						First Round Result:	
Vote	Wave 1	Polls April	Wave 2	Polls August	Wave 3	Valid Votes	All Votes
Dilma Rousseff	31	31	39	46	45	47	35
José Serra	23	37	25	30	26	33	24
Marina Silva	6	9	11	8	15	19	14
Ciro Gomes	6	13	-		-		
Others	6		5		8	1	0.007
Don't Know	22		18		5		
Didn't Respond	6		3				
Invalid Votes							7
Abstentions							17

Source: BEPS, `http://noticias.uol.com.br/fernandorodrigues/pesquisas/2010/1turno/presidente.jhtm` consulted on May 13, 2011 and Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

interview date, we expect answers to this item to be closer to official results than those referring to the first round (which occurred in October).

Although the other public opinion polls to which we compare our data may also contain error, we believe the comparison is warranted. For each comparison month we averaged the estimates from all polls conducted in that month by three Brazilian polling firms: Datafolha, Sensus and Ibope. These data are available from journalist Fernando Rodrigues' website, cited in the sources of Table 11.

Our estimates for Wave One matched perfectly with other polls in the case of Dilma Rousseff's vote intention. Our estimates were close in the case of Silva, but they differed significantly in the cases of Serra and Ciro. In Wave Two, we underestimated Rousseff's and Serra's vote intentions and overestimated Silva's. Comparing declared votes in the first round with official results, we observe a close match for Rousseff in terms of valid votes, but an overestimation as a percentage of all votes in the first round. In contrast, declared votes for Serra and Silva were clearly underestimated in our survey compared to official valid votes, though they were rather accurate if we take all votes into account.

Notice that the survey incidence of "don't knows" and "no response" was smaller than actual invalid votes or abstentions. It is thus plausible to speculate that some of those who did not vote, either abstaining or having voted null or blank, claimed they voted for the winning candidate. It might be tempting for respondents to report they voted for the winning candidate rather than that they did not fulfill their civic duty of voting. In other words, this question is susceptible to social desirability bias: to avoid reporting abstention, which is always frowned upon as an undesirable

social behavior. Indeed, we notice that if we add the discrepancy in Rousseff's votes (between our survey and official results based on all votes) to the categories of "other," "don't know," and "no response," we obtain a reasonable approximation to the percentage of abstentions and invalid votes.

This issue deserves attention in future research. One option is to divide the question in two, first asking whether the respondent voted or not; then asking only those who said that they voted, what candidate they chose. This approach could reduce social desirability bias, if the question is worded to reduce the stigma some respondents associate with admitting not having turned out to vote.

It is also important to keep in mind that the radical changes in vote intentions for Marina Silva towards the end of the first round – which add up to almost 11 percent when we contrast August polls and the first-round results – were much attenuated in our panel study, where the shift was only 4 percent. Therefore, the distribution of the data in the BEPS may attenuate the impact of variables that explain volatility towards Marina Silva.

Regarding the second round of the election, Table 12 indicates that our results underestimated the valid votes each candidate received. If we exclude from our sample what we could consider invalid votes (blank/null, did not vote, don't know and no response), then Rousseff receives in our count 67 percent of the votes in the second round and Serra receives 37 percent. In this scenario we are now overestimating the Rousseff vote in comparison to the valid votes in the election results and still underestimating the Serra vote. Hence, voters apparently hesitate to admit they voted for the loser.

However, it is more instructive to compare our survey outcomes with the election results *including invalid votes and abstentions*. We find here an impact similar to what which we found regarding vote intentions in round one (discussed above). We clearly overestimate the winning candidate's vote. The runner-up's vote is slightly underestimated, but not by much.

This is something Licio et al. (2009) found when analyzing the 2008 AmericasBarometer, and it appears to be an important topic for research on voters' recall processes. Our indicators of invalid votes and abstentions total approximately 18 percent of the sample, but invalid votes and abstentions in the actual election sum to 26 percent. Again, it seems that some form of social desirability bias has inflated the declared vote for the winning candidate and reduced the propensity to admit abstention or the casting of an invalid vote.

If we look at the item format for second round declared vote in our Wave Three questionnaire, the response alternatives include "did not vote" and "voted blank" or "voted null." Still, this was not sufficient to attenuate the effect of social desirability bias, further strengthening the idea that a filter item indicating whether or not the respondent voted might generate better results.

Table 12. Declared Vote in the Second Round and Data from Polls for October and Election Results for the Second Round of the Election, Brazil 2010 (%)

			Second Round Result:	
Vote	Wave 3	Last Polls of October	Valid Votes	All Votes
Dilma Rousseff	52	51	56	41
José Serra	30	40	44	32
Blank/Null	4	8		
Did not Vote	8			
Didn't Respond	6			
Invalid Votes				5
Abstentions				21

Source: BEPS, `http://noticias.uol.com.br/fernandorodrigues/pesquisas/2010/1turno/presidente.jhtm` consulted on May 13, 2011 and Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

Table 13. Party Identification (%)

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
No ID	69.50	62.00	59.46
PT	18.01	23.13	24.24
PSDB	2.34	3.85	5.49
PMDB	4.79	4.63	5.00
Other	5.36	6.39	5.81

Source: BEPS.

Note: Data are raw (unweighted) for the full sample of respondents.

These results do not undermine analyses of vote intention volatility in the 2010 campaign, but they must be taken into account when considering the results obtained from such analyses. Measurement error in vote intention can lead to Type II error in regression analyses set up to explain vote choice under the assumption that the errors are random (Bound et al., 2001). This means that coefficient estimates will be downward-biased, making it more likely that the null hypothesis is accepted even in cases where it should not. Thus the lack of statistical significance should be treated with caution.

In addition to vote intention, all waves of the BEPS asked respondents whether "nowadays, do you sympathize with any political party" (question VB10). Respondents who answered this question affirmatively were then asked which party they sympathized with (question VB11). Table 13 reports raw results for party identification in the three waves of the sample, for the three main parties.

Figure 1. Identification with Parties with and without a Presidential Candidate



Results are compatible with previous surveys, and they indicate that more than half of those who identify with any party in Brazil, identify with the PT. Another important feature of the data is that party identification as a whole grew considerably between the first and the last waves. As a first approach to exploring this variation, we present these same figures grouped by whether the party had a presidential candidate (PT, PSDB, PV, and tiny PSOL). The results, reported in Figure 1, show that all the growth in identification occurred for parties fielding presidential candidates.

Table 14 explores the variation in identification a little further by examining the extent to which individuals change ID from one wave to the next. The evidence suggests that identification with the PT (*petismo*) is much more consistent than that with other parties. Although the proportion of petistas who repeat their attachment to the PT from one wave to the next is lower than for parties in other countries where similar data is available (Zuckerman et al., 2007; Lawson et al., 2008; ANES, 2009), petismo is highly bounded in the sense that nearly all petistas "pick a side by not picking a side," and it approaches levels seen in Mexico and in older democracies.

Table 14. Bounded Partisanship, Brazil 2010

		Party at time t				
		PT	PSDB	PMDB	Other Party	No party
Party at time $t+1$	PT	**0.58**	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.16
	PSDB	0.03	**0.43**	0.10	0.03	0.03
	PMDB	0.01	0.06	**0.40**	0.04	0.03
	Other Party	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.40	0.03
	No party	0.36	0.33	0.38	0.40	0.75

Source: BEPS.

Note: Table compares individual-level answers to the partisan ID question between two adjacent waves of the panel. Each column gives the average proportion of individual choices in the next wave based on what an individual chose in an initial wave.

Only 6 percent of individuals who identify with the PT in one wave identify with another party in the next wave. The likelihood that a PSDB or PMDB identifier in one wave will not pick that party again in the next wave is lower than a coin flip, and 76 percent and 78 percent repeat their party choice or choose no party at the next wave, respectively. In other words, almost one quarter of partisans for both the PSDB and PMDB choose a different party at the next wave–and 10 percent of PSDB and PMDB partisans even switch to the PT.

3.1.1 Partisanship Survey Experiment

The experimental question pertaining to partisan cues was presented to third wave respondents *after* the party identification items in the third wave only. Respondents were randomly assigned one of two versions of the question. We randomized the assignment of treatment ex-ante, within each sector that was sampled in the survey. The "treatment" version of the question carried informationon party labels; the control version did not. The experimental question focused on the government's role in financing private companies, as follows:

> Durante a campanha eleitoral deste ano, os principais candidatos apresentaram propostas diferentes sobre o financiamento do governo a empresas privadas. [Uns/Candidatos do PT] acham que o governo deveria financiar empresas brasileiras a juros baixos para estimular a economia e gerar empregos. [Outros/Candidatos do PSDB] acham que são os bancos privados e não o governo que deveriam financiar empresas, e que o governo deveria usar recursos em outras áreas como saúde e educa cão. Com qual dessa posi cões o Sr./Sra concorda mais?

- Governo deve financiar empresas privadas ou
- O governo não deve financiar empresas privadas

Table 15. Should the Government Finance Private Brazilian Companies? (Control Group Only)

	Yes	No	Don't Know
No Party	29.58	49.30	21.13
Other Party	27.59	58.62	13.79
PMDB	40.00	31.43	28.57
PSDB	43.24	37.84	18.92
PT	33.73	49.70	16.57

Source: BEPS.

- Não sabe

There are two noteworthy limitations to the design of the BEPS experiment. First, it focuses only on the two main parties. This decision was dictated partly because the PT and PSDB were running the leading candidates in the presidential race and partly by resource constraints, as it would be hard to obtain sufficient numbers of sympathizers with other parties to conduct statistical analysis.

In addition, and more importantly, the design of the experiment means we cannot separate positive and negative cuing, which means we cannot determine whether learning the position of the PT or learning the position of the PSDB (or both) is what drives our results. This design decision was also driven by resource constraints.

The baseline positions of the control group provide an interesting glimpse of public opinion on the issue in question. Without receiving any information about the parties' positions, support for government financing of private sector companies in Brazil is lower for PT supporters than for PSDB supporters (though not statistically significant). This result for the control group might surprise observers of Brazilian politics, but suggests that the word "private" may be playing a stronger role than the word "Brazilian," as both nationalism and statism should be associated with "petismo."

In the treatment group, in contrast, petistas are equally split between the two alternatives, while PSDBistas are almost all against government financing of private companies.

However, identifiers with the PT and the PSDB who receive information about the party's position are significantly more likely to agree with their party. Support for government financing of private Brazilian companies—the position actually defended by the PT—is considerably higher among PT supporters in the treatment group compared to the control group. In fact, the proportion supporting the PT's position is 0.11 larger in the treated group, which means PT respondents were 35 percent more likely to agree with the party's position when cued. The reduction in support for the opposite position was small and not significant, but there was a substantial and significant

Figure 2. Partisan Cueing on PT and PSDB Identifiers



Note: Figure reports simple differences between PT and PSDB identifiers in control and treatment group. In the experimental question, each of the two statements that were read to respondents corresponds to the position of one of the two parties. We report treatment effects agreeing with the actual position of the party with which respondents identify. The residual category is composed of those who do not agree with the party's position. This category, includes those who agreed with the alternative statement as well as those who answered "don't know." Within that residual category, decreases in "don't knows" was significant only for the PT, and decreases in support for the alternative statement was significant only for the PSDB.

reduction in the probability of answering "don't know" to the question in the treatment group. Since both of these categories imply failing to agree with the partisan cue, we opted to report them together. The result is a 19 percent reduction in the probability of disagreeing with the party's position among the treatment group.

The effects of the PSDB cue are even larger. However, because only about 5.5 percent of the sample identified with that party, the results are quite noisy. After receiving the cue, PSDBistas were almost twice as likely to agree with the party's position, and 70 percent less likely to agree with the alternative position identified with the PT. Once "don't know" answers are added to the disagreement we arrive at a reduction of close to 60 percent in the probability of disagreeing with the party.

Figure **??** reports results for voters who identified with the PMDB, voters identigying with any other party, and voters who expressed no partisan identification. The treatment made no differ-

Table 16. Most Pressing Problem

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Violence	19.04	30.23	37.15
Health	15.31	19.97	20.24
Unemployment	12.52	13.72	14.91
Corruption	9.99	6.13	6.79
Education	3.60	3.46	5.46
Inequality	5.33	1.73	3.60
Poverty	3.33	2.13	3.60
Don't Know	0.80	0.80	0.80
Other	30.09	21.84	7.46

Source: BEPS.

Note: The question asked was "In your opinion, what is the most pressing problem in the country?" "Violence" lumps together "segurança," "violência," and "tráfico."

ence for the positions of non-partisans and for those who identified with other parties. PMDBistas responded to these statements in a very similar–albeit slightly less pronounced–way to those who identify with the PSDB.

3.2 Government Performance

3.2.1 Government Ratings

In order to gauge individuals' policy priorities, the BEPS asked an open-ended question in which respondents stated what they regarded as the most pressing problem in the country today. Table 16 reports the evolution of opinions over the three waves of the study. In line with the main concerns of Latin Americans in general, respondents in Brazil showed particular worry about violence and about jobs.

The three waves of the surveys then asked respondents whether they agreed with six statements about how the "current government" is doing in tackling some of these issues. In these questions (N1 N3 N9 N11 N12 N15) respondents were presented a 7-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." All questions were positive statements about the current government, but they did not mention President Lula personally.

Figure 4 presents simple averages of responses by wave. The image that emerges is of a government that was generally well evaluated and one that had improved in the course of the year. In all but one item, there were improvements in respondents' perceptions of the government as the year progressed.

Figure 3. Partisan Cueing on Other Respondents



Note: Cues were only given for the positions of the PT and the PSDB, so respondents in these figures were *not* cued on their parties positions. The cues moved PMDBistas closer to the position of the PSDB, but had no effect on sympathizers with other parties or on those who did not identify with any party.

Figure 4. Agreement with Positive Statements about the Government



Note: Figure reports simple average level of agreement by wave, with several different statements regarding the government's performance. Answers were measured on a 1–7 scale, with higher numbers indicating more agreement. All statements were presented in a "positive" way, so higher numbers always indicate a more positive view of the government. Non-valid responses were eliminated before the calculation of results.

The two items with which respondents most agreed were that the current government fights poverty (rose from 4.47 to 4.81) and manages the economy well (from 4.36 to 4.85). The statement that the "government fights corruption" commanded the least support, but it also showed improvement over time (from 3.52 to 3.69). The statement that the current government "improves security," which refers to urban violence, was the only statement that did not show improved agreement scores across waves, as agreement peaked in Wave Two. It is worth mentioning that the last two questions were the only ones for which the average rating was on the negative half of the scale.

Adding to this panorama, another question (M1) specifically asked about President Lula's job approval. Results for this question are presented in Figure 5 alongside with an analogous question (M2) that inquired about the job approval of congressmen collectively. Respondents could rate the job performance as very good, good, regular, bad or very bad. For simplicity, we combined the two positive and the two negative statements.

Figure 5. Job Evaluations



(a) President Lula (b) Congress

Note: Figures show the share of respondents that rate the president's and congress' job performance as "good" or "very good", "regular", "bad" or "very bad", in each of the three waves.

President Lula was already very well evaluated at the start of the panel, but the share of respondents with a positive evaluation further increased during the year. Close to 80 percent of respondents had a positive evaluation of the president by Wave Three, and the share of respondents with negative evaluations was just over 3 percent.

Congress was not nearly as positively evaluated, with positive and negative ratings converging to just over 20 percent. During the course of the panel there was a slight increase in the share of respondents with neutral evaluations of Congress.

3.2.2 Corruption

Few respondents report direct experiences with corruption. Figure 6(a) reports answers to three questions that were asked in Waves One and Two only. The first two referred to whether respondents had been asked for a bribe in the last 12 months by policemen and public servants. A higher share reported bribing incidents with the police, but for both categories the incidence was low (note the scale of the figure), and declined from Wave One to Wave Two. The third question reported in Figure 6(a) asked whether it was acceptable, in some circumstances, to pay bribes. A stable 7-8 percent of respondents answered yes to this question.

Figure 6. Corruption



Note: Figures show the shares of respondents who believe bribes are acceptable and who were asked for a bribe by the police or by a public employee (panel a), and the share of respondents who believe that corruption among public employees is "very common", "somewhat common", and "not common" (panel b).

The survey also asked whether, based on hearsay, the respondent thought that corruption among public employees was very common, somewhat common, or uncommon.[1] Figure 6(b) reports the answers to this question, and shows that a plurality of voters (45 percent at the end of the panel) think corruption is very common among public employees. The data also reveal perceptions of corruption to have increased over the time of the panel, with the share of respondents that consider corruption uncommon falling from nearly 30 percent to 22 percent in the course of the survey.

3.3 Government and the Economy

Two questions (SOCT and SOCT3) addressed respondents current assessments about the economy and their outlook. As reported in Figure 7(a), perceptions about the economy reflect the generally positive mood in Brazil in 2010. The share of respondents who classified the economy as good or very good rose from about 35 percent to close to 45 percent at election time, and an equal share considered the economy "regular." The share classifying the economy as bad or very bad fell to 10 percent at election time. Brazilians were similarly upbeat about the economic outlook, with 50 percent at election time expecting conditions to improve in the future. Only 10 percent had a negative outlook for the economy.

Figure 7(c) pools the data from all waves to show the association between current evaluations and outlook. The figure shows that even those evaluating the economy as bad were equally divided among those with positive, neutral, and negative outlooks. The largest three groups, which are equally sized and account for roughly 60 percent of the respondents, were those that considered the economy good and had a positive outlook, those that considered the economy regular and had a positive outlook, and those that considered the economy "regular" and had a "neutral" outlook.

Three questions (SOCMOB1, SOCMOB2, and SOCMOB3) assessed respondents' perceptions of social mobility. In all of these questions, respondents were presented with a 7-point scale where the lowest value represented the "bottom" of society and the highest value the "top" of society. Respondents were asked where they thought they were positioned now and 10 years ago, and where they thought they would be five years into the future. All three questions were asked in Wave Two, but the retrospective question was not asked in Wave Three. Mean responses changed very little between waves, so we report simple tabulations for pooled results only.

A total of 70 percent of respondents think they fall, today, in the middle three categories. More importantly, figure 8(a) shows that respondents overwhelmingly think they are better off (46 percent) or equally well positioned today (38 percent) compared to their situations of 10 years ago.

[1] The survey actually had two "uncommon" categories, "uncommon" and "very uncommon," so we merged them into one category for ease of presentation.

Figure 7. Evaluations of the Economy and Economic Outlook by Wave



(a) State of the Economy (b) Economic Outlook (c) Current and Outlook

Figure 8. Perceptions of Social Mobility



(a) Past and Current Position

(b) Current and Future Position

Note: The size of the squares represent the share of respondents in each response category. Panel 8(a) uses data from Wave Two only, as the retrospective question was only asked in that wave. Panel 8(b) is based on pooled answers from Waves Two and Three.

Figure 8(b) completes the optimistic outlook by showing that the share of respondents that think they will be better of in the future is even higher (74 percent).

Respondents' assessments of who is responsible for the economic management in the country was probed by three questions (RESP0, RESP1, and RESP2). Each asked respondents to attribute a level of responsibility on a 7-point scale, from no responsibility to a lot of responsibility. Despite some shift in average answers, respondents attributed most responsibility to the president, followed by Congress and then the governors.

Two questions (CRISIS1 and CRISIS2) gauged respondents' opinions about the world economic crisis of 2010. As reported in Figure 10, about half of the respondents throughout the panel thought the country was weathering a serious crisis, though the share that saw "no crisis" increased as the year progressed. Interestingly, a plurality of respondents attributed the crisis to the previous government (which we take to mean Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government), and not to the current government. By the time of the election, those who blamed the previous government outnumbered those who blamed the current government by more than 2-to-1. In fact, almost as many respondents thought the current government was responsible for the crisis as thought "rich countries" were to blame. Only a tiny fraction of respondents (not reported in the figure) thought that the rich inside Brazil were to blame.

Figure 9. Responsibility for Economic Managment



Figure 10. Economic Crisis



(a) Is There a Crisis?

(b) Who's Fault is It?

Note: Panel 10(b) reports raw percentages computed from the total of valid responses. The question, however, was only presented to respondents that said the country was in a crisis. "Other" responses, "don't knows," and "never thought of it" answers were included in the computations of the percentages, but are not reported for ease of presentation.

3.4 Ideology and Policy Preferences

One of the main pillars of the study of political behavior is the concept of ideology. The use of that term, however, is based on studies of developed countries, where codemocracy and parties have existed for a much longer time than in countries like Brazil. Also, the socio-economic conditions are very different from what we find in Latin America. Both factors influence not only political preferences, but also the very meaning of "left-right" in the political debate. It is common to assume that the redistributive implications of social policies are the same across countries. That is, what is considered a "left" policy in one place should also be considered "left" in another. Moreover, many take for granted the conventional assumption that there exist important differences in support for policies across socio-economic groups, in particular for redistributive policies. These assumptions, however, remain an open empirical question.

In order to begin to gauge how well these expectations fare in the case of Brazil, the BEPS included the commonly used self-placement item on the "left" and "right" scale and a battery of more specific policy preference questions. This allows us to explore the relationship between the two and the patterns of support across different groups of voters.

3.4.1 Individual Self-Placement

The following items on policy preferences were included in the BEPS waves:

Reduce inequality (ROS4) The Brazilian state should implement firm policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor. Using a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), how much do you agree or disagree with that statement?

Provide Pensions (ROS5) The Brazilian state more than the private sector should be responsible for retirement plans. Using the same 7-point scale, how much do you agree or disagree with that statement?

Provide Health (ROS6) The Brazilian state more than the private sector should be responsible for providing health services. Using the same 7-point scale, how much do you agree or disagree with that statement?

Well-being (ROS2) The Brazilian state more than the private sector should be responsible for the well-being of people. Using the same 7-point scale, how much do you agree or disagree with that statement?

Own Industries (ROS1) The Brazilian state more than the private sector should own the most important firms and industries in the country. Using the same 7-point scale, how much do you agree or disagree with that statement?

Job Creation (ROS3) The Brazilian state more than the private sector should be responsible for creating jobs. Using the same 7-point scale, how much do you agree or disagree with that statement?

Left/Right Scale (L1) Consider a scale where 1 means "left" and 10 means "right." Nowadays when people talk about political preferences, they talk about those who lean towards the left and those who lean towards the right. Following the meaning the terms "left" and "right" have for you, where would you place yourself?

VB7 Some people believe the government should spend little on public services such as education, security and health, while others believe it is important that the government offers more services to the population. Considering that taxes would have to increase for the government to spend more, and that taxes could be reduced if it spends less, for each policy I read I would like you to tell me how much you believe the government should spend. Increase taxes and spend more, maintain current expenditure levels, reduce taxes and spend less, reduce taxes and end service provision.

Public Firms Abroad (VB7N) Some people believe the government should spend little on public services such as education, security and health, while others believe it is important that the government offers more services to the population. Considering that taxes would have to

increase for the government to spend more, and that taxes could be reduced if it spends less, for each policy I read I would like you to tell me how much you believe the government should spend. Increase taxes and spend more, maintain current expenditure levels, reduce taxes and spend less, reduce taxes and end service provision. Financing Brazilian enterprises abroad.

Servant (VB7K) Public servant pension schemes.

Unemployment (VB7Q) Unemployment insurance.

Pension Poor (VB7H) Non-contributory pension benefits to the elderly poor.

Roads (VB7L) Road construction and maintenance.

Transportation (VB7P) Public transportation.

Security (VB7O) Security (police and army).

Water/Sanitation (VB7M) Building and maintenance of water and sanitation infrastructure.

Health (VB7D) Public health services or SUS.

College Education (VB7C) Tertiary public education.

Secondary Education (VB7B) Secondary public education.

Primary Education (VB7A) Primary public education.

The initial set of questions is one that is standard in the AmericasBarometer and can thus be compared across the region. These questions refer primarily to the role of the state versus the private sector in providing key services. Following a general pattern in Latin America, Brazilians tend to favor high degrees of government participation in economic and social spheres (see Figure 11). This statism is usually associated with left-leaning preferences. However, if we compare answers to these items with those coming from our left-right ideological self-placements, we notice a significant discrepancy. The average respondent tends to lean towards the right, not the left.

The next set of questions is particular to the BEPS and refers to levels of expenditures on a number of specific government provided services and benefits. Figure 12 displays the percentage of respondents agreeing with paying higher taxes to increase expenditures on each item. We notice that consistent with the initial question on main problems facing the country, respondents show a particular inclination to increase expenditures on the provision of public health services and security. Next in line comes education, infrastructure, and pensions to the elderly poor. Finally,

Figure 11. State (7.0) vs. Private Sector (1.0) Responsibilities



Figure 12. Should the Government Raise Taxes and Increase Expenditures?



the least attractive expenditures are those on public servants' pension schemes and public firms abroad.

More interesting than these average preferences is their relationship to each other. In other words, the extent to which we observe any correlation between policies that are usually associated with a particular ideological position. Figure 13 displays the correlations between these items for wave one responses. The most striking pattern is the generally low correlations, especially with the left-right self-placement scale, which, although not significant, tends to go in the opposite direction from our expectation.

3.4.2 Candidates' Placement

Democracies are representative governments. Not only to choose representatives but also to evaluate their performance, individuals need information on the policy stances of candidates. But what do they know about them? To answer this question the BEPS included the following questions about respondents' perceptions of candidates' placements:

Left/Right Scale (L1A-C) Consider a scale where 1 means "left" and 10 means "right." Nowadays when people talk about political preferences, they talk about those who lean towards the left and those who lean towards the right. Following the meaning the terms "left" and "right" have for you, where would you place president Lula (Serra, Dilma)?

Pro-Poor/Pro-Rich Scale (VB6A-D) Some say that politicians defend primarily the interests of the poor, while others say they defend those of the rich. I would like you to give a score from one to ten to each of the following politicians, regarding how much they defend the interests of the poor (where 1 means they do not defend the interests of the poor and 10 means they defend primarily the interests of the poor). This scale was reversed for comparison purposes in the figures below.

As shown in Figure 14 some learning seems to have taken place across waves about Rousseff's and Silva's positions. They both started towards the middle and ended up nearer the "pro-poor" side. For Serra, things did not change. Interestingly, the trend was opposite when the question referred to the left/right scale. Rousseff started towards the right and ended even further down that side, thus going counter to the "pro-poor/pro-rich" scale.

3.5 Conditional Cash Transfers

Three questions (CCT3BRA, CCT4BRA, CCTNEW) probed respondents' perceptions and opinions towards Bolsa Familia, Brazil's main Conditional Cash Transfer program (CCT). One question asked respondents who they thought was responsible for the program; the second asked respondents whether they thought the program should be expanded, reduced, kept as is or eliminated

Figure 13. Pairwise Correlation between Policy Issues



Figure 14. Candidate Placement: Densities and Averages across Waves



Note: Figures display the density of responses to the question "Consider a scale where 1 means "left" and 10 means "right." Nowadays when people talk about political preferences, they talk about those who lean towards the left and those who lean towards the right. Following the meaning the terms "left" and "right" have for you, where would you place president Lula (Serra, Dilma)?" Simple average of responses for each wave is represented by the vertical lines. For comparison purposes, average responses to the question on candidate's positions on the "left-right" scale (asked about Dilma and Serra on waves two and three only) are represented by the thick vertical lines.

completely. Another questions asked respondents whether they approved of the program, but this question was asked only in Wave Two, as it was part of a survey experiment (not reported here) in Wave Three.

More than 80 percent of respondents attribute the program to the Federal Government, which is even more impressive when one considers that beneficiaries enroll at their municipal government offices. About half of respondents would like to expand the program, with just under 40 percent preferring to keep it as is. Less than 10 percent of respondents want to reduce or eliminate the program.

Figure 15(c) shows that responses are quite consistent with the "approval" of the program (measured only in Wave Two): 57 percent of those who disapprove of the program would like to eliminate it, and 18 percent would like to increase it. Overall, however, more than 50 percent of respondents both approve of the program and would like to expand it.

3.5.1 CCT Survey Experiment

The third wave of the BEPS included a survey experiment measuring the effect of highlighting the conditionalities of Bolsa Familia on support for the program. The experiment had the simplest possible design, with only one treatment and one control condition, randomly assigned. Respondents in the treatment group were presented with the full statement, below. Respondents in the control group did not receive the clause in *italics*.

> Bolsa Família is a social program that pays monthly benefits to low income families *and requires, among others, that these families keep their children at school and take them to regular health check ups*. Do you approve or disapprove of the Bolsa Família program?

This is, admittedly a very weak treatment. Not only is baseline support for the program quite high, restricting the scope of any possible increase in support, but evidence reviewed earlier suggests that respondents have considerable knowledge about the program. Hence, most people are likely to already know the program entails conditionalities, and the "treatment" should have very little effect. Still, it is worth analyzing the results.

Overall, treatment and control groups varied very little with respect to approval of CCT. The average treatment effect was less than 1 percentage point, suggesting that the treatment did not lead to any change in opinion. However, once we break down the data by income bracket, an interesting result emerges. As reported in Figure 16, even though there is absolutely no change in the opinions of respondents in most brackets, there is a quite large and statistically significant effect for the highest income category. Seventy percent of the wealthier control group supported CCTs, and this value rose to 83 percent among the wealthier in the treatment group.

Figure 15. Conditional Cash Transfers



(a) Who is Responsible



(b) Expand or Reduce?



(c) Approval and Expansion

Figure 16. Effect of Highlighting Conditional Aspect of CCTs



Note: Figure displays the estimated effect of being reminded about the conditionality of the Bolsa Família Program on approval of the program across different income ranges (from zero to one minimum wage up to 5 or more minimum wages). Lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

This is precisely the bracket for which baseline support was lowest, which would be compatible with the existence of a ceiling effect in the other brackets. It is also interesting to note that information levels are higher among the better off, but nevertheless, calling attention to the conditionalities seems to have had an effect. Though these preliminary results should be taken with many grains of salt, they suggest that the existence of conditionalities might be driving support for CCT only among the wealthiest 12 percent of the population.

3.6 Political Participation and Engagement

3.6.1 Access to News and Political Information

Over the course of the three waves of the BEPS project, we sought to measure many aspects of access to news and political information. First, we asked about personal social connections,

Table 17. Access to Political Information (%)

	Wave 2	Wave 3
Knows Politician	58.4%	56.4%
Has Paid TV	16.8%	19.1%
Watched HGPE:		
Daily		19.7%
A Few Days a Week		35.8%
A Few Times		29.7%
Never		14.8%

using the following question: KP, "Do you know personally some politician or candidate or a person who's campaigning for a politician or candidate?" [2] In addition, we measured access to more traditional media. One question, HOR, measured attention to the free electoral hour (horário gratuito de propaganda eleitoral): "How often did you pay attention to the programs in the free electoral hour and the commercials for the candidates who were running in this year's election? Daily, a few times a week, a few times during the campaign, or never?" [3] In addition, another question, GIM1, asked: "Do you have access to paid TV (like cable TV, satellite TV) at home?" [4]

Table 17 reveals that over half of respondents in both the second and the third waves knew either a politician or someone campaigning for a politician or candidate. Less than one in five, however, had access to paid TV. Meanwhile, a little over half of respondents paid attention to the free electoral hour at least a few times a week, while only about 15 percent never watched the electoral hour.

3.6.2 Support for Politicians

The BEPS project also sought to measure support for a series of politicians and parties. The FT series, utilized only in the third wave, began with the following introduction: "Finally, and using this card, where 1 is the lowest grade and 10 is the highest, what grade would you give the following politicians and parties?" The individuals and candidates mentioned included Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (FT1); the PT (FT2); Dilma Rousseff (FT3); José Serra (FT4); and the PSDB (FT5).[5] Table 18 indicates that support for Lula was much higher than support for any candidate or party.

[2] Non-response was 2.8 percent across Waves Two and Three.
[3] Non-response was 1.2 percent.
[4] Non-response was 0.33 percent across Waves Two and Three.
[5] Non-response was 1.5 percent (FT1), 4.1 percent (FT2), 8.3 percent (FT3), 6.5 percent (FT4), 9.4 percent (FT5).

Table 18. Ratings of Politicians and Parties (%)

Response	Lula	PT	Dilma	Serra	PSDB
1	2.4	9.3	9.2	9.5	12.4
2	0.7	3.7	4.0	4.1	4.9
3	2.0	5.3	4.4	6.5	9.2
4	2.4	4.8	5.1	7.9	9.7
5	6.5	12.9	14.2	18.7	20.2
6	6.4	9.7	8.2	11.8	12.2
7	10.7	11.8	12.0	13.9	11.6
8	20.3	14.7	15.6	13.3	9.6
9	17.2	11.0	11.0	5.9	3.5
10	31.4	16.8	16.3	8.4	6.8
Mean	8.0	6.4	6.4	5.7	5.2

Note: Lowest grade is 1 and highest is 10.

3.6.3 Self-Efficacy and Interest in Politics

BEPS also addressed political engagement. In the first and second waves, respondents were asked to agree or disagree with two statements, on a 7-point scale where 1 referred to "strongly disagree" and 7 to "strongly agree." The first, EFF1, measured external efficacy: "Those who govern this country care about what people like you think." The second, EFF2, dealt with internal efficacy: "You feel that you understand the most important political issues in this country."[6] Table 19 reveals low levels of efficacy, with means below the scale midpoint of 4, on both measures and in both waves. External efficacy is measured as being slightly lower than internal efficacy.

In all three waves, BEPS respondents were asked about their levels of political interest using question POL1, "How much are you interested in politics: a lot, some, little, or none?" [7] Table 20 indicates fairly low levels of political interest, with about three-quarters of respondents in each wave reporting little or no interest, and less than 10 percent of respondents reporting a lot of political interest.

Next, a few questions asked about more active forms of engagement. In the second wave, the survey asked PP2A, "There are some people who work for parties and candidates in elections. Are you working for some party or candidate in this year's election?"[8] Just 7.4 percent of interviewees responded in the affirmative in that wave.

Finally, respondents were asked about the extent to which they tried to convince others whom to vote for. Question PP1, administered in all three waves, was as follows: "During elec-

[6] Non-response for EFF1 is 5.2 percent; for EFF2 it is 4.6 percent.
[7] Non-response is 1.3% across all three waves.
[8] Non-response is 0.8 percent in Wave Two.

Table 19. External and Internal Efficacy (%)

	External Efficacy		Internal Efficacy	
Response	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
1	27.5	24.65	17.82	16.95
2	13.79	16.67	13.51	14.56
3	17.58	19.33	17.65	21.39
4	15.88	16.2	20.7	21.16
5	12.77	13.19	18.84	16.5
6	6.09	5.79	6.27	6.03
7	6.39	4.17	5.21	3.41
Mean	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.4

Note: Answer categories vary from 1 "strongly disagree" to 7 "strongly agree".

Table 20. Political Interest (%)

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
A lot	8.36	9.63	8.94
Some	14.89	14.51	16.21
Little	42.33	45.07	43.86
None	34.42	30.79	30.99

Table 21. Frequency of Attempts to Convince Others (%)

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Frequently	5.93	7.2	9.08
Sometimes	18.08	16.72	17.31
Very rarely	17.67	12.62	11.85
Never	58.32	63.46	61.76

Table 22. Participation in Associations (%)

	Parent Group		Neighborhood		Political Party	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Once a week	1.99	0.89	1.14	0.67	0.41	0.56
A few times a month	12.88	15.05	4.38	4.69	1.67	2.46
A few times a year	17.99	19.29	8.49	8.71	6.38	6.59
Never	67.14	64.77	85.99	85.94	91.55	90.39

tions, some people try to convince other people to vote for some party or candidate. How frequently did you try to convince other people to vote for a party or candidate during these elections? Frequently, sometimes, very rarely, or never?"[9] In Table 21 we find that over half of respondents report never trying to convince others, while between 6 and 9 percent frequently tried to persuade their fellow citizens whom to vote for.

3.6.4 Participation in Associations and Protest

BEPS examined measures of civil society and social movement participation in the first and second waves. The former was tapped using a series that began with the following introduction: "Now I'm going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you go to the meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never." Question CP7 asked about "meetings of an association of parents and teachers at school;" CP8 about "meetings of a neighborhood association or community improvement group;" and CP13 about "meetings of a party or political movement."[10]

In Table 22 we find that levels of participation are quite low. Only around one percent of respondents reported participating in each activity at least once a week; meanwhile, about 65 pearcent of respondents said that they never participated in parent groups, while 86 percent reported never participating in neighborhood associations, and over 90 percent reported never participating in political parties.

[9] Non-response was 2.0 percent across the three waves.
[10] Non-response is 0.7 percent (CP7), 0.9 percent (CP8), and 1.0 percent (CP13).

We also asked about participation in social movements in the first and second waves. In Wave One, question PROT3 was as follows: "In the last twelve months, have you participated in any demonstration or public protest?"[11] In the second wave, the question was modified to reference "since the last time you were interviewed." As a result of these differences in the reference period, reported protest participation declined: 5.9 percent reported that they had participated in a demonstration or protest in Wave One, and 3.0 percent in Wave Two.

3.6.5 Political Knowledge

BEPS also included a series of questions measuring the respondent's level of political information, with different questions asked in different waves:

GI1 What is the name of the current president of the United States?

GI1new What is the name of the current president of Venezuela?

GI3 How many states does Brazil have?

GINEW How many senators represent each state?

GINEW2 Which party elected the highest number of senators during the elections of October 3 of this year?

VBK In the presidential elections of this year, which candidate is supported by President Lula? Dilma Rousseff, José Serra, Marina Silva, or someone else?

As Table 23 indicates, the only question that was present in all three waves was GI3. On this question there does appear to have been some learning over the course of the survey, with a jump of close to six percentage points in the proportion answering the question correctly between the first and the third waves. Looking at other questions, we find that the percentage able to answer questions correctly varies substantially from question to question. By the third wave, nearly all respondents knew who Lula's candidate was, a very minimal test of attention to the recently completed election campaign. By contrast, in the same wave fewer than 10 percent of respondents could correctly identify which party had elected the highest number of senators in the recently completed elections.

[11] Non-response is 1.0 percent.

Table 23. Political Knowledge (%)

	Wave 1		Wave 2		Wave 3	
	Correct	DK/NR	Correct	DK/NR	Correct	DK/NR
US President	65.9	25.7			74.0	21.5
Venezuelan President			39.8	51.7	42.5	48.0
Brazilian States	27.4	45.8	28.5	48.1	33.2	39.7
Senators per State			13.2	54.1	16.2	44.8
Party won Senate					9.8	61.1
Lula's Candidate			80.8	14.3	94.4	4.2

3.6.6 Clientelism

BEPS sought to measure clientelism, using an innovative survey experiment (following González-Ocantos et al., 2012). The introduction of question LISTEXP read as follows, in both the treatment and control groups: "Now, I'm going to show you a card that mentions various things that candidates in all elections and their campaign workers (*cabos eleitorais*) sometimes do during political campaigns. I would like for you to tell me simply **HOW MANY** of the following, not which of them, happened during this year's political campaigns:"

The control group then received four items:

- Candidates offered you flyers, stickers, or buttons
- Candidates visited your home
- Candidates offered you money to campaign for them
- Candidates threatened you or someone in your family

The treatment group received these four items, plus a fifth: "Candidates offered you money, favors, or presents in exchange for your vote." Since the only variation between the treatment and control is in the inclusion of the fifth item, we can interpret the difference in the mean number of items reported in the treatment and control as an estimate of the proportion of respondents who were offered some good or money in exchange for their votes.

Table 24 reports the percentage of respondents providing each response to the list experiment, in the treatment versus the control groups. What is striking is the very small difference between the treatment and control groups. These results indicate that only 5 percent of respondents were offered a clientelistic exchange, a percentage that is not statistically significantly different from 0.

Table 24. List Experiment Responses (%)

Response	Control	Treatment
0	30.6	32.2
1	33.3	32.2
2	22.1	20.0
3	4.6	6.5
4	9.4	3.2
5	0.0	6.0
Mean	1.29	1.34

Table 25. Religious Affiliation in Brazil, April 2010

Denomination	Percent
Catholic	60.5
Pentecostal Evangelical	13.8
Traditional Protestant or Non-Pentecostal Evangelical	11.6
Kardecist/Spiritist	2.5
Jehovah's Witness	0.6
Traditional/Native Religions (Candomblé, Umbanda, etc.)	0.5
Mormon/Latter Day Saints	0.2
Jewish	0.2
Other Non-Christian (Muslim, Buddhist, etc.)	0.2
None (Believes in a Supreme Being)	6.8
Atheist/Doesn't Believe in God	0.4
Doesn't Know/No Response	2.7

Note: Analysis is weighted at the regional level by population, sex, and age.

3.7 Religion and Moral Issues

3.7.1 Religion

BEPS offers a number of opportunities to study the role of religion in the 2010 presidential election. First, denominations were identified in each wave using a question that asked simply, "What is your religion, if any?" Table 25 presents the full breakdown of responses to this question in the first wave. As we can see, by far the largest response categories are Catholic, Protestant, evangelical, and unaffiliated. Because adherents to other religious groups make up such a small proportion of the population, in the following analysis they are grouped together with the religiously unaffiliated.

Beyond their religious affiliations and frequency of church attendance, during the second and third waves of the study, respondents received three further questions about their exposure to religious messages. First, they were asked "During the election campaign, did you hear the pastor

Table 26. Exposure to Religious Intermediaries, 2010 Presidential Election.

	Priest Supported a Candidate		Priest Discussed Candidates		Religious Media Exposure	
	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 2	Wave 3
Other	1.8	4.3	4.2	7.1	24.5	18.4
Evangelical	7.5	15.0	14.1	27.6	59.9	64.3
Protestant	6.3	8.9	11.6	15.8	68.3	74.1
Catholic	3.0	3.8	6.6	8.7	53.2	50.0

Note: Analysis is weighted at the regional level by population, sex, and age.

or priest of your church talk about the candidates in the current campaign?" Second, respondents were asked "Did the priest/pastor of your church support some candidate for President?" If the answer was in the affirmative, the interviewer asked "Whom?" Third, interviewers asked "Do you listen to some religious program on the radio or watch some religious program on TV?" Responses to the first and third questions were coded Yes/No. Affirmative responses to the second question were coded as "Dilma Rousseff," "José Serra," "Marina Silva," and "Other."

Table 26 presents responses to these three questions, by denomination. Only a small share of respondents in any denomination was aware of their priest or pastor explicitly supporting a candidate. In the third wave, almost one in six evangelicals knew which presidential candidate their pastors supported, while less than 10 percent of Protestants and an even smaller percentage of Catholics did so. Evangelicals tended to report that their clergy supported Serra or Silva; Protestants reported Serra or Rousseff; and Catholics largely reported that their priests supported Rousseff, while none chose Silva.

Table 26 also shows that a much larger share of respondents were aware of clergy members *talking* about the candidates. Not surprisingly, awareness of priest involvement in the campaign rose over the course of the study. Nonetheless, these differences are actually fairly small. As with priest support for candidates, discussion is concentrated within evangelical, and to a lesser extent Protestant, denominations.

Finally, the table shows that the opportunities for exposure to political messages through the religious media are strong; in the third wave, three-quarters of Protestant respondents report exposure to these media. Moreover, half of Catholics report such exposure.

3.7.2 Race and Affirmative Action

BEPS also offers many opportunities to study attitudes towards race and affirmative action. First, in all three waves respondents were asked the question RAC2: "Changing the topic, but using the same card [involving a 7-point scale running from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 7 ("strongly agree")], please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with this sentence: It's fair for public universities

Table 27. Support for Affirmative Action (%)

Response	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
1	16.71	17.58	17.52
2	4.53	4.19	6.07
3	3.83	4.54	6.24
4	5.58	6.29	5.73
5	10.29	9.66	9.49
6	12.58	12.11	13.42
7	46.48	45.63	41.54
Mean (whites)	4.65	4.65	4.51
Mean (*pardos*)	5.38	5.31	5.11
Mean (*pretos*)	5.26	5.32	5.34

to reserve spaces for Afro-descendants (people who are black or mulatto)." Table 27 reveals that support for affirmative action is quite strong across all three waves, with between 65 and 70 percent of respondents in each wave reporting a 5, 6, or 7.[12] Nonetheless, an important minority disagrees with the statement in each wave, with between 16 and 18 percent of respondents reporting a 1. Moreover, support for affirmative action appears to drop slightly across the three waves, with statistically significant differences between Waves One and Three. The table also indicates that there are small but important differences in support for affirmative action across racial and ethnic groups, with whites significantly less likely to support affirmative action than those who self-identify as *pardo* or *preto* (brown or black).[13]

In the second and third waves, BEPS also included a question on affirmative action based on social class, rather than skin color. Question AANEW reads, "Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: It's fair for public universities to reserve spaces for people from low-income families." Responses, which are presented in Table 28, reveal that support for class-based affirmative action is substantially and significantly higher than support for race-based affirmative action. Indeed, class-based affirmative action is supported almost universally: 83 percent of respondents in Wave Two and 81 percent in Wave Three give the statement a 5, 6, or 7, on the agreeing end of the scale. At the same time, only 12 percent disagree with the statement in Wave 2, and 13 percent do so in Wave Three. We also find that mean levels of support for class-based affirmative action are quite high among all three major racial groups, whites, *pardos*, and *pretos*.

[12] Non-response was 6.70 percent across all three waves.

[13] We only report responses for these three major categories because of the small number of respondents identifying as indigenous or as *amarelos*.

Table 28. Support for Class-Based Affirmative Action(%)

	Wave 2	Wave 3
Response		
1	7.37	6.95
2	1.47	2.2
3	3.63	3.9
4	4.88	5.42
5	9.52	7.2
6	11.56	14.41
7	61.56	59.92
Mean (whites)	5.79	5.79
Mean (*pardos*)	5.88	5.87
Mean (*pretos*)	6.19	6.17

The data also reveal Brazilians to be highly supportive of racial mixing. In the first and second waves, BEPS asked two questions about attitudes towards racial interactions throughout society. Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed, on a 7-point scale, with two statements: RAC3A, "The mixture of races is good for Brazil" and RAC3B: "You would agree with your son or daughter marrying a black person." Table 29 indicates that two-thirds of respondents reported the highest possible response to the first question, and that three-quarters did so for the second question. By contrast, only five percent of respondents reported a "1,' "2,' or "3' on either question in either wave. Support for racial mixing also appears to have risen slightly over time; the differences between the Wave One and Wave Two means are statistically significant for both variables. Finally, the table indicates that agreement with these statements is quite high among all three major racial groups, whites, *pardos*, and *pretos*.

3.7.3 Abortion

In the third wave, we also sought to study attitudes towards abortion, using the question ABORT: "In some people's opinion, the law should permit abortion under certain conditions; in other people's opinions, the law should prohibit all types of abortion. Which of the following statements best expresses your opinion? (1) Abortion should not be permitted by law under any circumstance; (2) Abortion should be permitted by law under some exceptional circumstances, such as in the case of risk to the life of the pregnant woman and in cases of rape; (3) Abortion should be permitted by law, for any reason, as long as it is in the first trimester; or (4) Abortion should be permitted by law, without restrictions."[14]

[14] Non-response was 3.03 percent.

Table 29. Support for Racial Mixing (%)

	Good for Brazil		Child's Marriage	
Response	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
1	2.06	1.49	2.62	2.72
2	1.15	1.03	0.9	0.68
3	1.65	1.72	1.51	0.79
4	4.98	3.32	2.94	1.59
5	11.12	8.93	8.34	6.35
6	13.83	15.23	10.58	9.86
7	65.21	68.27	73.11	78
Mean (whites)	6.24	6.29	6.29	6.35
Mean (*pardos*)	6.26	6.34	6.41	6.51
Mean (*pretos*)	6.25	6.66	6.58	6.85

Table 30. Support for Abortion (%)

	Percent
Never permitted	35.22
Exceptions for mother's health and rape	60.22
No restrictions in first trimester	2.87
No restrictions at all	1.69

In Table 30, we find that over a third of respondents reported that they believed that abortion should be outlawed under all circumstances, even when the mother's life is in danger. Almost all of the remaining respondents agreed that abortion should be allowed only in special circumstances, such as when the mother's health is in danger or in the case of rape. Fewer than 5 percent of respondents were in favor of less restrictive abortion laws.

3.7.4 Gay Rights

Next, we also sought to understand attitudes towards gay rights, and in particular attitudes towards the rights of same-sex partners. Question D6, which was included in the first and second waves, asked "To what extent do you approve or disapprove of homosexual couples having the right to marry?" In the second wave, we also included question D8: "To what extent do you approve or disapprove of homosexuals being able to put their partners on their health plans?" [15]

In Table 31, we find mixed attitudes towards same-sex partner rights. Support for both gay marriage and same-sex partner health benefits falls somewhat below the scale midpoint of 5.5, with somewhat less support for gay marriage than for health benefits. In the first wave, 63 percent

[15] Non-response was 4.1 percent for D6 in Waves One and Two and 4.1 percent for D8 in Wave Two.

Table 31. Support for Same-Sex Partner Rights (%)

	Marriage		Partner Health Plans
Response	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 2
1	36.69	44.53	32.49
2	6.19	4.44	4.25
3	5.05	4.9	4.36
4	3.96	3.87	4.02
5	10.66	6.49	7.92
6	4.55	4.67	5.86
7	6.78	4.33	7.23
8	4.97	5.13	7.69
9	3.03	3.08	4.02
10	18.11	18.56	22.16
Mean	4.56	4.29	5.15

Table 32. Attitudes towards Authorities Violating the Law (%)

	Wave 1	Wave 2
Must always respect the law	70.17	77.59
Can ignore laws sometimes	29.83	22.41

of respondents reported a "5" or lower in support for gay marriage, while in the second wave 64 percent did so. By contrast, only 53 percent reported a "5" or lower in support for same-sex partner health benefits. At the same time, there is an important minority in favor of same-sex partner health benefits. A little under a fifth of respondents reports the highest possible support for gay marriage, and a little over a fifth does so for same-sex partner benefits.

3.7.5 Respect for Law

BEPS also sought to tap attitudes towards the authorities violating laws in order to preserve public order. In both the first and second waves, we asked question AOJ8: "In order to capture criminals, do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or that, on certain occasions, the authorities can act without respecting the law?"[16] Table 32 reveals that most respondents agree that the authorities must always respect the law, though an important minority is willing to forgo the rule of law sometimes to catch criminals. Interestingly, there is a drop in support for violations of the rule of law between the first and second waves.

[16] Non-response was 1.9 percent across both waves.

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