Approach Paper

Haiti
2011-2015
Country Program Evaluation
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### ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>EDH</td>
<td>Electricité d’Haïti</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>IDB-9</td>
<td>Ninth General Increase in the Resources of the Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>IIC</td>
<td>Inter-American Investment Corporation</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OMJ</td>
<td>Opportunities for the Majority Sector</td>
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<td>OVE</td>
<td>Office of Evaluation and Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>Structured and Corporate Financing Department</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>Technical cooperation</td>
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1.1 Since the 2010 earthquake, economic growth in Haiti has been moderately positive, driven largely by reconstruction efforts and significant amounts of external financing. In real terms, the earthquake’s impact was an estimated 5.5% decrease in GDP in 2010, in addition to massive losses of human life, infrastructure, and social capital.¹ Since then, largely as a result of reconstruction efforts pursued by the international community, GDP has grown at a moderate pace: after 5.5% growth in 2011, the rate fell to an estimated 2.7% in 2014.² The construction and public works sectors have been the primary engines of economic growth, with a significant increase in investment. From a low of 25.4% of GDP in 2010, gross investment—driven primarily by public investment—rose gradually to an estimated 31.2% in 2014. The increase in the gross investment rate was reflected almost entirely in the expansion of the fiscal deficit and an increase in imports. More than half of all public investment was financed by foreign grants, including budgetary support. Some of the financing came from loans from Petrocaribe on favorable terms.³ Remittances, which are also a significant source of financing in Haiti, rose from 20.6% of GDP in 2011 to 22.7% in 2014.

1.2 In terms of public finance, Haiti has one of the lowest levels of public expenditure in the region, reflecting the limited provision of public services. Revenue intake, which accounted for 12.1% of GDP in 2014, improved slightly in the 2000s (9.7%) but remains at typical levels for low-income countries. These revenues barely cover current expenses, which are equivalent to about 11% to 12% of GDP. Fiscal policy in Haiti has tended to be regressive. Low levels of public expenditure on payroll (5.6% of GDP in recent years) and on goods and services (about 3% of GDP) reflect the limited ability of the Haitian government to provide public services. In fact, most basic services such as health care and education are provided by nongovernmental actors (private and nongovernmental organizations), transferring the cost to households and linking service delivery/quality to household income.⁴ Given the low level of interest payments on the current debt (0.5% of GDP), the most significant recurring expenses are transfers and subsidies, which represented about 3% of GDP in 2013-2014. Half of these transfers went to cover the losses of the electricity company, Electricité d’Haiti (EDH).³

1.3 Limitations on economic growth and competitiveness in Haiti are related to institutional factors that are structural in nature. With real wages relatively

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¹ The Haitian authorities estimated that the earthquake was responsible for the deaths of more than 200,000 people and the displacement of over one million more. The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment estimated the earthquake-related damage and losses at more than US$7.9 billion (equivalent to 120% of GDP) and total recovery needs at US$11.5 billion.
² Grants from the international community were 10.6% of GDP in 2011 and 5.9% in 2014.
³ Petrocaribe is an initiative of the Venezuelan government aimed at developing a partnership whereby Caribbean countries purchase Venezuelan petroleum on preferential terms of payment.
⁴ Dependence on nongovernmental actors and external aid weakens the management of public investment and hinders the effective use of public resources. Few sector strategies are in place to guide the prioritization of projects. As a result, the public investment program consists of projects that have not been fully evaluated or prioritized.
⁵ EDH’s losses are equivalent to 2.5% of GDP (2014). Government transfers are 1.6% of GDP.
low (by Caribbean standards), and a real effective exchange rate estimated at near equilibrium, price competitiveness is not considered a significant obstacle to economic growth in Haiti. The obstacles are institutional in nature. In particular, Haiti’s business environment is regarded as among the weakest in the world. The main limitations on business activity include deficiencies related to property rights (especially land tenure), insufficient productive infrastructure (especially in the supply of electricity), and limited access to finance. Other indexes highlight institutional limitations related to government efficiency and quality of government institutions for service delivery.

1.4 **These institutional factors have an impact on export growth and on the limited diversification of exports.** Exports are much less diversified now than in the 1980s, despite a relatively enabling environment for trade agreements and low trade barriers, particularly in the maquila assembly industry, which accounts for most of Haiti’s exports and enjoys preferential access to markets in the United States. Nontariff barriers, including import licenses, have been dismantled as a matter of law, but the importation of goods remains under the de facto control of a small number of agents.

1.5 **Haiti is also one of the countries most vulnerable to extreme events and natural disasters related to climate change.** In Haiti, the high levels of physical exposure, limited socioeconomic conditions, and low levels of institutional capacity combine to create conditions of extreme vulnerability (see document RE-459-1, Annex VII). Loss and damage associated with tropical storms and hurricanes have increased in the past 10 years. Haiti is also experiencing severe deforestation as a result of unsustainable agricultural practices, high demand for firewood for energy purposes, and rapid population growth. Projected changes in precipitation patterns could adversely impact agricultural productivity, and thereby food security.

1.6 **Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western hemisphere.** GDP growth per capita has been small in recent years, and per capita GDP (US$833 in 2014) remains among the lowest in the region. Although Haiti’s poverty rates have declined since 2001, poverty is still widespread. In 2012, the Government of Haiti, with support from the World Bank, announced the first official national poverty line for Haiti on the basis of unmet needs, a food basket, and consumption. On this basis, the poverty rate for 2012 was estimated at 58.5%.

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6 Haiti was ranked 180th out of 189 countries in the Doing Business 2015 report.
7 The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015 ranked property rights as the weakest factor under institutions for the country’s competitiveness (ranking 143rd out of 144).
8 Among the World Bank’s governance indicators, Haiti scored particularly low on “government effectiveness,” with a percentile rank of 0.96 in the distribution for 2014 (compared to a percentile rank of 2.9 in 2010). In terms of institutional capacity, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment showed no significant improvement. Haiti maintained an average score of 3.2, which is below the threshold for a country to be deemed fragile.
9 These preferences are an extension of a previous U.S. law known as the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act, passed in December 2006. This law was expanded and extended (until 2018) by the HOPE II Act of October 2008. After the earthquake, it was again expanded and deepened (until 2020) by the Haiti Economic Lift Program of April 2010. In June 2015, the terms of preferential access were extended to 2025.
and the extreme poverty rate was estimated at 23.8%. The poverty rate is significantly higher in rural areas and in the northern part of the country. Moreover, 10% of the population lives just above the poverty line, which suggests high levels of vulnerability. With a Gini coefficient of 0.61 (unchanged since 2001), Haiti’s income distribution is among the most unequal in the region.

1.7 In terms of access to basic services, Haiti has made improvements in the health care and education sectors in the past 10 years. Gains in the water and sanitation sectors, meanwhile, have been limited. Health indicators overall suggest considerable progress in the past 20 years. While the disparity among income-based quintiles remains significant, the lowest quintiles are showing a positive trend. The primary school enrollment rate grew by more than 10 percentage points between 2001 and 2012, while the rate for secondary schools more than doubled over the same period. The quality of education, however, is highly uneven and quite low, which is one of the main reasons for Haiti’s high unemployment rates (World Bank, 2015). Haiti has made limited progress in energy coverage, with a coverage rate of only 36% of the population in 2012 (32% in 2010); in access to clean water, with rates that hovered around 60% between 2000 and 2015; and in access to basic sanitation, which improved slightly (from 21% in 2000 to 28% in 2015) but remains among the lowest in the region.

II. The IDB’s Strategy in Haiti

A. Background

2.1 Since early 2000, OVE has conducted two evaluations of the Bank’s country strategies with Haiti and produced an evaluation report on the commitments of the Ninth General Increase in the Resources of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB-9) for Haiti. The evaluation of the 2001-2006 country strategy spanned a period of great political polarization and instability that ended with the ouster of the nation’s president, the establishment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, and the development of the Interim Cooperation Framework. The evaluation of the 2007-2011 country strategy also included an update by Bank Management in response to the 2010 earthquake. In addition, OVE prepared an evaluation report on the IDB-9 commitments for Haiti in 2012 and an update report in 2014. Box 2.1 summarizes the conclusions of OVE’s evaluations.

10 In 2001, Haiti’s poverty and extreme poverty rates were 76% and 56%, respectively. These rates are not comparable to those of 2012 because they reflect the number of people below the international thresholds of US$2 per day (poverty) and US$1 per day (extreme poverty) (using purchasing power parity for currency conversion). The 2012 poverty rate is based on the cost of basic needs, estimated at 81.7 gourdes, equivalent to US$2.41 at the purchasing power parity conversion rate for 2005.
The evaluation of the Bank’s country strategy with Haiti for 2000-2006 concluded that the Bank’s presence in Haiti was relevant in the complex political environment of the period. However, the program did not succeed in providing policy guidelines to support the Government of Haiti in prioritizing its scarce resources and embarking on a medium-term planning process. The program was aligned with the Interim Cooperation Framework and achieved greater coordination among donors, although it fell short of harmonization. Policy-based loans were relatively effective in supporting the balance of payments and also relaunched important reforms related to political and economic governance.

The evaluation of the Bank’s country strategy with Haiti for 2007-2011 emphasized that the Bank’s organizational and financial response to the 2010 earthquake emergency was swift and timely. It concluded, however, that the strategic response was insufficient to position the Bank in the face of the enormous challenges created by the earthquake. The organizational response included the creation of the Haiti Response Group in March 2010 (document GN-2563) and the strengthening of the Country Office. The financial response included the expansion of the Bank’s Haiti Grant Facility with Ordinary Capital resources, authorizing the approval of a grant of up to US$200 million per year for 10 years (2011-2020). The evaluation noted that the 2010 country strategy update had not included an evaluation of risks of the post-earthquake conditions on the portfolio in execution, nor did it offer a sequential strategy for IDB action on emergency, reconstruction, and development tasks in the long term. The evaluation also cautioned that the new grant modality eliminated factors that traditionally have guided the Bank’s work, such as the country’s willingness, expressed in counterpart funding, and/or commitment to repay, creating room for discrecretionality. The low evaluability of the strategy and program hindered project monitoring and accountability for the impacts of the Bank’s work in Haiti. Execution problems placed major constraints on the achievement of project outcomes, due to the institutional fragility of the Haitian State and the lack of designs adapted to the circumstances. The Bank’s effectiveness was hindered by a failure to obtain the desired outputs.

The evaluation of the Bank’s country strategy with Haiti for 2010-2012 concluded that the Bank’s post-earthquake strategic positioning. The evaluation found the following:

1. The Bank fulfilled its financial commitments, canceled the debt, transferred US$200 million per year to the Haiti Grant Facility, and financed a program for an amount exceeding the transfers.

2. In terms of effectiveness in coordinating aid, the evaluation acknowledged the Bank’s technical leadership in multiple sectors but concluded that coordination of donors in Haiti remains insufficient and subject to endemic limitations associated with the fragmentation of public management. The evaluation acknowledged that the Bank continued to play an active role in catalyzing and attracting resources from the international community, but it noted that this initial push to catalyze cofinancing was losing momentum over time.

3. In terms of strategic positioning, the Bank oriented its strategy with Haiti toward the long term, with no strategic, sequenced response to meet (short- and medium-term) reconstruction needs. Work focused on the Bank’s traditional sectors of activity prior to the earthquake (between 2007 and 2009, the six strategic areas accounted for about 70% of the portfolio in execution). The Bank’s positioning included two strategic changes: a regional development program in the northern hub centered on building an industrial park, and the replacement of crosscutting reform programs to support governance and the comprehensive strengthening of the State through the strengthening of programs and institutions in priority sectors. At the time of the evaluation, the private-sector development strategy faced significant risks related to the limited number of firms based in the industrial park, low wages for the jobs created, a lack of productive and social infrastructure associated with development of the industrial park, and difficulties in raising levels of project ownership on the part of both the government and international organizations. Also, the lack of a comprehensive program to support governance jeopardized the sustainability of actions in each sector.

The evaluation also concluded that the urgent need to approve and disburse US$200 million per year for 10 years created incentives to direct operations to areas or sectors capable of actually disbursing with a degree of autonomy and speed (large infrastructure projects and policy-based grants), thus reducing the appeal of taking on the essential task of building and strengthening local
capacities. The evaluation noted that the IDB-9 commitments do not explicitly require that the annual allocation of US$200 million be approved and disbursed each year, but rather that those funds be transferred to the Haiti Grant Facility.

The update to the OVE's evaluation of IDB-9 commitments for Haiti in 2014 confirmed that the Bank is still Haiti's leading donor. The Bank continued to approve US$200 million per year, while the collection of cofinancing resources continued to decline. Coordination among donors remained insufficient, but the Bank continued to position itself technically in multiple sectors (primarily agriculture and transportation). Also, the evaluation noted as a positive development that Bank Management had redirected its attention to management of public finances with emphasis on support for public procurement and financial management processes. Implementation remained subject to limitations associated with problems in operation design, a lack of quality preinvestment studies, constraints on the procurement market, limited ability to institute and oversee execution units, and the Haitian government's low level of ownership of Bank-financed interventions.

B. The Bank's country strategy with Haiti, 2011-2015

2.2 The 2011-2015 country strategy was approved in November 2011 and is the Bank's first post-earthquake country strategy. The Bank's country strategy was based on the Government Action Plan for National Recovery and Reconstruction and on the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment. The government's action plan included a strategy built around the four “E’s”: État de droit (rule of law), Education for All, Employment, and Environment. The Bank's country strategy with Haiti identified development challenges that were aligned with the government's program (see Table 2.1). For each of these sectors, the country strategy proposed indicators and ambitious targets. These indicators and the corresponding targets were revised in 2013, as noted in the progress reports that Management submits to the Board of Executive Directors every six months. However, the country strategy results matrix has not been updated, which creates limitations for the task of accountability for the evaluation.

11 The education targets for 2015 call for doubling the gross enrollment rate for grades 7-9 (from 46% to 96%) or quadrupling the percentage of grade 1-9 students enrolled in schools free of charge (from 20% to 85%). Similarly scaled targets were adopted for improved coverage of energy and of clean water and sanitation: the percentage of EDH's technical and business losses was to be cut from 60% (2010) to 30% (2015); electricity coverage was to be increased from 40% to 70%; and the operating margin of the National Directorate for Water and Sanitation was to be widened from 30% to 65%.

12 In education, the new indicators are mostly output-related: they measure the number of project beneficiaries (number of schools built or rehabilitated and number of tuition waivers). The target for the percentage of private schools accredited by the ministry was cut back sharply, from 100% to 12%. In energy, the target for generation capacity was reduced from 200 to 64 megawatts; the target for reducing EDH's technical and business losses was raised (from 30% to 45%), and the target for the cost recovery index was scaled back (from 50% to 40%). In the private sector, the target for creating new SMEs in the northern part of the country was cut by half, and the target for new jobs created was reduced from 50,000 to 18,000.
### Table 2.1: Priority Sectors for the 2011-2015 Country Strategy

<table>
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<th>Government program</th>
<th>Bank priority sectors</th>
<th>The Bank's strategic objectives for the 2011-2015 program</th>
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</table>
| Social rebuilding – Environment | Water and sanitation | Improve coverage and management of water and sanitation services in urban and rural areas  
Improve solid waste management practices |
| Social rebuilding – Education | Education | Improve access and quality of education  
Strengthen the institutional capacity and governance system of the Ministry of Education and Professional Training  
Reform technical and vocational training  
Reform higher education |
| Social and economic rebuilding – Environment | Agriculture | Protect the environment, respond to climate change, and enhance food security  
Increase agricultural income in target areas |
| Territorial and economic rebuilding – Employment | Transport | Improve the quality of national road infrastructure  
Improve the institutional capacity of the transport sector  
Improve international connectivity |
| Territorial and institutional rebuilding – Employment | Energy | Increase government oversight and planning of the energy sector  
Improve the operational efficiency of EDH in Port-au-Prince  
Expand electricity service in urban and rural areas |
| Economic rebuilding – Employment | Private sector development | Promote private sector investment in order to create jobs, achieve sustainably growth, and reduce poverty |

### Risks of the country strategy

The main risks identified in the country strategy are: (i) a **funding shortfall** that could reduce the scope of reforms and entail a need for additional resources; (ii) **limited management and execution capacity of local entities** to handle higher annual revenues and a greater workload, and avoid cost overruns on projects due to the limited supply of construction companies; (iii) **macroeconomic risks and business environment risks** that could frustrate private-sector growth, etc.; (iv) **institutional risks** that could pose an obstacle to reforms; and (v) **natural disaster risks** given the country's exposure and vulnerability. Lastly, the country strategy identifies an endogenous risk of **lack of coordination between Bank units and external actors** that could translate into limitations on the efficiency of the Bank's work.

### C.  The Bank’s operational portfolio, 2011-2015

2.3 **Between January 2011 and July 2015, the Bank approved US$1.009 billion in grants, US$137 million of which was cofinancing funds.** The country strategy called for US$1.044 billion in financing in the form of grants, with US$1.12 billion in disbursements, equivalent to US$230 million per year. During the period 2011-2015, US$962 million was approved (with Bank resources), and a total of US$1.029 billion disbursed, equivalent to an average of US$231 million per year (between 2011 and 2014) (see Figure 2.1).
2.4 **By type of instrument, the Bank-financed portfolio in Haiti during 2011-2015 is concentrated in investment grants, with limited involvement of the private-sector windows.** Of the total amount approved (US$1.009 billion), 77.5% (US$852 million) was investment grants, US$92 million (11%) of which was cofinancing. Policy-based grants accounted for 15.5% of all approvals (US$170 million). Technical cooperation operations, meanwhile, represented 6% of approvals (US$70 million, 64% of which was cofinancing). Lastly, the Structured and Corporate Financing Department (SCF) and Opportunities for the Majority Sector (OMJ) approved operations in the amount of US$7 million, accounting for 1% of the total amount approved, despite the fact that the 2011 Operational Program Report (document GN-2617) called for the approval of US$52.2 million in non-sovereign guaranteed operations.\(^{13}\) Meanwhile, the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) approved 13 projects for US$20 million during the evaluation period, and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) approved 10 investments for a total of US$11.4 million. OVE’s evaluation will include operations from all three private-sector windows (SCF, OMJ, and IIC) and MIF operations related to the strategic sectors.

2.5 **The portfolio was distributed relatively evenly across strategic sectors.** Between 2011 and 2015, the sector that approved the most resources for non-sovereign guaranteed projects was private-sector development, with 28% of all resources (US$308 million), followed by the transportation sector with 25% of all resources.
The education and agriculture sectors received 15% (US$172 million) and 14% (US$162 million), respectively. The energy sector approved US$121 million (11%), and the water and sanitation sector approved US$67 million (6%). The remaining resources were allocated to other sectors, primarily in response to the emergency in social protection, housing, and health care, as well as for institution-strengthening.

2.6 The country program evaluation will include operations approved prior to 2011 that were executed substantially during the evaluation period. As a result of the accumulation of undisbursed balances between 2009 and 2010 and growth in annual disbursements, many projects inherited from previous cycles were executed during the 2011-2015 strategy period (Figure 2.2). Thus, the loan portfolio under evaluation will consist of 156 operations totaling US$1.49 billion approved between 2006 and 2015.

![Figure 2.2: Capital Flows with Haiti, 2007-2014: Disbursements/Undisbursed Balance](image)

Source: OVE calculations based on Loan Management System (LMS).

### III. Evaluation Questions

A. Evaluation dimensions

3.1 The country program evaluation will use the traditional evaluation dimensions of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability (OECD-DAC). These dimensions provide a comprehensive overview of the program, not only in terms of size, but also outcomes and the means used to achieve them. The evaluation of the 2011-2015 country strategy will build on the evaluations recently performed by OVE, with emphasis on alignment and ownership of the Bank’s grant program by the Government of Haiti, efforts related to institution-strengthening and capacity-building for the provision of goods and services, and the implementation arrangements adopted by the Bank.

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14 The inherited portfolio includes all operations that, as of 1 January 2011, had an undisbursed balance greater than 70% of the originally approved amount.
1. Relevance

3.2 Relevance measures the degree to which the objectives of the Bank’s program are aligned with the needs of the country. Relevance should also consider the changing nature of the country’s needs. Questions to guide the analysis of relevance:

- What was the Bank’s strategic positioning in the post-earthquake political, economic, and social setting? How did the Bank position itself vis-à-vis other donors in Haiti? How did this affect the relevance of the Bank’s program and donor coordination?
- How relevant were the strategic objectives and the sector intervention approach? How technically and financially relevant was the grant program? How much alignment was there between the Bank’s program with the government’s sector plans? To what extent did the Government of Haiti take ownership of the program?
- How compatible was the Bank’s program with the country’s planning and execution capabilities?

2. Efficiency

3.3 Efficiency focuses on issues related to resource use and project implementation. Questions to guide the analysis of efficiency:

- How did the organizational model established for Haiti impact the program? What was the impact of the selection/combination of instruments?
- How much did the prefeasibility studies of operations impact their efficiency?
- What was the efficiency of IDB projects? How did the increase in approvals and disbursements impact project efficiency indicators (preparation and execution costs and times)?
- What have been the principal factors affecting execution of the IDB portfolio? How were issues related to institutional fragility and limited institutional capacity resolved? What impact did these issues have on project approval and execution times? How did issues related to donor coordination impact the efficiency of the IDB program? What project implementation problems impacted the program’s efficiency?

3. Effectiveness and sustainability

3.4 Effectiveness refers to the extent to which the program objectives agreed upon between the Bank and the country were met. Sustainability refers to the likelihood that program results will persist over the long term. Questions to guide this analysis include:

- What has been the effectiveness of IDB aid in Haiti? How much progress has been made toward the strategic objectives of the Bank’s country strategy? Which interventions/sectors have been the most effective?
- What have been the role and outcomes of the IDB’s private-sector windows? What have been the main constraints on development of the private-sector portfolio?
• How were the risks associated with weak institutions and low risk-bearing capacity addressed? What were the institutional strengthening arrangements supporting IDB programs, and their results?

• How well did the Bank anticipate sustainability challenges/risks in program and operation design? What mechanisms seem to have contributed—positively or negatively—to the sustainability of program outcomes?

• What degree of institutionalization was achieved by the Bank’s program and operations with respect to the country’s structures?

B. Sources of information and work execution timetable

3.5 The evaluation will draw on a wide range of information sources. It will also include a study of the effectiveness of the various institutional strengthening arrangements in the context of weaknesses in the Haitian State. These sources include interviews with key respondents: current and former government officials, individuals responsible for project execution, Bank sector specialists, international cooperation agencies, project beneficiaries, and members of civil society. The Bank’s documents for programming, monitoring (progress monitoring report), and evaluation (project completion report) will also be reviewed. OVE will build on the desk analysis with statistical analyses of internal and external databases. OVE plans to conduct a study of weaknesses of the Haitian State and their impact on program effectiveness, as well as of the various institutional strengthening arrangements. OVE will prepare sector notes for the strategic sectors, including sector-specific diagnostic assessments, as well as analyses of the implementation and outcomes of the Bank’s portfolio in each sector.

3.6 The Haiti country program evaluation will be conducted by a multidisciplinary team. The evaluation timeline is designed to coincide with the preparation process for the Bank’s new country strategy for the period 2016-2020. The team consists of Verónica González Diez, Team Leader; Monika Huppi; María Elena Corrales; Anna Crespo; Ali Mahmoud Khadr; Roland Michelitsch; Rafael Alcántara; Felipe Vargas; Julie Biau; Margareth Celse-L’Hoste; and María Cabrera Escalante. To ensure that the evaluation is relevant and useful, the team established a free-flowing dialogue with Bank Management, and in particular with Bank staff in Haiti and with the Country Office. The evaluation will conduct two missions to Haiti. In accordance with the protocol for country program evaluations, the findings of the evaluation must be reported at a time when the government is willing to make strategic decisions on the use of external aid. In practical terms, this means having a draft of the report ready for Management and the Government of Haiti to consider within the first few months of the new administration. The timeline is given in Table 3.1.

15 Through a competitive process, OVE commissioned a study to evaluate how and to what extent the Bank has contributed to strengthening of the institutions involved in service delivery or policy-making in Haiti. This study includes (i) a review of donor effectiveness and lessons learned from fragile States with a special emphasis on institutional capacity-building in Haiti; and (ii) an in-depth analysis of a sample of Bank projects with components explicitly aimed at strengthening institutions to improve service delivery and project implementation.
Table 3.1: Timeline of Activities

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<tr>
<td>Contextual analysis; First mission to Haiti</td>
<td>August 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approach paper</td>
<td>November 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project analysis; Second mission to Haiti</td>
<td>January 2016</td>
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<td>Submittal to the Programming Committee of the Board</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
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