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IDB CITIZEN SECURITY PROJECTS
### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GCI</td>
<td>General Capital Increase</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>OVE</td>
<td>Office of Evaluation and Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drug and Crime</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This approach paper identifies the rationale, the main evaluative questions, and the methods to be used for an evaluation by the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) on Citizen Security in Latin America and the Caribbean. The evaluation is the second in a two-stage evaluation of citizen security. The first evaluation examined five citizen security operations. That evaluation focused on the implementation challenges the Bank faces. This second phase of the evaluation will look more broadly at all of the Bank’s work in citizen security, including both lending and non-lending activities. It will also attempt to identify the Bank’s strengths (and weaknesses) in addressing one of the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Region’s most pressing challenges: the persistence of crime and violence.

1.2 The expression citizen security refers to the right of citizens to live free from all forms of violence and crime in times of peace. The expression, increasingly used in LAC since the 1980s, has put people at the center of security matters, in contrast to the security of the State, which is often associated with human rights violations by authoritarian regimes.\(^1\) Citizen security is often part of the name of policies that address the issue of violence and crime. Perception of insecurity refers to another concept—how citizens interpret their context and their safety.

1.3 Violence is defined by the World Health organization as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.”\(^2\) It includes domestic violence and child maltreatment, sexual abuse, and other types of aggressions. Crime refers to activities that are against the law. Crime and violence often overlap, but not always: there are crimes that are nonviolent, such as money laundering, and there are violent acts that do not constitute a crime in some countries, such as rape within marriage. Combining both terms embraces all harmful activities against persons and properties that take place within the home and on the streets, against children, women, men, and the elderly in all their diversity,\(^3\) for a wide range of motives (economic, social, political, or pathological), and with consequences as diverse as the loss of property, injury, trauma, or death.

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\(^1\) Citizen security is a rights-based term that was endorsed by the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and is commonly used throughout the Region.

\(^2\) WHO, 2002. The OVE evaluations focus solely on interpersonal violence and common crime in urban contexts. Thus they do not cover suicide, armed conflict, or organized crime. However, both evaluations include all these forms of violence in the contextual part (diagnostic).

\(^3\) In all their diversity means independently of their age, ethnicity, ability, sexual preference, gender, religion, or profession.
A. The LAC Context

1.4 **LAC is one of the most violent regions in the world.** Although the Region has a relatively high level of economic development, it also has very high incidences of violence. This includes different types of inter-personal violence, ranging from domestic violence to homicides. For example, recent data from official statistics put the Central American homicide rate at 25 per 100,000, the Caribbean rate at 21, and the South American rate at 22—three to four times the world average. The only other region with these levels is Africa, with average rates of 29 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. These aggregated figures hide large differences among countries and across cities and regions within countries.

And although homicides are the most comparable measure of violence, the available data show that the region has relatively high incidences of other forms of violence. For instance, a cross-country comparison of domestic violence done by the WHO (Garcia, 2005) shows a high percentage (between 29% and 69%) of women reporting being victims of physical or sexual violence in the LAC countries surveyed in the study. Likewise, a recent review of victimization survey data by the World Bank (World Bank, 2011c) documented high—if uneven—incidences of other types of crime, such as robbery and burglary.

1.5 **The nature of violence and crime in LAC has changed substantially over the past decades.** The LAC Region has experienced high levels of violence since colonial times. Research, often links the nature of this violence to the Region’s

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4 These data are for 2010 or the latest year available, which could go back as far as 2008 (UNODC 2011). The study reports homicide rates from both criminal justice and health sources. For the Central American and South American sub-regions the figures are similar across these sources, but for the Caribbean they differ: criminal justice data show a figure of 21 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, but health sources show a figure closer to 13. We report figures from criminal justice sources for all three sub-regions. The number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is the most reliable and comparable indicator across countries and over time. However, homicides are often only the tip of the iceberg, as violence and crime encompass a large variety of manifestations.

5 UNODC (2011) reports a world average of 6.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

6 UNODC (2011) reports a single figure of 17.4 for the whole of Africa, but it also shows in a graph separate figures for Eastern, Western, North, and South Africa—approximately 22, 17, 6, and 32, respectively. These data are also for 2010 or the latest year available.

7 For example, while homicide rates for Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago increased from 2000 to 2008, going respectively from 34.4 to 59.5 and 9.3 to 41.1 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Chile had stable rates during the same period ranging from 5 to 13 per 100,000. Data for Chile come from Pan-American Health Organization for 2000 and from criminal justice records for 2008, according to UNODC (2011).

8 Even within countries, there can be large differences from one city to the other. For example, in Brazil, in 2010, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro had, respectively, 13 and 24.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, while Curitiba, Recife, and Maceio had homicide rates of 55.9, 57.9, and 109.9 (Waiselfisz 2011a, p. 48, using preliminary data from SIM/SVS/MS).

9 See World Bank (2011c). The overall incidence of self-reported victimization varies across countries, ranging from 8% in Panama to 28% in Argentina.
evolving socio-political context. During the second half of the 20th century, much of the violence was attributed to the conflict surrounding the authoritarian regimes in most of the Region, and particularly in the Southern Cone and in Central America and the Caribbean. The rise of these regimes, and their relationship with citizens, was influenced by broader political struggles associated with the Cold War. Furthermore, the Region’s underlying inequities exacerbated socioeconomic and ethnic tensions and contributed to the emergence of violent intra-state confrontations. During this period the Region’s security institutions, and particularly the police, were skewed toward repression and control of the citizenry, usually under militarized arrangements that reported to central authorities. Starting in the late 1970s, and accelerating into the 1980s (Southern Cone) and the 1990s (Central America), most countries in LAC transitioned from authoritarian rule to more democratic arrangements. This process was accompanied by a broader liberalization of most state institutions, including those associated with the control and prevention of crime and violence. However, this period also saw a change in the nature of crime and violence, as civil and political conflict gradually gave way to criminal behavior that was more urban, and was generally associated with different causes.

1.6 The increase in crime and violence over the past two decades is attributed to a range of causes. The explanations offered for changes in crime span the spectrum of public policy—for example, changes in urbanization; increases in inequality, both of income and of opportunities; an increasing gap between expectations and employment opportunities for youth; fragmentation of family life; and lack of appropriate role models. On the policy side, the nature and timing of reforms to the police and other violence-prevention institutions have been insufficient to address the magnitude of the problems facing the Region. Persisting deficits of state institutions for the prevention and control of crime—including corruption—are also often advanced as explanations for the increase in crime, particularly during the adjustment period, as police forces abandoned their roles of tools of political control and repression and were gradually reformed as professional, civilian-controlled institutions. Although this process is still in ongoing, there are many examples of successful reforms of police forces.

For example, see Brands (2010) for a discussion of the history of violence in LAC during the Cold War.

See World Bank (2011) for a discussion of the role of the Cold War in determining the nature of violence worldwide and in LAC.

Note that some authors argue strongly that the underlying social tensions that gave rise to the “political” violence of the earlier decades are still responsible for their more contemporary manifestations; see, for example, Rodgers (2009).


For a discussion of the transition of police forces in LAC, see Frühling (2009) and Bailey and Dammert (2006a, 2006b).
general, these deficiencies led to high levels of impunity, and to ineffective crime prevention institutions.

1.7 The rise of drug trafficking also changed the equation for violence and crime prevention in the Region. The rise of international drug syndicates during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s had a transformational impact on violence and crime in the Region. In LAC drug trafficking predominantly involves the export of cocaine from coca-producing countries to markets in North America and Europe (and to some degree Oceania). The rise in crime and violence associated with the drug trade, and the changes in the control of the drug trade, were quite rapid during the 1980s, albeit with different trends by country—and persists today. The drug trade presents a pernicious problem with significant consequences for the legitimacy of democratic institutions.

B. The Consequences of Crime and Violence

1.8 The high costs of violence and crime and their long-term consequences put a significant burden on individuals, families, and communities, and ultimately affect countries’ development negatively. At the individual and family levels, the immediate and longer-term consequences of violent crime are dramatic: crime can engender losses that can have serious welfare consequences. In LAC, these losses have typically been large, reaching levels exceeding two years of lost life expectancy—as in Colombia during the 1990s. If not only loss of life but also disability is included—as measured by the WHO “disability-adjusted life years lost” method, of DALY, the evidence again shows a Region with high deficits. A recent review by World Bank estimated the costs of 1.2% of GDP annually in terms of los DALYs for Central America. Crime and violence can also generate widespread fear and insecurity, which can dramatically restrict behavior, limit activities, and affect productive decisions, as economic agents faced with uncertainty generated by crime can alter investment behavior.

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15 See UNODC (2010) for a description of the magnitude of the global drug trade.
18 See World Bank (2011c) for a description of the DALY results in Central America. DALYs were also used in the World Bank-UNODC’s 2007 assessment of the cost of violence in the Caribbean.
19 Feelings of insecurity in the Region are widespread. Citizens surveyed across Latin America place insecurity as the first or second priority for their country, after or with unemployment (Latinobarómetro 2009:77.) A 2008 IDB study also shows that 60% of LAC citizens do not feel safe in their neighborhoods (Lora 2008, cited in GN-2587:26, IDB); and even though perceptions of violence and insecurity do not necessarily match data on crime and violence, they negatively affect quality of life (cf. Briceño-León, 2001:19-20, emphasizing the impact on mobility, among other things.)
20 Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg (2008) argue that increased risk of death can produce very large welfare costs, beyond the actual loss of life span.
addition, violent crime has a documented impact on macro-level development outcomes. For example, evidence points to a causal relationship between higher levels of crime and lower levels of economic output, total factor productivity, and household income growth, among other outcomes.

1.9 The impacts of violence and crime, when computed as a percentage of GDP, tend to be substantial. Studies that monetize and compare the consequences of violence and crime in terms of GDP tend to come to large estimates that range from 2% to 10% of GDP, depending on the setting considered and methodology used. For the LAC Region as a whole, a recent study found that on average 13% of GDP—including direct costs to health and mortality and costs to the business climate—is lost to the excessive rates of violence. This is nearly three times the public expenditure dedicated to education in countries like Brazil or Mexico (respectively, 5.1% and 4.8% of GDP in 2007). Other indirect costs and negative effects range from loss of productivity and earnings of victims to lower school attendance of children who are victims or witnesses of abuse in their home or their community, and a tendency for children to reproduce violent behaviors when adults. Violence, or the fear of violence, can also engender myopic behavior with respect to work, savings, and productive decisions.

C. Challenges in Addressing the Problem

1.10 Research on the causes of violence and crime and on the effectiveness of different public policies to prevent violence has increased over the past decades. Assessments of evidence-based policy in crime and violence prevention have flourished in industrialized countries, generating a significant amount of knowledge about the effectiveness of policies and specific programs within that context. Large-scale literature reviews and meta-evaluations, which distill knowledge on the effectiveness of particular families of programs or

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21 See Mauro and Carmeci (2007), for instance.
22 We do not discuss the role of political violence and civil unrest in this paper. Collier (1999) provides some of the first analysis of the consequences of political violence. A more recent review can be found in World Bank (2011b). Likewise, we are not addressing nonviolent forms of crime, such as corruption. There is a vast literature on the role of corruption and other forms of nonviolent crime in development (for a review, see Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004).
25 Willman (2008: 63-64). It is important to note that the relationship between experience of violence during childhood and violent behaviors in adulthood should be understood retrospectively and not predictively: most adults who are violent have suffered from experiences of violence in their childhood. However, not all children who experience violence as witnesses or victims will become violent adults.
26 For example, Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg, (2006) find that increased mortality can shorten agents’ planning horizon, increasing risky behavior, increasing fertility, and reducing investments in physical and human capital.
interventions, have also emerged as a valuable resource for policymakers. These efforts have generated a significant empirical foundation, which has helped to clearly identify programs that are ineffective. However, the translation of this empirical base to actual adoption by policymakers has been slow and erratic. Also, given that the preponderance of evidence is from industrialized countries, the conditions under which this is applicable to the crime patterns, institutions, and specific populations in LAC is unclear.

1.11 **Violence and crime have proven extremely difficult to address, partly because evidence on what works is still scarce and fragmented in LAC.** The multi-causal nature of crime and violence has led to complex policies, which makes it difficult to isolate specific evidence. The evaluation of such policies leads to silos of specific knowledge but leaves large areas in which relatively little is known. And in LAC, evidence on effectiveness continues to be relatively scarce. In some cases research in the Region has been important in informing the discussion on violence prevention—for instance, in the debate on the effects of limiting alcohol sales and consumption, examples such as Diadema and São Paulo have become well known and have contributed to the evidence on the effectiveness of dry laws. As another example, in the discussion surrounding the effectiveness of electronic monitoring, evidence from LAC helped to challenge the mounting evidence against the effectiveness of electronic monitoring. Evidence from the region also contributed to the debate on the effectiveness of different police deployment protocols. However, these are isolated studies, which would need to be replicated and verified across different contexts, and expanded to other research questions. In general, the push for evidence-based policy in the prevention of crime and violence that took place in many industrialized countries has not been replicated in LAC.

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27 Perhaps the best known large-scale literature review, and still the most comprehensive of these efforts, was that of Sherman, who reviewed over 600 studies; see Sherman (1997) and Sherman et al. (2002). Also prominent in this effort was work by the Campbell Collaboration on crime and justice, as well as crimesolutions.gov.

28 See Lum et al. (2011) for a discussion of these efforts, and the effectiveness of integrating this research into actual public policy.

29 The results from Diadema, for instance, show a dramatic 44% reduction in homicide rates; see Duailibi et al. (2007). Biderman et al. (2010) find significant but more modest results for São Paulo. There are also results for other areas in LAC, including for Bogotá (De Mello et al., 2013).

30 A recent paper by Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2010) suggests that electronic monitoring can be an effective alternative to incarceration in deterring recidivism. This is one of a very few rigorous studies that favor electronic monitoring on effectiveness grounds.

31 Garcia, Mejia, and Ortega (2013) provide evidence from the implementation of the “Plan Cuadrante,” a localized and decentralized police deployment and training program in Colombia.

32 Even for the case of the effectiveness of alcohol controls, the evidentiary production in LAC is limited: in a recent meta-evaluation on dry laws (Giesbrecht et al., 2009), only one of the 62 studies reviewed was from LAC.
1.12 It is also difficult to develop evidence-based public policies to prevent violence and crime because these are sensitive and ideological topics, which can rapidly become politicized. Violence and crime touch people intimately, for they eventually deal with life, death, and traumas. Consequently, the topic has become prominent in the list of preoccupations of LAC citizens.\textsuperscript{33} All this increases political pressure in a context where knowledge is divided by discipline and evidence of effective policies remains sparse in developing countries, regardless of significant progress in knowledge over the years. The topic has also become a valence issue\textsuperscript{34}, and as a result political parties in LAC have used it to consolidate support and build coalitions. This is especially true in Central America, where the political discourse surrounding “mano dura” policies in the late 1990s and 2000s has been particularly unsophisticated and uninformed by evidence.\textsuperscript{35}

II. The IDB’s Response to Crime and Violence

2.1 The IDB has worked in the prevention of crime and violence for over three decades. In the 1990s the IDB began preparing operations in areas related to reform of the state, including in areas related to crime and violence. The Bank’s early activities were concentrated in the justice sector. During the 1990s the IDB approved justice projects in most countries in LAC—work that addressed the changing organization and working of the justice systems in LAC, and accompanied the Region’s reform efforts. Some of these projects were directly focused on reforms to the criminal justice system, but most addressed specific investment needs of the judiciary and related agencies in the executive branch (prosecutors and others). However, as these reform processes began to advance and consolidate, lending to the justice sector waned. The IDB also approved a limited number of projects in areas that were outside the modernization of the state area but had some bearing on crime and violence, including projects in the social sector and in housing.

2.2 Since 1996, the IDB’s main instrument for addressing crime and violence has been its portfolio of citizen security projects. The IDB was one of the first multilaterals to begin engaging directly in violence and crime prevention through citizen security projects. At present IDB’s work includes 19 approved citizen security stand-alone loans spanning 16 countries, as well as loans in other sectors that have specific components to prevent violence\textsuperscript{36}. Furthermore, over the past

\textsuperscript{33} See data from Latin American Public Opinion Project, available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.

\textsuperscript{34} In political science, valence issues are defined as issues uniformly liked or disliked by the electorate, across party lines.

\textsuperscript{35} Garland (2002) discusses the relationship between the crime discourse and the punitive stances taken by the United States and the UK in the 1970s and 1980s. For LAC, Cruz (2006) and more recently Holland (2013) describe the use of crime as a political instrument in El Salvador.

\textsuperscript{36} Two of these were supplemental grants to existing operations.
two years some countries in the Region have increasingly demanded this kind of support. Borrowers’ interest is also expressed in the policy dialogue with the IDB, as citizen security becomes a priority sector in Country Strategies—as, for instance, in those recently prepared for Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Uruguay.

2.3 The structure and nature of the Bank’s support for citizen security have changed over time. Early IDB projects in citizen security consisted of variants of the “integrated approach,” which attempted to address the social and situational causes of crime and violence through activities that typically spanned different areas of public policy, and were usually located in different line ministries (when provision was centralized) or different state, provincial, or municipal secretaries (when provision was decentralized). This model typically addressed crime prevention by focusing on institutions that primarily work with youth. Over time, Bank projects have become more heterogeneous, and have increasingly included components to address the needs of police, prisons, and other entities of the criminal justice system. This is seen by the percentage of projects which focused on social and situational prevention. Before 2006 9 of 10 projects had a social prevention component. After 2006, 4 of the 9 focused on social prevention. The same holds for components focusing on community prevention, and situational prevention (see Annex for a summarized typology of projects).

2.4 The Bank has articulated the rationale for its participation in citizen security through a series of guidelines and strategies approved over the past two decades. In 1999, IDB approved the first document that presented a motivation for the Bank’s participation in the sector: Report of the Working Group on the Institutional Strategy. The paper did not address citizen security directly, but rather it highlighted the role of weak judicial, legislative, and civil institutions as drivers of inequality and citizen insecurity, and noted the importance of working across sectors to address these issues. In 2003 the Bank approved the first sector strategy that explicitly addressed citizen security: Strategy for the Modernization of the State. The strategy placed rule of law and justice reform as top priorities for the Region by stating that sustainable and equitable growth was impossible without legal predictability and equality before the law for all citizens.

2.5 Both the Ninth General Capital Increase (GCI9) and the Bank’s strategy on institutions have identified citizen security as a priority. GCI9 identified citizen security as one of the most important challenges for the Region and included targets in its results framework. It also called for the Bank to produce a strategy on institutions, which would further specify the nature of the Bank’s commitment to the sector. In 2010 the Bank approved a Strategy for Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare, which moved toward an interpretation of modernization of the state that encompassing a broader definition of

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37 Since 2009, the Bank has approved nine operations for a total of US$306 million.

institutions, but also reaffirmed the importance of citizen security in the Region, and of the institutions that would promote this goal. The strategy indicated that “the Bank will build upon its current operational and knowledge base, in particular the recently-approved operational guidelines for citizen security projects, to provide countries with high value-added financing and technical assistance under an integrated approach that both prevents and confronts violence and insecurity.” In addition, the Social Policy Strategy approved in 2011 set youth-at-risk as a priority for the Bank and highlighted the gender dimension of violence and its causes. The Bank also approved a series of operational guidelines, as well as a conceptual framework for action in the sector.

2.6 There are few evaluations of the Bank’s role in citizen security, and the Bank faces significant knowledge gaps regarding the results the programs and policies that it supported. In 2001 the IDB published a self-assessment of its experience in the area of justice. Although the review did not assess the IDB’s contribution to the different reform initiatives in the Region in the 1990s, it found that the Bank had been active in the sector and was one of the pioneers in promoting justice reform. It also found that projects had suffered from a series of internal and external constraints that affected their implementation. Other reviews of the Bank’s experience came to similar conclusions, highlighting issues such as the long-term nature of judicial reform and the complexity of inter-agency cooperation within governments. There are also few rigorous papers estimating the impacts of these programs. The experience with citizen security has been more recent, and thus far there has only been one published evaluation of the Bank’s work in this area: a 2010 OVE reviewed of 11 projects approved from 1998 to 2009. The review concluded that it was difficult to assess the impacts of the Bank’s projects, since the projects were not designed to collect data on results. The study recommended that the Bank base its future interventions on empirical or theoretical evidence, and ensure that rigorous evaluation mechanisms are in place to enable learning from the experience of these projects.

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39 In particular through the prevalence of males in youth violence, early pregnancies, and gender-based and domestic violence.

40 See Biebesheimer and Payne (2001). Among the issues the authors identified were (i) lack of specialized knowledge (and working in too many sectors), (ii) poor monitoring of implementation and supervision, (iii) implementation issues due to the complexity of coordinating across powers of government, and (iv) working in contexts in which reform for consensus is weak.

41 See Faundez and Angell (2005).

42 For evidence on the case of courts decentralization in Peru see Soares et al (2010); for an assessment of the impacts of improved court efficiency on crime outcomes in Costa Rica see Soares and Sviatschi (2010).

43 See OVE (2010). To provide more evidence on the effectiveness of operations, OVE conducted a series of impact evaluations in Colombia, Jamaica, and Chile, which suggested that the main results were those associated with the conduct of youth and parents.
2.7 In response both to the rapid changes in the Region and to the general absence of evidence on the Bank’s results in citizen security, in 2011 OVE proposed a two-part evaluation of the topic. In 2012 OVE undertook a comparative project evaluation of an older set of citizen security projects, analyzing the factors that facilitated effective implementation (OVE, 2013). The aim was to help prevent operational hindrances during the implementation of future projects, and to facilitate designing such projects so that their results could be evaluated. In particular, the evaluation found that a set of characteristics were associated with project implementation performance, including the level of complexity, the alignment of incentives across line ministries and levels of government, and community participation in project implementation. This 2013 paper will build on the findings of OVE’s first evaluation, reviewing a more recent portfolio of projects, and looking into issues of strategy and comparative advantage.

III. THE PROPOSED EVALUATION STRUCTURE

D. Objectives and Scope

3.1 The objective of OVE’s thematic evaluation on citizen security is to help identify the Bank’s comparative advantage in the sector by analyzing the Bank’s past work, its strengths and weaknesses, and the changing nature of the Region’s needs. The evaluation will build on the operational evaluation undertaken in 2012 on the implementation performance of citizen security projects and will complement it with an analysis of the results and the positioning of the Bank over the past years. It will include an analysis of the evolution of Bank’s strategy and normative framework in the sector and of its operational experience and results (in instances for which this evidence is already available). It will also include a review of the Bank’s resources to prepare and supervise citizen security projects, and of its knowledge, initiatives, and partnerships in citizen security. The evaluation will draw recommendations that can help enhance the Bank’s impact as a strategic partner in citizen security in the Region, given the resource, institutional, and political constraints under which it operates.

3.2 The scope of the evaluation will be citizen security operations prepared and approved by the Bank. As the discussion above has indicated, because violence is multi-causal, many of the activities that the Bank undertakes throughout its portfolio—for example, in education, social protection, and gender and diversity—will likely affect the risk or protective factors that help determine positive and negative violence outcomes. The evaluation will characterize the Bank’s work in these areas; however, it will analyze only the operations approved under the citizen security topic. These include a desk review of all citizen

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44 See OVE (2013).
security operations approved, but will focus analytically on more recent operations.

B. Evaluative Questions

3.3 The main evaluative question for the thematic evaluation is the following: What are the Bank’s strengths and weaknesses for supporting the Region’s efforts to address the sources of insecurity for citizens? To answer this main evaluative question, OVE will analyze three key aspects.

3.4 **Bank’s Vision and Strategy.** Are the Bank’s strategy and vision relevant for addressing the Region’s evolving citizen security challenge?

The previous section described how the treatment of crime and violence has evolved in LAC from criminal justice policies to a broader preventive approach, which depends on institutions and policies across different sectors. The evaluation will look at the Bank’s evolving strategy over time in this public policy context. The evaluation will assess the de facto Bank strategy in the countries in which it has approved operations. It will analyze how the Bank has attempted to address the Region’s challenges, including (i) identifying diagnostics of the crime and violence problematic; (ii) identifying the specific models of intervention the Bank used, (iii) examining how these models fit within the evolving public policies that different countries used to prevent crime and violence, and finally (iv) describing how the Bank’s program complemented the work of other development actors in the sector. The comparison of country needs with respect to the Bank response will help to define the institution’s relevance. The assessment of what countries demand from the Bank, versus other institutions—along with an assessment of the quality of the Bank’s work (see below)—will help to determine its comparative advantage.

3.5 **Bank’s portfolio and recent operational experience.** How has the Bank’s citizen security work contributed to addressing the citizen security challenge in the specific contexts in which it has engaged, and what characteristics of project design have favored or hindered this effort?

OVE will address this question in two ways. First, it will build on the existing evidence on implementation of citizen security projects, reported in OVE’s paper on the implementation of citizen security projects, by further examining the implementation and results of all citizen security projects approved. Second, it will review the characteristics of Bank projects that are associated with the quality of design, again building on the findings of OVE’s earlier evaluation, which identified design issues associated with project diagnostics, complexity, and adequacy of design to local institutional circumstances. The evaluation will identify the degree to which these issues have been addressed in recent operations. For this question, the universe of approved projects will be reviewed. The review will consider both lending and non-lending activities, including the Bank’s work in producing and using knowledge products. This review will only
apply evaluative criteria that are appropriate to the project’s maturity, so that the review of recently approved projects will focus on design, and the review of older projects will consider both design and early evidence of implementation/results.

3.6 **Bank’s resources for project preparation and supervision.** *Are the Bank’s resources adequate for the institution to address client demand?*

OVE will describe the Bank's available resources for citizen security projects in terms of budget, analytical inputs, training, and staff, and analyze how they are allocated in relation to the current portfolio and perceived future needs. This assessment will allow a better understanding of the current financial and technical constraints that the Bank faces in addressing the demand from the Region. The evaluation will also look at the availability of resources for both preparation and supervision of Bank projects.

C. **Methods and Activities**

3.7 **To answer the evaluation questions, the evaluation will use five types of evaluation activities.** To complement each of these activities, OVE will also conduct interviews with Bank staff, country stakeholders, and other development actors.

- **Desk reviews of Bank strategies, frameworks, guidelines, projects, studies, and other instruments.** OVE will conduct desk reviews of Bank documentation, such as sector and thematic strategies, guidelines, and Bank Country Strategies.

- **Desk review of project documentation.** OVE will briefly identify Bank operations that attempt to address crime and violence, to provide a description of what the institution does in the area. OVE will then analytically assess the projects in the areas of citizen security. For this assessment, OVE will develop an instrument to evaluate project diagnostics and design, building on the instruments used in the 2012 OVE review, as well as other Bank instruments (e.g., the Development Effectiveness Matrix). OVE will assess the degree to which projects have been implemented and have produced results. This review will rely exclusively on Bank-produced data and information.

- **Review of resources for project preparation and supervision.** This analysis will include a review of (i) financial resources, including budget allocation for project preparation and supervision, as well as available trust funds; (ii) technical resources, including training opportunities for staff working on citizen security; and (iii) the use of expert consultants with whom the Bank works to respond to specific technical demand from clients. Given that there is no clear benchmark by which to assess the Bank in this regard, the exercise will attempt to draw lessons from contrasting the availability and use of resources across projects and over time.
**Review of the Bank’s knowledge initiatives and partnerships.** Because the Bank’s support to clients includes both lending and nonlending products, OVE will review the production and use of nonlending products to identify (i) what the Bank has produced, (ii) the degree to which these products have complemented its program in specific countries, and (iii) the use that these knowledge products have had. The review will also include a forward-looking view of the Bank’s current initiatives and how they are being used to pursue sector objectives, either formally (e.g., identified in strategy/frameworks/guidelines) or otherwise.

**Country case studies.** In a series of country (or city\(^45\)) case studies, OVE will assess the relevance of the Bank’s work in the context of the specific country’s policies and the development resources available to the country. Tentatively, 6 countries have been identified in which to conduct the case studies, with differences in context and in the types of components, and age and level of execution. The criteria for selection were to have at least one project in:

(i) contexts with different underlying levels of violence; and

(ii) contexts with different types of interventions.

Applying these two criteria to the portfolio, the following matrix of possible case studies is proposed by OVE. Note that since the underlying objective is to assess relevance, both recent and older operations are being considered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mostly social, situational, community prevention.</th>
<th>Higher crime</th>
<th>Medium crime</th>
<th>Lower crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica, El Salvador(^{1,2})</td>
<td><em>Jamaica, El Salvador</em>(^{1,2})</td>
<td><em>Guyana</em></td>
<td><em>Argentina</em>(^{2})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention, but with significant components in police or prisons.</td>
<td><em>Honduras</em>(^{1,2})</td>
<td><em>...</em></td>
<td><em>Costa Rica</em>(^{1,2})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{1}\) *indicates project approved after 2009.*  
\(^{2}\) *indicates project less than 20% disbursed*

### IV. TIMELINE AND STAFFING

4.1 This study will consist of a final evaluation report and individual country case studies. All deliverables of this evaluation are scheduled to be finished during 2013, and OVE will expect to send the thematic evaluation to the Board in December 2013. The proposed timeline is presented in the table below.

\(^{45}\) In some instances projects focus on a limited number of larger cities. It may thus be useful to concentrate case studies at the city level of intervention, particularly if the public policies supported are mainly subnational.
4.2 The evaluation team consists of Yuri Soares, Chloë Fèvre, Maria Elena Corrales, Carlos Morales, Alayna Tetreault-Rooney, and Paula Buitrago. In addition, consultants will be hired for specific thematic analyses and for the country studies.

**Summary of critical dates for the evaluation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal review meeting on the updated approach paper</td>
<td>May 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Updated approach paper sent to Board</td>
<td>June 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk review of recently approved project designs</td>
<td>May-July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of knowledge, initiatives and partnerships</td>
<td>June-July 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Analysis of normative documents</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviews with IDB staff working on citizen security and country programming</td>
<td>July-August 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missions to countries</td>
<td>July-August 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of resources</td>
<td>July-August 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation first draft writing</td>
<td>September 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal review</td>
<td>October 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submission of the thematic evaluation to Management for comments</td>
<td>November 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review meeting</td>
<td>November 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of the thematic evaluation to the Board</td>
<td>December 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


Cano, Ignacio and Nilton Santos. 2001. Violência letal, renda e desigualdade social no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro. 7 Letras,. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil


Kahn, Tulio. 2007. “Por que a criminalidade está em queda em São Paulo?” Mimeo.


## ANNEX A: IDB CITIZEN SECURITY PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Approval Year</th>
<th>Amount (million USD)</th>
<th>% Disbursed</th>
<th>Typology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ES-L1025| Violence Prevention Strategy Comprehensive Support Program           | 2012          | 45.0                 | 0.0%        | Situational and social prevention  
Justice System strengthening  
Social rehabilitation                                                                 |
| HO-L1063| Program of Support for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Civic Coexistence | 2012          | 66.4                 | 1.1%        | Police strengthening  
Strengthening the criminal investigation system  
Strengthening of community security (victim assistance centers and observatories)  
Information and analysis systems                                                                 |
| CR-L1031| Violence Prevention and Social Inclusion Promotion Program           | 2011          | 132.4                | 1.4%        | Social prevention  
Justice System strengthening  
Police reform (or strengthening)  
Information and analysis systems on citizen security  
Social Rehabilitation                                                                 |
| EC-L1098| Citizen Sec. Prog: Strength. Pol. Effect. thru Improve. in Manage. & Crim. Info | 2011          | 10.0                 | 21.0%       | Information systems, production and use of data on violence  
Police reform (new protocols based on evidence)                                                                 |
| BL-L1014| Community Action for Public Safety                                   | 2010          | 5.0                  | 8.0%        | Social prevention  
Social rehabilitation  
Information and analysis systems on CS                                                                 |
| JA-L1009| Citizen Security and Justice Programme II                            | 2009          | 22.2                 | 98.7%       | Situational and social prevention  
Justice System strengthening  
Community engagement and participation  
Information and analysis systems on citizen security                                                                 |
| AR-L1074| Citizen Security and Inclusion Program                               | 2009          | 25.0                 | 2.4%        | Social prevention  
Police strengthening  
Information and analysis systems                                                                 |
| TT-L1003| Citizen Security Program                                             | 2008          | 24.5                 | 7.0%        | Social prevention  
Situational prevention  
Information systems, production and use of data on violence  
Police strengthening                                                                 |
| PN-L1003| Comprehensive Security Program                                       | 2006          | 22.7                 | 55.5%       | Social prevention  
Justice System strengthening  
Police strengthening  
Information and analysis systems on CS                                                                 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Impact</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GY0071</td>
<td>Citizen Security</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
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<td>Police strengthening</td>
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<td>Justice System strengthening</td>
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<td>Social prevention</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Community engagement and participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NI-0168</td>
<td>Citizenship Security Program</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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<td>Social prevention</td>
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<td>Police strengthening</td>
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<td>Information and analysis systems</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other (social communication campaigns)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HO-0205</td>
<td>Sula Valley Citizenship Security</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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<td>Community engagement and participation</td>
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<td>Social Prevention</td>
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<td>Police or strengthening</td>
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<td>Information and analysis systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH0178</td>
<td>Innovation Program for a safer Chile</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<td>Community engagement and participation</td>
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<td>JA-0105</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>Others (attitudinal change campaigns)</td>
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<td>VE-0057</td>
<td>Support Reform Criminal Justice System</td>
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<td>UR-0118</td>
<td>Citizens Safety Prevention of Violence &amp; Delinquency</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>Information systems on CS</td>
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<td>Other (public information campaigns)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO0213</td>
<td>Support for peaceful coexistence and citizen security</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>Situational prevention</td>
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<td>Information systems, production and use of data on violence</td>
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<td>ADR/Conciliation, houses of justice</td>
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<td>Police strengthening</td>
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